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Summary 
Over the past decade technology has changed at a rapid pace, giving rise to several new 
technology-based firms (TBFs). Scholars have long studied how and why some firms 
survive and prosper while others fail to persist. In order to survive, TBFs need to 
constantly innovate in an environment characterized by fast changes. To gain 
competitive advantage, firms primarily need to create and maintain value (Conner, 
1991; Ireland et al. 2003). Value creation is crucial for TBFs, initially to survive and later 
to grow. Despite the development of the concept of value creation in management and 
organization literature, questions remain on the subjective nature of value realized for 
diverse target users (Lepak et al., 2007). Existing research has conferred several factors 
that enhance the total value created by the firm, such as new products and services, 
virtuous ecosystems, talent attraction, resource base, complementary and leveraging 
technologies etc. (Amit and Zott, 2001; Herskovits et al., 2003). However, the primary 
source of value creation remains the stock of resources that a firm possesses (Barney, 
1991). Scholars further claim that firms need to acquire, develop, incorporate and 
leverage resources in order to create value (Sirmon et al., 2007). This issue of value 
creation is of primary importance for new and young TBFs since they operate in 
technological markets characterized by high uncertainty. In absence of easy access to 
technological and social capital resources, TBFs find it difficult to innovate and create 
value. In my doctoral dissertation, I conduct three studies in TBFs to explain how TBFs 
manage technological and social capital resources to create value by using diverse 
mechanisms-namely bricolage, ecosystems and business models.    
The first study proceeds from the resource based view which underlines the importance 
of resources for value creation. However, not all firms, particularly new TBFs, have easy 
access to resources. Baker and Nelson (2005) present Levi-Strauss’ (1966) concept of 
bricolage- “making do with what is at hand”- as a mechanism to address resource 
scarcity. Using bricolage, firms are able to create something from nothing by exploring 
resources which are overlooked or rejected by other firms. I propose freely available 
open source software (OSS) as a technological and social capital resource for bricolage 
in resource-constrained TBFs. Using the strategic lens of ambidexterity (March, 1991), I 
study how OSS enables bricolage in TBFs subject to resource scarcity within the firm. A 
detailed case study approach reveals that the degree of bricolage using OSS is contingent 
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upon the level of resource scarcity within the firm. The study further examines the 
explorative and exploitative activities during the bricolage process. First, a firm with 
high resource constraints strongly follows the exploitation process and largely benefits 
from the software and its user community for formulating their value proposition and 
reaching their customers. Second, a firm with moderate resource constraints gains 
speed and flexibility in serving customers through experimentation with OSS by 
balancing exploration and exploitation. Third, a firm with low resource constraints 
largely explores the advantage of OSS bricolage to gain credibility and showcase their 
technological innovation internally to their higher management. The study 
demonstrates that bricolage using OSS leads to higher value creation in resource-
constrained firms that effectively balance exploration and exploitation. 
The second study investigates whether the presence of knowledge and business 
ecosystems leads to value creation in young TBFs in Flanders. Innovative start-ups which 
are located in geographical hotspots, usually centered on universities and public 
research organizations are proved to be in a beneficial position. These hotspots or 
knowledge ecosystems play a central role in technological innovation in firms (Jaffe, 
1986; Almeida & Kogut, 1999). On the other hand, management literature focusses on 
business ecosystems as sources of competitive advantage for firms (Moore, 1996). A 
business ecosystem is seen as a group of companies which simultaneously create value 
by combining their skills and assets. Following the success of Silicon Valley and the 
Boston area, practitioners as well as researchers have implicitly assumed that a business 
ecosystem is a direct consequence of a knowledge ecosystem. However, this question 
was never addressed in research. To address the co-existence of a knowledge and 
business ecosystem, I empirically analyze a database of 138 innovative start-ups in the 
region of Flanders, founded between 2006-2010. A dense knowledge ecosystem in 
Flanders is observed, with two universities and three public research organizations 
playing a central role. The financial ecosystem is also prevalent with public investors at 
the top. Surprisingly enough, a business ecosystem is absent in Flanders. While several 
dyads exist, the lack of central players confirms the absence of a business ecosystem. 
The study further investigates whether these ecosystems contribute to the innovative 
performance and survival of TBFs. Analysis shows that being close to the most central 
organizations in the knowledge ecosystem has a positive impact on the innovation 
output of the focal firm. Surprisingly, receiving finance from the more central financial 
13 
 
players in the Flemish network has a negative impact on the venture’s innovation 
output. This indicates that these investors are mainly interested in exploiting the 
technology rather than further developing the technology portfolios. The business 
ecosystem literature proposes firm survival as the main performance indicator, 
especially for innovative start-ups as they operate in markets not yet clearly developed. 
Interestingly, working together with central partners in the knowledge ecosystem does 
not impact the survival rate of the innovative start-ups. This finding lends further 
supports to the hypothesis that a knowledge ecosystem does not automatically lead to a 
business ecosystem. 
The final study departs from the distinguished work of Amit and Zott (2001) which 
proposes the business model construct as a unifying analysis that captures value 
creation generated from multiple sources. Open source software (OSS) has long been 
associated with the concept of ‘free’ and consequently ‘no revenues’ or ‘no value’. 
Despite successful OSS companies, research focused on OSS strategies in comparison to 
closed source software (CSS) is still lacking. Previous studies have compared CSS and 
OSS firms based on innovativeness, design structure or pricing strategy. A comparison of 
OSS and CSS firms based on their business model, specific to one sector, is under-
researched in management literature. Hence, I depart from the OSS literature (Hecker, 
1999; Lerner & Tirole, 2002) and use the business model construct to study how OSS 
and CSS firms differ. I follow the definition of Teece (2010), aligning it with definition of 
Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010), to define a business model as a combination of three 
elements: value creation- the value proposition the company offers on the market, value 
delivery- how the value is delivered to the customer, and value capture- the financial 
aspects, namely the revenue and cost model. Focusing on a single industry of content 
management systems (CMS), 30 qualitative interviews with the management of top CMS 
companies and founders of community OS CMS were conducted.  My analysis shows that 
CSS companies excel in their innovative value delivery and value capture mechanisms, 
while OSS companies strongly compete on account of their extrinsic network value, 
defined by their large installed base. Owing to their popularity among individuals, 
community OSS enjoy higher social value but low economic value for the community. 
However, OSS community affiliated businesses benefit from the opportunity space and 
installed base created by OSS communities. As a result, they pose a serious challenge to 
OSS and CSS companies.  
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The three studies underline the importance of using and developing both technological 
and social capital resources for value creation. Not only does the triad of bricolage, the 
ecosystem and the business model help the TBFs in pursuing resources, it also facilitates 
easy adaption of their product development processes contingent on industry 
expectations in order to innovate and create value for the organization. 
These three studies make a number of significant contributions to the entrepreneurship 
and management literature. The first study primarily contributes to literature on 
bricolage by discussing the heterogeneity of contexts in which bricolage can occur in 
firms, and by revealing a link between bricolage and ambidexterity. The second study 
makes a significant contribution to the literature on ecosystems by arguing that while a 
successful knowledge ecosystem significantly impacts firm performance, it does not 
necessarily translate into a business ecosystem. The last study strengthens the literature 
on OSS by highlighting the opportunity space provided by OSS enriched by the huge 
community. In addition to literature contributions, this research offers several practical 
implications for entrepreneurs, investors and policy makers. Policy makers clearly hold 
the potential to boost the regional innovation systems in Flanders by playing a major 
role in developing business ecosystems. For entrepreneurs or managers, my research 
suggests a thorough analysis of OSS before adoption since OSS is certainly not a ‘one size 
fits all’ product. Lastly, the study suggests venture capitalists to look beyond the revenue 
model and open up for investments in (the large installed base of) OSS.   
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1 Introduction 
Over the past decade technology has changed at a rapid pace, giving rise to several new 
technology-based firms (TBFs). Scholars have long studied how and why some firms 
survive and prosper while others fail to persist. In order to survive, TBFs need to 
constantly innovate in an environment characterized by fast changes in technology, 
customers and competition (Danneels, 2002). To gain competitive advantage, firms 
primarily need to create and maintain value (Conner, 1991; Collis and Montgomery, 
1998; Ireland et al., 2003). Schumpeter (1934) established the theory of economic 
development and new value creation through the process of technological change and 
innovation. Several authors have discussed the relation between strategies of value 
creation and the likelihood of profiting from innovation (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003b; 
Teece, 2005; Jacobides et al., 2006). This doctoral dissertation recognizes the 
importance assigned to value creation in management literature, and develops it further 
with three studies on value creation in TBFs.  
In this introductory chapter, I begin by presenting the importance of value creation and 
sources of value creation on which I base the three studies of my doctoral dissertation. 
In the following section I put forward my research questions of the three studies. The 
organization of the dissertation is explained in the final section.   
1.1 Importance of Value Creation 
Value creation is a central concept in management and organization literature. Several 
scholars have discussed what value creation is and how it can be achieved at both the 
individual level as well as the organizational level, however not reaching a consensus on 
the concept of value creation (Lepak et al., 2007). Seth (1990) defines value creation as 
“a process which involves taking strategic actions to make optimal use of firm’s 
productive resources in the presence of environmental constraints and opportunities”. 
Definitions suggest that value creation is subjective and depends on the relative value 
realized by several target users (Lepak et al., 2007). Strategic management and 
entrepreneurship research have discussed value creation for various target users such 
as organizations (Porter, 1985), stakeholders (Post et al., 2002), customers (Priem, 
2007), employees (Wright et al., 2001) as well as society as a whole (Lee et al., 2007).  
 
28 
 
Studies with an organization as target user of value creation claim that firms create 
value by new technologies, new products and services, new raw material and inventive 
methods of doing things. Invention and innovation are thus central to an organization in 
creating value. Furthermore, scholars claim that firms are more likely to innovate in 
uncertain environments (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997), in resource-constrained 
environments (Van de Ven, et al., 1989), when they have established social networks 
(Smith et al., 2005), and when they possess the capacity to combine and exchange 
knowledge (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Existing research has conferred several 
factors that enhance the total value created by the firm, also referred to as value drivers, 
such as new products and services, virtuous ecosystems, talent attraction, resource base, 
complementary and leveraging technologies etc. (Amit and Zott, 2001; Herskovits et al., 
2003).  
Although diverse value drivers have been discussed in management literature, the 
concept of value creation finds its roots in the resource-based view of a firm (Barney, 
1991) which suggests possession of resources as a basis of value creation. While unique 
and valuable resources may provide competitive advantage to the firm, they do not 
guarantee value creation (Barney and Arikan, 2001). Scholars argue that in order to 
realize value, firms need to manage their resources in an optimal way. Priem and 
colleagues (2001) reveal gaps in management literature on theoretical studies to explain 
how firms transform resources to create value. However, the processes by which firms 
acquire, develop, incorporate and leverage resources to create and maintain value are 
not well understood. To clarify the link between the management of resources and the 
creation of value, scholars have studied the effects of the firm’s external environment on 
managing resources (Sirmon et al., 2007). The noteworthy theoretical work by Sirmon 
and colleagues (2007) opens avenues for further empirical research on the management 
of resources and the creation of value.  
This research gap in the management of resources for value creation is the outset for 
this doctoral dissertation. Few studies dealing with value creation for organizations 
have focused on new and young TBFs. As for established firms, resources are equally 
important for new and young TBFs. This issue of value creation is very important in hi-
tech entrepreneurship, since many firms start up but do not create any value and never 
make it past the start-up stage. These firms operate in technological markets which are 
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characterized by high uncertainty. In such an environment, entrepreneurs and managers 
find it difficult to develop, manage and deploy resources in the most favorable way by 
virtue of time pressure. More often than not, these TBFs do not possess valuable 
resources, and neither are they strongly connected in the industry network, which 
makes it difficult for them to innovate. Hence, value creation is crucial for the 
development of TBFs as it helps the firm in building a strong reputation (Sanchez and 
Sottorio, 2007). Within management research, scholars have already studied the 
acquisition and deployment of certain types of resources in value creation- namely 
human capital resources (Huselid, 1995; Lepak and Snell, 1999; Hatch and Dyer, 2004) 
and financial resources (Chebat et al., 1994; Kang, 2000). Entrepreneurs manage 
financial resources by bootstrapping (Winborg and Landstrom, 2001; Smith, 2009). 
However, technological and social capital resources, which have a greater impact on 
value creation in uncertain environments, are more difficult to develop and manage. In 
my doctoral dissertation, I implement three studies in TBFs to explain how TBFs 
acquire, develop, incorporate and leverage technological and social capital resources 
using diverse mechanisms- namely bricolage, ecosystems and business models.   
1.2 Sources of Value Creation 
My first study departs from the resource-based view of the firm (RBV). RBV suggests 
that complimentary and specialized resources may lead to value creation (Penrose, 
1959; Barney, 1991) through the development of competitive advantage (Ireland et al., 
2003; Sirmon et al., 2007). Resources that are rare and lack substitutes provide a 
superior edge to the firm. But not all firms have easy access to resources which results in 
firms following ‘bricolage’- using resources at hand (Baker and Nelson, 2005). In 
resource-constrained environments, where firms need to make do with resources that 
are available, finding rare and valuable resources can pose a challenge. Scholars claim 
that the combination and the exchange of resources also lead to value creation (Moran 
and Ghoshal, 1996). I argue that embracing freely available technological resources and 
incorporating them in novel ways within the firm can also assist value creation in firms. 
I propose bricolage using the freely available open source Software (OSS) as a 
technological resource to facilitate the innovation process for value creation in TBFs.  
Strategic networks- the important ties between participating firms- have been 
researched in literature as must-haves for competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
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Gulati et al., 2000). Not only do these networks provide access to information, markets 
and technology, they also facilitate knowledge sharing (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). In 
regional innovation systems, convergence of individual strategic networks of firms can 
lead to the creation of value networks (Normann and Ramirez, 1993; Eisenhardt and 
Galunic, 2000). In my second study, I advance from the literature on regional innovation 
systems to study ecosystems as a source of value creation (Adner and Kapoor, 2010) in 
the region of Flanders in Belgium. One of the key sources of value creation is the 
facilitation of the innovation process in individual companies (van der Borgh et al., 
2012). I suggest knowledge ecosystems as a technological resource and a facilitator of 
the innovation process within innovative start-ups in Flanders. 
In the third study, I depart from the distinguished work of Amit and Zott (2001) on value 
creation. Amit and Zott (2001) propose the business model construct as a unifying 
analysis that captures value creation generated from multiple sources. They observe a 
business model as a critical source of value creation not only for the firm, but also for its 
suppliers, partners and customers. I use the business model construct to explore value 
creation in OSS firms. While practitioners have long associated open source (OS) with 
‘free’ or ‘no revenues’, I argue that the value in OS lies in the social capital offered by the 
community and opening up the source code can facilitate the creation of an innovation 
community which is another source of value creation (van der Borgh et al., 2012). 
1.3 Research Questions 
In the first study, I focus on the role of technological resources, and specifically OSS, in 
enabling bricolage in the product or service development.  This is an important omission 
in contexts where technological resources are central to the value proposition of the 
firm. Value is created by balancing the level of exploration and exploitation (O’Reilly and 
Tushman, 2008; Teece, 2007; Raisch et al., 2009) that occurs during the bricolage 
process in firms. Remarkably the potential linkages between bricolage and exploration, 
and bricolage and exploitation are yet to be studied. Therefore, I address the following 
research questions: How does OSS enable bricolage in firms, and how do organizations 
confronted with resource constraints embrace the opportunity provided by OSS? To 
what extent is the bricolage process contingent on the level of resource scarcity? Does 
the explorative or exploitative nature of OSS bricolage allow firms to adapt and change 
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in order to create value through technological innovation? I use a case study approach to 
address these research questions. 
The second study discusses value creation in regional innovation systems. A stream of 
management research suggests several advantages for innovative start-ups located in 
dense knowledge ecosystems centered on universities and public research organizations 
(Pouder and St John, 1996; Van Looy et al., 2003). In contrast, strategic management 
literature focuses on business ecosystems as sources of competitive advantage for 
individual companies (Iansiti and Levien, 2004). There is a growing consensus that 
business ecosystems provide entrepreneurial firms with resources and information to 
navigate in a constantly changing competitive environment (Zahra and Nambisan, 
2012). Quite often, it is implicitly assumed that business ecosystems are the automatic 
consequence of setting up a knowledge ecosystem. In this study, I explore the question 
of co-existence of knowledge and business ecosystems, or in other words, the existence 
of a relation between knowledge ecosystems and business ecosystems. Based on a 
unique hand-collected database of 138 innovative start-ups in the region of Flanders, I 
analyze the knowledge ecosystem, the business ecosystem and the financial support 
network to study their impact on firm performance and survival.   
In the third study, I analyze the role of business models in creating value for the firm.  
Recent studies have identified the business model as a source of competitive advantage 
for the firm, which contributes to the firm’s survival and performance (Teece, 2010; 
George and Bock, 2011). While OS has been widely accepted as a successful 
development process in the software industry, the business models in OS still remain 
unclear. Questions remain as to how companies profit from providing OSS at no cost. 
Therefore, in this study, I aim to shed light on strategies of OS companies by exploring 
their business models in depth. I compare the business models of OSS and closed source 
software (CSS) companies using value creation, value delivery and value capture as 
three components of their business model. Using in-depth interview data, the study 
addresses the following research questions: How do business models of OSS and CSS 
companies differ? How do these OSS and CSS companies adapt their business models in 
response to industry trends?  
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1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
The current chapter is the introduction of the doctoral dissertation. In the second 
chapter, I present my first study on value creation in TBFs through bricolage. In that 
study, I introduce exploration-exploitation as a strategic lens to study bricolage 
processes using OSS as a technological resource in resource-constrained firms. Chapter 
3 of this dissertation includes my second study on value creation in ecosystems. I draw 
on the knowledge ecosystem, the business ecosystem and the financial support network 
in Flanders to study their impact on firm performance. In chapter 4, I compare business 
models of OSS and CSS companies. Using qualitative data on a single domain of content 
management systems, I analyze business models of OSS companies in their value 
creation, value delivery and value capture aspects. Finally, I highlight and summarize the 
main findings from the three studies in the dissertation in Chapter 5. I also present the 
implications for management science and practice and discuss the limitations of these 
studies, which indicate directions for future research. 
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2 Exploration, Exploitation and Bricolage: Technological 
Innovation Using Open Source Software 
 
ABSTRACT 
Technological resources have been an important source of innovation in companies. 
They play a key role in the development of new products and services. However, the 
upfront investment in technological resources to enable the development of new 
products and services can be quite high. We argue that the advent of open source 
software (OSS) creates an opportunity space for companies to build prototypes at a low 
cost and test their ideas in the market. Little is known about how OSS plays a role in 
allowing these firms to enhance product development. Using qualitative case studies, the 
study sheds light on how OSS acts as a bricolage mechanism, a term used in the 
entrepreneurship literature to refer to low-cost solutions by using resources available at 
hand, for technological innovation in firms. We further apply the strategic lens of 
exploration-exploitation to investigate OSS bricolage processes in firms contingent on 
the level of resource scarcity.  
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2.1 Introduction 
Most firms face substantial resource constraints during firm creation and growth 
(Shepherd et al., 2000). Several authors have studied resource constraints such as lack 
of finance (Berchicci and Hulsink, 2006), physical resources constraints (Garud and 
Karnoe, 2003) and/or technological resources constraints (Stuart et al., 1999). Firms 
which are resource constrained are unable to make the necessary upfront investments 
in technical resources to develop new products and services. 
Baker and Nelson (2005) present Levi-Strauss’ (1966) concept of bricolage- “making do 
with what is at hand” as a mechanism to address resource scarcity. Using bricolage, firms 
are able to create something from nothing by exploring resources which are overlooked 
or rejected by other firms (Baker and Nelson, 2005). Firms in resource-poor 
environments typically engage in bricolage by using resources at hand, or by combining 
resources for new purposes.  
Resources at hand typically include personal knowledge and capabilities, initial 
investment and personal network. However, technological resources may also play an 
important role in bricolage. In industries where technological resources are 
indispensable, considerable investments in the novelty and protection are required in 
order to access technological resources. A cheaper option for firms is to invest time in 
developing technology in-house using their technical knowledge and know-how. Open 
source software1 (OSS) presents an emerging low-cost alternative to access technology 
quickly. Free availability of source code, zero cost and access to a knowledgeable 
community are the major features of OSS which attract firms to adopt OSS (Fitzgerald, 
2006). OSS acts as an opportunity space for firms to experiment and manage innovation 
with technological resources. Moreover, OSS presents several networking opportunities 
for individuals and firms enabling ‘network bricolage’ (Baker et al., 2003). 
The literature has so far largely ignored the role of technological resources, and 
specifically OSS, to enable bricolage in the product or service development process. This 
is an important omission in contexts where technological resources are central to the 
                                                        
1 For better readability, the term open source will be used throughout this article, but the study also refers 
to Libre and Free software, which shares the same technical definition, but is driven by 
philosophical/moral considerations on freedom rather than technical arguments: see 
http://www.gnu.org/philiosophy/free-sw.html 
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value proposition of the firm. The value created by the firm is influenced by the way in 
which specific processes are performed, and is determined by a healthy balance 
between the ‘exploration’ of new capabilities and ‘exploitation’ of existing resources 
(March, 1991; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008; Raisch et al., 2009) that occurs during the 
bricolage process in firms. In this article, therefore, we address the following research 
question: How do organizations confronted with resource constraints, embrace the 
opportunity provided by OSS? Does the explorative or exploitative nature of OSS 
bricolage process allow firms to adapt and create value and lead to technological 
innovation?  
Specifically, based on three case studies, we observe how OSS facilitates technological 
innovation in firms. When considering OSS bricolage, ‘material at hand’ is typically the 
software and the network or the community behind the software. Our cases encompass 
three contexts. First, a firm with high resource constraints strongly follows the 
exploitation process and largely benefits from the software and community for 
formulating their value proposition and reaching their customers. Second, a firm with 
moderate resource constraints gains speed and flexibility in serving customers through 
experimentation with OSS by striking a balance between exploration and exploitation. 
Third, a firm with low resource constraints largely explores the advantage of OSS 
bricolage to gain credibility and showcase their technological innovation internally to 
their higher management. 
We contribute to the general bricolage literature and the broader emerging resource 
orchestration literature, by providing insights into how bricolage can be used to access 
technological resources in rapidly changing resource-constrained environments. We 
also contribute to the OSS literature by highlighting the heterogeneity of the contexts 
where it can be applied in technological firms with different resource structure. 
Moreover, we extend our understanding of the organizational ambidexterity literature 
and apply the exploration-exploitation framework to investigate OSS bricolage 
processes.  
The article is structured as follows. In the following section we outline the conceptual 
background on bricolage, OSS adoption and the exploration-exploitation construct. We 
proceed to analyze the three case studies to examine how OSS as a technological 
resource facilitates value creation and innovation through experimentation and 
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bricolage in firms facing different levels of resource scarcity. Finally we reflect on the 
findings and discuss the implications and conclusions. 
2.2 Theoretical Background 
2.2.1 The Concept of Bricolage 
The availability of resources presents firms with opportunities to experiment and create 
value for the firm. Demand and supply gaps lead to opportunity creation, while access to 
resources confines the choice of opportunities (Thakur, 1999). Availability of resources 
is highly valuable to young and nascent ventures (Hitt et al., 2001), initially to survive 
and later to grow (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003; Hoegl et al., 2008). However, financial, 
technical and human resources are often not available when required (Bruderl et al., 
1992). When entrepreneurs discover opportunities and are challenged with resource 
scarcity, they often make decisions using bricolage (Baker and Nelson, 2005). Bricolage 
allows these young and nascent ventures to deal with routine problems, and is seen to 
have a positive effect on innovation in nascent and young firms (Anderson, 2008; 
Senyard et al., 2011).  
Bricolage2 as a process of resource use and development is conspicuous in firms 
characterized by resource-poor environments (Baker and Nelson, 2005). Despite these 
resource constraints, some ventures survive by solving problems and developing 
opportunities (Mahoney and Michael, 2005). Levi-Strauss (1966) suggested bricolage as 
a mechanism for opportunity creation by using resources at hand, recombining 
resources for new purposes, and making do with existing resources. Previous studies on 
bricolage in SMEs and large organizations have limited its role in facilitating innovation. 
Few authors have studied the use of bricolage in ICT firms to develop new products or 
services (Ciborra, 2002; Ferneley and Bell, 2006). Ferneley and Bell (2006) studied the 
concept of bricolage to integrate business and IT innovation in SMEs. Scholars suggest 
                                                        
2 While bricolage discusses opportunity identification, several other theories describe entrepreneurial 
action. Effectuation, the way of thinking that serves entrepreneurs in the processes of opportunity 
identification and new venture generation (Sarasvathy, 2001) is a popular theory which argues the 
importance of resources in the start-up phase. In line with the concept of bricolage, effectuation also 
discusses the process of using the available resources. However, these two theories have developed 
independently (Fisher, 2012). While both theories talk about the use of available resources, effectuation is 
more relevant for new and uncertain environments while bricolage is effective in resource poor 
environments. Effectuation also enables the entrepreneurs to interpret the resources and clearly 
predefine the goals, while bricolage allows the bricoleur to take a pre-defined goal and construct the 
resources in the direction of the goal (Baker and Nelson, 2005). 
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that SMEs are recognized for their flexibility and ability to respond rapidly to a changing 
environment, but they are reluctant to adopt information systems, primarily due to lack 
of strategic planning (Levy et al., 2001) and financial constraints (Foong, 1999). 
Similarly, multi-national corporations face a number of hurdles which prevents them 
from reaching their full potential, uncertainty avoidance being the key hurdle (Halme et 
al., 2012). Halme and colleagues introduced the term intrapreneurial bricolage as 
entrepreneurial activity within a large organization, characterized by creative bundling 
of resources, in contexts of resource scarcity (Halme et al., 2012). In order to bricolage, 
the internal bricoleur, the person who engages in bricolage within an organization, 
needs organizational space to experiment and innovate (Ferneley and Bell, 2006). For 
innovation to occur, the internal bricoleur needs access to technology, which managers 
are often reluctant to invest in.  
While the role of bricolage in innovation has been studied, there still exists uncertainty 
related to the resource configuration of firms engaging in bricolage. Several authors 
have addressed technological resources as key success factors in high-technology 
industries (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Zahra, 1996; Autio et al., 1997). Not only do 
technological resources help in formulating the value proposition in the technology-
based firms, they also play a major role in understanding and evaluating the commercial 
potential of technological advances (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Research shows that 
technological knowledge resources impact firm performance (Lee et al., 2001; Clarysse 
et al., 2011) and that the quality and diversity of technological resources leads to 
breakthrough innovation (Srivastava and Gnyawali, 2011). We argue that the type of 
resource plays a key role in value creation and is a primary source of innovation. We 
further debate that the availability of technological resources can shape the value 
proposition of the firm, which in turn can facilitate innovation through bricolage.  
2.2.2 Open Source Software 
The term open source (OS) has its roots in the ICT industry. In the technology sector, 
ventures need to keep up with the rapid rate of technological evolution, more so in the 
ICT industry. Technological resources in ICT industry are protected by intellectual 
property rights in the form of patents and copyrights with a view to gain market share 
and obtain investments from venture capitalists (Bell and McNamara, 1991). Firms in 
resource-scarce environments either need to buy these technological resources 
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(software, system, platform, etc.) or need to reinvent the wheel and develop the 
technology in-house. With the rapid changes in the ICT industry, firms find it difficult to 
invest time and money in the development of technological resources. OS provides a 
solution for firms to use technology as a resource at hand, and manage innovation 
through bricolage. 
Open source has been widely accepted as a collaborative development process in the 
software industry. OSS is a software available in source code form, which can be 
modified by users, and can be redistributed freely even in a modified form without 
paying the original developers (Riehle, 2009). Development is undertaken by people 
dispersed all over the world, forming a virtual community via the Internet (Hertel et al., 
2003). Prior literature on OSS encompasses motivations and contributions to OSS (e.g. 
Lerner and Tirole, 2002; von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003), 
governance and organization of OSS (e.g. van Krogh et al., 2003; Shah, 2006; Lakhani and 
von Hippel, 2003) and competitive dynamics of OSS (e.g. Bonaccorsi et al., 2006; 
Economides and Katsamakas, 2006),  
Research on OSS suggests that OSS drives innovation and spurs novel business models 
(von Krogh and von Hippel, 2006; Ebert, 2007). Absence of pricing systems, formal 
hierarchies and alliance agreements promote innovation with OSS (Osterloh and Rota, 
2007). Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2006) observed that a key motivation for OSS 
entrepreneurial ventures to collaborate with OSS communities is that it allows small and 
new firms to be innovative. With a robust, high-quality, feature-rich software, and a 
strong community of developers creating and testing the software, OSS acts as an 
important source of opportunity for small and large firms. OSS has surpassed the notion 
of being free software developed by ‘techies’, and is being extensively embraced by 
organizations owing to its ‘high quality at zero cost’ facet. Not only individuals and SMEs, 
but also large corporations and government organizations show a strong increase in 
adopting OSS (Hauge et al., 2010). Deploying OSS products in their operation 
environment as end users has been the most common manner of organizational 
adoption of OSS (Fitzgerald and Kenny, 2004; Ven et al., 2008). Hague and colleagues 
argue that adopting OSS is more than simply using OSS products (Hauge et al., 2010). 
Integrating OSS components into own software is another popular way of organizational 
adoption of OSS (Ajila and Wu, 2007; Ven and Mannaert, 2008). Participating in OSS 
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development, providing own OSS products, and using OSS development practices within 
the organization are other ways in which organizations adopt OSS (Hauge et al., 2010).  
These studies on OSS adoption primarily focus on the collaboration process within the 
communities and its impact on firm performance. However OSS as an opportunity space 
and as a technological resource that drives value creation and technological innovation 
tends to be sidelined in existing literature.  
2.2.2.1 OSS Bricolage in firms 
The concepts of OSS and bricolage have been previously discussed by Feller and 
Fitzgerald (2002). Feller and Fitzgerald (2002) addressed the approach of collaborative 
development in OSS communities, where developers and users bring together their 
knowledge resources to develop solutions rapidly. The use of these communities 
enables a process of bricolage. Scholars have observed communities of users and 
developers interacting via the Internet to be valuable innovation inputs (Hargrave and 
Van de Ven, 2006; Piva et al., 2012). Proprietary firms are promoting employees to 
contribute to OSS in order to insource technical knowledge (Colombo et al., 2013). 
Participation and/or collaboration with an OSS community can facilitate bricolage in 
firms. We define OSS bricolage as “making use of OS software or OS platform and the OS 
community as materials at hand”. OSS bricolage may apply to ventures dependent on the 
ICT industry. Businesses in the ICT sector are more likely to adopt OSS owing to the 
familiarity with the concept. In contrast, industries such as biotech, pharmaceuticals and 
manufacturing are less likely to engage in OSS bricolage due to the high importance 
assigned to intellectual property rights.  
Technology and technological services are the key resources in the ICT sector (Melville 
et al., 2004). While technology can be patented, the CSS code is primarily protected by 
copyright. On the contrary, OSS code is protected by copyleft which makes it easily 
available for use under one of the FOSS (Free or OSS) licenses. The free availability of 
software presents the technical resource to build up the value proposition. Rather than 
buying expensive licenses on copyright protected software, OSS allows entrepreneurs to 
experiment and build products and services with freely available software code. 
Founders of micro firms and developers in large firms can syndicate their technical 
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knowledge and expertise to work further on the freely available OSS to strengthen and 
expand their own product and service portfolio.  
Several researchers have validated the importance of networks and partnerships for 
firm performance (Gabbay and Leenders, 1999; Elfring and Hulsink, 2003). Social capital 
allows firm to build up their resource base with the help of other partners. For young 
and small firms, the social capital resources provide access to information, technical 
knowledge, market know-how and complementary resources (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven 1996; Hitt et al., 2001). The OSS community consists not only of the core 
developers of the software, but also testers, end users and vendors of the software. 
Owing to their community participation, members tend to know the working of the 
software. As a result, most of the community members take a step further to set up start-
ups based on OSS by integrating the freely available software within their products and 
services (Gruber and Henkel, 2006). The community itself acts as the major social capital 
for these ventures. Moreover, these firms partner with other OSS-based firms in order to 
reach their end customer. The community not only helps with the development and the 
testing of the software, it can also act as a primary marketing and distribution tool for 
these OSS-based firms. Established firms and multinational organizations often allow 
their developers to work on the development of OSS in order to build up their 
knowledge and professional network (Dahlander and Magnusson, 2008).   
Limited by financial and human resources, firms balance their internal R&D efforts by 
networking intensively with external third parties that are likely to contribute valuable 
knowledge and competences (Stuart and Sorenson, 2007). With fairly addressable 
human and financial resources, entrepreneurial ventures regard OSS primarily as a 
technological and social capital resource during bricolage. For firms with lower resource 
constraints, OSS as a technical resource can provide them with a platform to expand 
their value proposition. Moreover, OSS bricolage in these organizations can pave the 
way for more resources that are a necessity for higher levels of innovation (Rothaermel 
and Deeds, 2006). In this study, we present OSS as a key technological and social capital 
resource in bricolage process in firms. 
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2.2.3 Exploration and Exploitation  
The terms exploration and exploitation have their roots in the vast literature on 
organizational ambidexterity, the premise of striking a balance between the exploitation 
of existing resources and exploration of new capabilities which has gained immense 
attention in management literature since the seminal work of March (1991). The 
primary argument of organizational ambidexterity is the careful adjustment of short-
term exploitative capabilities and long-term exploratory capabilities in order to achieve a 
right balance for a particular set of organizational and market conditions (Birkinshaw 
and Gibson, 2004). March (1991) described exploration as “things captured by terms 
such as search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, 
innovation”. Exploitation, on the other hand is illustrated by terms such as “refinement, 
choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation, execution”. He further stated 
that “essence of exploration is experimentation with new alternatives” whereas “essence 
of exploitation is the refinement and extension of existing competences”. Applying 
Levinthal and March’s (1993) definition of exploration as “the pursuit of new 
knowledge, of things that might come to be known” and exploitation as “the use and 
development of things already known”, Rothaermel and Alexandre (2009) explain 
exploration as “sourcing of new technology” and exploitation as “sourcing of known 
technology”. He and Wong (2004) define exploitative innovation as “technological 
innovation activities aimed at improving existing product-market domains” and 
exploratory innovation as “technological innovation aimed at entering new product-
market domains.” Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009) argue that exploration of existing 
products enables incremental innovation while exploration of new opportunities fosters 
more radical innovation. 
Further scholars claim that exploration and exploitation need to be recombined to 
create value (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008). Focus on 
exploitation may result in short-term success, but it might hold back the firms from 
responding to environmental changes (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). On the contrary, 
exploration will allow the firms to strengthen its knowledge base, but it can trap 
organizations in the endless cycle of search and change (Volberda and Lewin, 2003). 
Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) state that firms need to excel at both explorative and 
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exploitative innovation in order to survive and prosper and to achieve long-term firm 
performance.  
Applying the exploration-exploitation lens to organizational behavior (Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004), organizational learning and adaptation (Levinthal and March, 1993), 
strategic alliances (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006), 
knowledge search and knowledge creation (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Nerkar 2003; Sidhu 
et al., 2007) and innovation and technology management (Benner and Tushman, 2003; 
He and Wong, 2004) is well established in literature. These studies view the balance of 
exploration and exploitation as a necessary condition for organizational success and 
survival (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) go a step ahead 
to analyze the relationship between organizational ambidexterity and firm performance. 
Recent studies on ambidexterity have discussed relationships between complex 
antecedents and potential moderators (Auh and Menguc, 2005; Jansen et al., 2006). 
Remarkably the potential linkages between bricolage and the balance of exploration and 
exploitation are yet to be explored.  
Therefore, we address the following research question: How does OSS enable bricolage 
in firms, and how do organizations confronted with resource constraints embrace the 
opportunity provided by OSS? To what extent is the bricolage process contingent on the 
level of resource scarcity in the firms? Does the explorative or exploitative nature of OSS 
bricolage process allow firms to adapt and change in order to create value through 
technological innovation? We address these research questions by using a case-study 
research. 
2.3 Data and Methods 
In the absence of prior research on the processes of bricolage associated with OSS in ICT 
firms, a case study approach seems most appropriate for interpreting these processes 
(Yin, 1984; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Leitch et al., 2010). We adopt a case study 
approach to explore how dependence on OSS and an OSS community helps facilitate 
technological innovation in firms. In particular, we examine the nature of the resource 
configuration associated with OSS, and the process of OSS bricolage for value creation.  
The choice of the ICT industry was triggered by the familiarity of OSS in the industry. 
Due to the knowledge of the ICT concept, employees in ICT firms are more likely to 
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embrace ICT. While a FOSS license enables free download, install and use of OSS, most of 
these licenses also make it difficult to build commercial products with OSS.    
The popularity of OSS has resulted in several small and large, private and public firms 
adopting OSS. However, there is no official census available for firms that provide OSS 
based solutions or firms that adopt OSS. Absence of a precise definition of the population 
does not allow us to extract a representative sample. Hence following Eisenhardt and 
Graebner (2007) we follow theoretical sampling, more specifically extreme sampling to 
select the three cases. The selection is based on two extreme criteria; Firstly, the cases 
are unlike in their level of resource scarcity, each of the cases is either confronted with 
low, moderate or high level of resource constraints. Secondly, each of the cases adopts a 
different type of OSS. The uniqueness of the cases is balanced and controlled by the 
institutional context and age. All three cases are from Benelux and share the same 
European institutional context. Moreover, all cases were established in the same period 
2006-2007. 
In order to look at the adoption of the OSS under different degrees of resource scarcity, 
we studied its use in three contexts: First, an extremely resource-constrained firm, 
second, a firm which can afford the use of CSS while still being in a constrained 
environment, and third, a firm with low resource constraints. In each case, we 
interviewed the founders or the department heads of the product development 
department. Details of the data collection process are shown in Table 1. 
With regards to case with high resource scarcity (Case A), we interviewed the founders 
of a small Dutch web development company, JWebs. As an initial stage in identifying a 
suitable case, several firms adopting OSS were interviewed at the first Joomla!3 
international conference. JWebs was considered relevant for the research owing to its 
minimalistic resource base- the two founders had limited technical knowledge, were not 
part of a relevant network and modest savings as start-up investments.  
Case B, Mobixx represents an example of a Belgian SME trying to carve a space for itself 
in a niche market of mobile web while facing medium level of resource constraints. 
Interviews were conducted with two founders and four employees of Mobixx. The 
                                                        
3 Joomla! is one of the most popular open source content management systems today with a large 
community consisting of more than 500,000 forum members. Until 2010, Joomla! has been downloaded 
25 million times and more there are more than 30 million websites running on Joomla 
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company contact was obtained through the professional network of one of the authors. 
Since one of the founders of Mobixx works in close collaboration with the authors, it was 
easy to obtain access to the company data throughout the company lifecycle.  
In search of firms with low resource scarcity, the authors were directed to large firms. 
Large firms are less likely to face resource constraints in comparison to start-ups or 
SMEs. OSS adoption in large firms is commonplace in the ICT industry. However, since it 
is difficult to study company-wide adoption of OSS particularly in large ICT firms, we 
choose to study OSS adoption in an ICT department in a large non-ICT company. To 
study OSS adoption in a firm with low resource scarcity, we interviewed the director/ 
department head of the application management department of Dutch Bank in the 
Netherlands (Case C). The authors identified this case by interviewing five project 
leaders of intrapreneurial projects in a large organization. The director had initiated and 
managed the adoption process from start to finish, and provided the authors with the 
required information for the case study.   
The primary data source is the interviews conducted with the people involved in the 
bricolage process, namely the founders or department heads. The interview data is 
complemented by other data sources such as company archives and publicly available 
data. The details of the analysis are presented in Table 1. 
To study the level of exploration and exploitation, we performed a content analysis. 
Firstly using the extant literature on exploration and exploitation, we coded a list of 
keywords representing these two notions. Two researchers read the interview notes 
and the secondary material and coded the keywords and noted their frequency. We 
further calculated intercoder reliability using Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen, 1960), which 
equaled 0.81, a value within an acceptable range for this kind of analysis. Any 
disagreements in the coding were resolved by further discussion. 
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Table 1: Data sources and data analysis methods 
   Interviews Archival Material Data analysis method 
Case A 2 interviews with founder1 
ranging 55m-1h35m 
Founder conference 
presentations  
Company website 
Interviews were semi 
structured with open-ended 
questions in English. Two 
authors conducted the 
interviews, while a third 
author was not a part of the 
interviews in order to avoid 
any confirmatory biases. The 
interviews were audiotaped 
and notes were taken. The 
interviews were transcribed 
verbatim and the text was 
read and re-read several 
times to identify themes.  
 
Case B 6 interviews (2 founders + 4 
employees) lasting between 
1h and 1h50m  
 
Press releases 
Company archives 
including versions 
of business plans, 
MoM for board 
meetings, etc. 
Case C 1h25m interview with 
director of Application 
Management department (+ 
4 other interviews with 
other department heads 
involved in 
intrapreneurship) 
Corporate 
presentation of the 
department head at 
a conference. 
 
2.4 Analysis 
2.4.1 Case A- Bricolage in a firm with high resource scarcity: OSS adoption in a 
Web Development Company 
In this case, founder1 had a degree in computer science and had used his knowledge to 
control sound and lights in the theatre industry for nearly two decades. After initially 
working with the .NET framework, he started coding in php in 2007. He founded JWebs 
in 2007 together with founder2, a creative designer, with a view to build customized 
websites and applications. Dynamic websites demanded the use of a content 
management system (CMS) and founder1 initially built a CMS from scratch using .NET 
and later reworked it in php. He was soon confronted with the difficulties of extending 
and maintaining the CMS.  
“If my customers wanted additional features, I had to write extensions specifically 
for them. All customers had different requirements, and it was quite time consuming 
to customize the CMS for each one of them.” 
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Having switched to php from .NET, he was presented with a wide variety of OS CMS to 
work with. Fascinated by the community and extendibility of Joomla!, he embraced  
Joomla! in 2008. Joomla! CMS served the purpose of a php-based CMS. Not only was 
Joomla! easy to work with, there was also a list of free and cheap extensions available 
and ready-to-use.  
“When I bumped into Joomla!, I realized that I was reinventing the wheel. With 
Joomla!, I did not need to write specific extensions for customers any more, I could 
find it or buy it without spending more time developing them myself. Also I did not 
need to customize them for different websites; the available extensions were ready-
to-use.” 
In comparison to php-based OS CMS, very few .NET OS CMS were available in the market 
at that time. As a result, the extensions for .NET OS CMS were highly priced, and php-
based OS CMS was the way to go. Customers of JWebs did not care about the backend 
and just needed a website that worked. Hence founder1 decided to migrate all his 
existing websites to Joomla!.  
“All my customers want a beautiful website, one which can be easily updated. They 
don’t even know what a CMS is.” 
Joomla! is supported by a strong and active community of developers and end users. 
Since Joomla! is backed by a not-for-profit foundation, the decision making rests with 
the community elected representatives, giving more freedom of opinion to community 
members. The Joomla! website provides a space for service providers like JWebs to 
introduce themselves and get noticed.  
“Getting listed does matter, creates a lot of traffic, people know you and want to try 
you out. If you are not listed, you are completely dependent of GOOGLE SEARCH and 
events. Someone contacted me from Norway, through the Joomla Resource 
Directory (JRD). Since there are not many companies on JRD who provide Flash 
integrated websites, they contact me.” 
The Joomla! community also helps founders to expand their professional network. 
Activities like Dutch Joomla! days allowed founder1 to meet fellow Joomla! users and 
developers from the Netherlands.  
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“People interact here and become friends and partners, rather than competitors. At 
the end of the day, everyone is limited with the number of (human) resources and 
cannot commit to all projects.” 
Not only does Joomla! provide the technological resource for bricolage for JWebs, the 
large active community of Joomla! also acts as a string social capital resource for JWebs. 
“The active community is Joomla!’s biggest strength. Without this community, it 
would be difficult for me to fulfill my client requirements quickly. If client asks for 
some features, and they are not available on Joomla! extensions directory, I make a 
request to the community. In this active community, you always have someone who 
can develop it for you, or if you are lucky, it will be available in the next build for 
free.” 
The founders of JWebs are not keen on growing the company, but rather prefer dealing 
with new technical challenges in the future. As a result, JWebs did not hire any 
employees, never considered outsourcing the work to developing countries, and at times 
even declined projects or passed it on to other developers. JWebs decided to start small, 
and focus on building up their social network. 
“Co-operation with other small companies is essential. When you are a small 
company, you can do several small projects; but when you are many small 
companies together, you can do any big project.” 
To summarize, JWebs adopted OSS due to its ease of use and extendibility. Over the 
years, Joomla! has become an integral part of their value proposition. Not only does 
Joomla! provide these resource-constrained individuals with a free platform for use, it 
also provides micro companies like JWebs with a space to advertise themselves to the 
target market. OSS like Joomla! presents a huge potential for extension developers and 
service providers to set up micro businesses and to make profits by exploiting OSS. As 
founder1 defended the concept of OS: 
“One idea of open source is that you don’t put any energy in protecting it, otherwise 
there is less time spent for coding, and more for workarounds.”  
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2.4.2 Case B- Bricolage in firm with moderate resource constraints: OSS adoption 
in a Small Mobile Internet Company 
This case study presents innovation in a Belgian mobile internet company with the help 
of OSS. Mobixx started in 2006, at the time when the mobile internet market was still in 
an early stage of development. After a successful pilot project, Mobixx was officially 
founded in 2007 with two founders, one project manager, three software engineers and 
four freelance software developers. The value proposition of Mobixx was a technological 
solution to adapt website content to any mobile device in real time, while adding specific 
applications like a flexible mobile payment system, location specific information, 
targeted advertisement, etc. The founders were highly dependent on their strong 
personal and professional network in order to bring the product to the market. Due to 
lack of a customer profile, Mobixx was confronted with a range of customers who 
expected high level customization and experimentation with the technology. As the 
software engineers mentioned:  
“In the beginning the founder just sold projects to customers and we had to make 
sure we develop what he had sold. We often had to push reality to deliver everything 
that was promised to the customer.” (Interview with SE1, 16 Nov 2007) 
“…We basically make whatever the CEO asks us to do. He has the contacts with the 
customers and he usually overpromises. It is always a challenge for us to realize 
technically what he wants and especially before the deadline he tends to give us. But 
I guess that is how it is working in a small start-up.” (Interview with SE2, 12 
December 2007) 
The wide-ranging customer demands were fuelled by the novelty of the value offering. 
Neither the customers knew what they could get, nor did the company know which 
products or services the market preferred. The diversity of customer profiles demanded 
a lot of customization and experimentation with the technology.  
 Discussion point (Meeting minutes: 24 Feb 2008):  
“Choice between serving every customer OR Focus on development of platform. The 
former (server every customer) asks for a lot of customized software development, 
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is time consuming and not scalable. If you cannot develop it on time, you need to 
look for other options- to buy or to outsource.”  
To meet the customer demands, the company had to be flexible with the technological 
resources they used. This triggered them to use OS components to build part of their 
value proposition.  
“…The technology platform exists of a device detection database, content fetcher 
and a transcoder; the device detection database is based upon the open source 
WURFL mobile device database which is updated continuously. This allows us to 
keep up with recent developments at no cost…” (Interview with SE2, 12 December 
2007) 
The use of OS components allowed the developers to easily respond to the varied 
customer requests. At zero costs, and in no time, the components can be downloaded 
and used with no need to negotiate and buy a license for use. One of the major 
components of their technology platform- the device detection database- was based on 
OS WURFL mobile device database which was continuously updated. The use of OS 
components enabled the company to instantly respond to opportunities with no 
significant financial commitment.  
“The Bazaar Model used by the open source community is the only way to keep 
abreast of the tidal wave of innovation that characterizes Web technologies. 
Without a large community, maintaining such a project and pushing its possibilities 
to its limits is impossible.” (Founder1 in Press article, 16 October 2008) 
While making use of existing OS database, Mobixx dedicated some time to interact with 
the community- the contributors for the WURFL database.   
“The community acts as our informal business partner. We consult them for what 
we need, and share whatever extra information we had to keep the WURFL 
database up to date.” (Interview with SE1, 16 Nov 2007) 
In addition, one of the venture capitalists (VC) involved in Mobixx had previously 
invested in some OSS-affiliated companies, instigated by the success story of Red Hat. 
The VC intended to push the business model of Mobixx in the direction of OSS. As a 
56 
 
result, Mobixx also provided an OS platform at a later stage under a dual license and 
publicly announced it in the national press and on their company blog:  
“..Besides, Mobixx itself largely depends on other open source projects, so it seems 
only fair to give something back to the community.” (Founder1 in Press article, 16 
October 2008) 
“By making its mobile application gateway available to the open source community 
of Web builders, Mobixx wishes to further stimulate the use and development of its 
mobile internet platform for building mobile websites.” (Press article, 16 October 
2008) 
In summary, the evidence from Mobixx suggests that small firms with sufficient 
resources may be able to benefit from OS in order to widen their value proposition. 
Moderately resource-constrained firms are often confronted with speed and timing 
issues in their early stage, and free availability of technological resources can help 
strengthen their value proposition and meet their market needs. Technological 
innovation with the help of OS components assists small organizations in nascent 
markets to compete with incumbents aiming to be fast followers in their industry. 
2.4.3 Case C- Bricolage in a firm with low resource constraints: OSS adoption in a 
ICT department of a large Bank 
This case study involves bricolage at the application management department of a large 
retail bank in the Netherlands. In the recent past, information technology has come to 
play an important role at the heart of the banking sector. The banking sector has moved 
from outsourcing IT services to having its own IT department. Dutch Bank has nearly 
2000 employees in their offices in the Netherlands. With the radical changes in IT, banks 
are continuously under pressure to have innovative solutions, while being under cost 
pressure. In 2007, they realized a sudden drop in customer satisfaction and realized that 
customer did not care anymore about product specifications and features, but more 
about the services and easiness. They saw an enormous opportunity for the IT 
department to contribute to the primary strategy of the organization and hired a new IT 
head in 2007. The application management department was expected to develop 
innovative applications in order to offer better customer service. As MVD, the director of 
application management department, suggests, the narrow focus on application 
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development at Dutch Bank circumvents the need to be entrepreneurial and look for 
creative solutions in the outside world.   
“Last month, I took a week off together with my boss and signed for a fantastic web 
conference in California. I had a fantastic week with developers of Yahoo! and 
Facebook. We would have expected our people that actually do the work (of 
application development) to be there. But there was nobody. People are so 
frightened and under cost pressure. No team manager allows his people to fly for a 
week to the States to actually find out what Yahoo! and Google are doing. I truly 
think there is a great opportunity but also a great need. If we are not careful, in 10 
years people will not see the value of a bank anymore.” (MVD, Director Application 
Management, Dutch Bank) 
After MVD’s manager attended a Google conference in 2011, he was impressed by the 
Android operating system and the opportunities provided by its application 
development platform. With MVD’s previous IT education and expertise, he and his 
manager started working on the development of a mobile banking application. Although 
they had the required background, he did not have formal financial support or dedicated 
resources from the department. To start with, they needed a software platform to build 
his application on. MVD went back to his roots and thought about OSS. During his Ph.D. 
years, he was a Java developer. Contributing to Java had helped him to know the 
language well and comfortably work with it. Along with his manager, MVD decided to 
start up a Java community and decided to bricolage and use resources at hand. 
Technological resources were no more an issue. Java was freely available, and they had 
the knowledge of source code although it was not necessary for the development. To 
gather human resources, MVD set up a Java community and encouraged people to come 
together for free pizzas every Tuesday evening, where they would work on developing 
something cool. This became an enormous success, and 50 people decided to dedicate 
their free time to the community. With the help of the Java programming language and 
the Android software development kit, the application code was well under 
development. Apache Nutch, an OS technology of screen scrapping was used to evoke 
the requests on mobile phones, which otherwise is done by browsers on desktops. The 
knowledge pool resulted in a fully-working mobile application in 2.5 months. This 
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prototype built using OSS met all requirements about the working and feasibility of the 
application, which normally would not have been possible without resources.  
Although they had a fully-working application, the next challenge was to get it into 
production. Due to several technical reasons, the prototype developed with OSS could 
not officially advance to production. Additionally, there had been several failures of 
projects in the past. Thankfully, the prototype proved the success and potential of the 
mobile application.  
“We had a fully-working version but that’s not the official way to get into 
production for many technical reasons. Then you see that it really helped, because 
all the questions- does it work, is it feasible, they are all gone!” (MVD, Director 
Application Management, Dutch Bank) 
The only problem that MVD still faced was to institutionalize several processes and get it 
up and running for the bank. They placed an official program in the application 
development group to replace the version built in their free time using OSS with a 
formally developed application. The success of the prototype gained them credibility 
and legitimacy, guaranteed them a budget for the development, and also speeded up the 
development, which was practically impossible with only a handful of developers. 
“Everyone saw the prototype and everyone loved it! Instantly we were issued a 
budget to buy the necessary proprietary software.” (MVD, Director Application 
Management, Dutch Bank) 
Although large organizations are perceived to have several resources at hand, the 
resources are in fact tightly held which creates several resources constraints. 
Intrapreneurship or new business creation in large firms is complex and time 
consuming due to activities involved across multiple levels within the organization 
(Garvin, 2004). Due to rigid structures and control, employees in large organizations 
find it difficult to move from their assigned tasks to something creative and 
entrepreneurial. OSS provides these firms a platform to bricolage and seek resources for 
technological innovation in order to gain credibility within the boundaries of the firm.  
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2.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Using qualitative case studies, our aim has been to shed light on how OSS acts as a 
bricolage mechanism for technological innovation in resource-constrained contexts in 
firms. The degree of bricolage in firms tends to vary based on the level of resource 
scarcity. This can be accounted to the difference in the firms’ initial resource 
configuration as well as the growth perspective of the firm. Our analysis suggests there 
are important strategic differences in the way in which OSS is harnessed in resource-
constrained firms. Based on our case study research, these differences concern the 
intent of bricolage, characteristics of the OSS used, and the extent to which OSS is used 
for exploration or exploitation activities. 
Intent of using OSS for Bricolage 
Several ICT firms start up with scarce resources. Mostly these resources consist of the 
software skills of the founders and their expertise developed from their participation in 
the OSS community. As a result, they are highly dependent on OSS for technological 
resources as well as the network. OSS allows them to build their value proposition, while 
the OSS network provides them with marketing channels and allows them to easily 
target their customer group. The OSS community helps them build a professional 
network which opens up possibilities for business partnerships to enable them to work 
on bigger projects, while still staying small. The regular updates and releases of OSS 
spurs little innovation opportunities for the service companies, but promises 
persistence to the firm. For OSS firms engaging in extended product development for 
OSS, innovation opportunities are higher with every new major release of OSS. The 
speed of innovation for these firms is driven by an OSS release plan. As a result, firms 
with high resource constraints are more likely to work with successful OSS, which is 
under continuous development by an active community. These firms are highly 
dependent on OSS projects and systems tend to remain small. Rather than ambitious 
growth in terms of revenues and employees, they emphasize on technical superiority 
and contributing back to the OSS community.  
Firms with moderate resource constraints are in possession of some resources at start 
up. They have a better insight into market requirements, and the value proposition is 
already in place at start-up. While software skills and expertise are at hand, these firms 
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are typically challenged by vague customer demands in a niche market and require more 
resources due to time constraints. In order to gain competitive advantage in a niche 
market, these firms need to satisfy customer requirements by competing on their own 
expertise, rather than collaborating with peers and the OSS community. Speed and 
timing are crucial in a niche market. As a result, these firms are on a constant lookout for 
existing technological resources which could strengthen their value proposition to 
address varied customer requirements. As seen in Case B, the availability of an OS 
database can be very useful for these firms, which along with resources are also time 
constrained, and hence cannot reinvent the wheel. While their dependence on OSS is of 
medium importance, they can benefit from OSS bricolage in order to rapidly adapt their 
value proposition and expand their customer reach. Free availability of several OSS also 
allows these firms to experiment and constantly innovate their value proposition. OSS 
bricolage in turn helps them to display flexibility and allows them to gain access to 
financial resources.  
Low levels of resource scarcity are predominant in large firms where several 
departments find it difficult to get a hold of resources owing to the hierarchy, control 
and structure (Damanpour, 1992; Dougherty, 1992; Halme et al., 2012). Consequently, 
innovation activity in these firms is limited to specific departments. In spite of the 
existing knowledge and skills prevalent in some departments, the department heads 
find it difficult to encourage innovation owing to the lack of resources. Innovation 
activity and access to resources are interdependent, as one is a necessary condition for 
the other, and vice versa. Such low resource-constrained departments foresee the 
availability of OSS platforms as a resource-seeking mechanism. As seen in Case C, these 
departments use OSS platforms to build a working prototype of their products. Working 
on mature OSS platforms assures high level of security. Building a working prototype 
using OSS platforms as technological resource allows these departments to gain 
credibility within the firm and showcase their innovations to higher management in 
order to seek further resources.  
Characteristics of OSS  
Although OSS is characterized by free availability, adoption of OSS is influenced by the 
license under which the OSS is available. The licenses range from weak to strong which 
in turn determine the possibilities of using OSS for commercial value creation. Highly 
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resource-constrained firms regard OSS as a cornerstone of their business. Owing to high 
dependence on the OSS, these firms choose to work with a developing OSS with a strong 
active community. Since OSS contributes heavily to the value creation of the firm, these 
firms depend on OSS for its features, usability and extendibility. Moderately resource-
constrained firms, on the other hand, are on a lookout for an OSS which strengthens 
their value offering. Due to moderate dependence on OSS, these firms mainly look for 
the content of OSS and hence opt for OSS which is completely developed. In firms with 
low resource constraints, use of OSS is temporary, which is reflected by their low to 
moderate dependence on OSS. As a result, these firms choose mature OSS which has long 
been developed and adopted by the mass market for their functionality and stability.  
However, while OSS adoption minimizes the costs for technological resources, not all 
OSS are easy and advantageous to adopt. Although OSS is ‘free’ to use, there are several 
implementation and support costs associated with OSS adoption. The choice of OSS 
should take into account the fit with firms’ requirements and budget. The requirements 
may demand the firms to reuse OSS code in the form of algorithms and methods, single 
lines of code, or components, which can in turn influence the level of bricolage (Haefliger 
et al., 2008). The stage of development and the future development potential also play a 
key role in OSS adoption. Firms are reluctant to embrace software which has been 
inactive for a long time, or have scarce documentation and inert support forums. 
Moreover, compatibility of OSS with existing hardware, extent of availability of support 
and maintenance also determine the choice of OSS. Lastly, the license conditions under 
which the OSS is released can impact OSS adoption. On the one hand, weak licenses 
allow users to freely adopt OSS and redistribute it even for commercial purposes. On the 
other hand, stronger restrictive licenses like GNU GPL prevent users from using the 
software for commercial purposes, requiring them to share modifications with the 
community. In spite of the license conditions, research shows that developers engage in 
selective revealing of OSS code and protecting some of their developments in order to 
gain benefits from OSS (Henkel, 2006; Bonaccorsi et al., 2006). That being said, firms 
need to rethink how OSS could confer them competitive advantage, given the fact that 
everyone else has access to it.  
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Exploration-Exploitation Lens  
JWebs uses OSS as a platform to develop a product (“production”). JWebs’ founder 
extends the current competencies that he or his firm owns and refines them to provide a 
value offering using OSS. Moreover, JWebs provides a product for a market that already 
exists, with the help of technology that is already known. The main value offering of 
JWebs is the development and maintenance of websites. Hence, ensuring customer 
satisfaction is crucial for JWebs, which is another characteristic of exploitation. To cope 
with the customer demand, JWebs teams up with partners and builds up alliances. These 
keywords clearly show that JWebs exhibits high exploitation through OSS bricolage. 
Highly resource-constrained firms like JWebs which innovate through OSS bricolage are 
risk averse and focus on incremental innovation which can lead to short-term 
profitability. Since JWebs does not conduct any explorative activities, their long-term 
survival is questionable. Thus, although OSS allows these companies to easily enter the 
opportunity space and to get off the ground following a lean start-up philosophy (Reis, 
2011), it is difficult for them to monetize on OSS. We expect that this is a typical scenario 
in highly resource-constrained firms. Only a few OSS start-ups have escaped this 
through the attraction of venture capital.4 In our opinion, these firms could benefit from 
responding to environmental changes and adapting themselves accordingly.   
Moderately resource-constrained firms are not deterred from experimenting with either 
developing or mature OSS. Alongside using OSS for iterating their value proposition, 
they often tend to be flexible in fulfilling customer requirements in a new product-
market domain. As these companies have an installed customer base to which they have 
sufficient credibility, they can explore OSS components without taking too much risk. 
With moderate resource constraints, Mobixx demonstrates some level of explorative 
activities alongside exploitative activities. In the case of Mobixx, OSS bricolage is 
primarily used for incremental innovation, but the potential of higher levels of 
innovation are exhibited in the development of their own OSS. Since these companies 
typically do not have R&D departments, the OSS community becomes the enlarged R&D 
department of the company. This implies that these companies also engage in giving 
                                                        
4 For a related research, the authors conducted an online questionnaire survey to study the product 
developers and service providers for Joomla! OS CMS. Out of the 170 firms, as many as 93% of the firms 
started with less than 3 employees, and 91% of these remained with less than 5 employees within 1-5 
years of their founding. None of these 170 firms received any venture capital or external funding.  
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back to the community while exploring at the same time. These companies are probably 
the most important sources of innovation for the community. For them, OSS resembles 
open innovation in a true sense.  
Case C exemplifies exploration because it allows the firm to search for new technological 
possibilities and experiment with OSS without any investment or legitimation. The firm 
also involves risk taking by using OSS in developing a radical innovation for a new 
market and for a new customer group. Moreover, the adopting process is a bottom-up 
learning process in which managers are persuaded to abandon old routines and 
committing to a new course of action (Lubatkin et al., 2006) which is typical of 
exploration. Although no exploitative activities arise in the OSS bricolage in Dutch Bank, 
the fact that they proceeded quickly from the prototype to development and further to 
market launch clearly represents that exploration is not extreme and that the firm is not 
stuck in the infinite cycle of search and change. For large companies, OSS tools have 
become a sense-giving instrument to convince the different management layers that a 
new product or service can be useful. Especially in an environment such as a bank, 
where new technologies tend to be cognitively distant from the mainstream 
understanding in the company, it is important to visualize and even prototype new ideas 
and services. OSS is an ideal fast and low-cost way of prototyping. Without OSS, a 
traditional business case would have to be made and an upfront investment would be 
needed. It is unlikely that managers would have been convinced to invest in this. 
Table 2 below summarizes the differences in the use of OSS between firms with varying 
levels of resource scarcity. 
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Table 2: Differences between the three case studies 
 Case A Case B Case C 
Before Bricolage 
Resources at hand Software skills Software skills, 
professional network 
Software skills, 
professional network, 
commercial channels, 
infrastructure 
Level of resource 
scarcity 
High Moderate Low 
Resources needed Technical, Social Technical, Financial Technical, Financial 
Bricolage using OSS 
Type of OSS Developing Developed Mature 
Dependence on 
OSS as T.R.* 
High Medium Low-Medium 
Dependence on 
OSS as S.C.R** 
High Medium-High Low 
Use of OSS Firm level Firm level Department level 
After Bricolage 
Reason for 
bricolage 
Value offering, network, 
marketing channels 
Satisfying customer 
demands, expand 
market (Speed and 
timing) 
Gaining credibility 
within firm 
Degree of value 
creation 
Low Medium High 
Level of 
Exploration 
None Low-Medium High 
Level of 
Exploitation 
High Medium-High  NA5 
* T.R. = Technological Resource  
** S.C.R = Social Capital Resource 
                                                        
5 Exploitative activities are present but are not prevalent in the particular case of OSS bricolage which is 
studied at department level. 
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2.5.1 Managerial Implications 
The overall pattern of results suggests that balancing exploration and exploitation while 
engaging in OSS bricolage is challenging. The choice of OSS also impacts the level of OSS 
adoption and bricolage. Managers should evaluate the use of OSS with care. Quite a 
number of software start-ups have a value proposition based on OSS. Although we 
clearly understand why these business models are attractive from a technology 
exploitation point of view, they might limit or even preempt technology exploration. A 
start-up with an OSS business model precludes itself from being active on the market for 
technology where licenses are the main transaction mechanism. Therefore it has to build 
up complementary assets to play a role on the market for products if it wants to be 
successful. The latter is a much riskier strategy (Bruneel et al., 2012), which assumes 
that the companies can raise sufficient funds to build up marketing, sales, etc. 
Not surprisingly, OSS provides most opportunities for firms with moderate resource 
constraints, which tend to have an established customer base. These companies can 
make use of the OSS community as an external R&D department. However, it also 
implies that they need to give something back to the community, if not the use will be 
short-term oriented. As these firms already have complementary assets in place, OSS 
allows them to speed up the development process and to customize products and 
services at low cost. The license agreements of OSS tools do not play much of a role as 
the customers are on the market for products, implying that they buy products or 
services rather than licenses on the technology. Therefore, OSS provides them with a 
real open innovation platform without the pitfall of restricted IP. 
In large companies, where level of resource scarcity is low, secrecy and protection 
policies are much stricter. Hence, a true OSS policy is more difficult to implement. These 
companies cross-license their products and protect their proprietary technology. If 
necessary, they go to court to make their point as illustrated by visible patent battles 
such as the Apple vs. Samsung case or the TomTom vs. Garmin case. Still, OSS can play 
an important role for them. OSS facilitates the making of fast and easy prototypes, which 
can be tangible artifacts that are used in downstream or upstream communication. The 
use of these artifacts for prospective sense-making purposes has been illustrated by 
Stigliani and Ravasi (2012). Prospective sense making is used to convince the 
constituents of the company of the need to move into a certain opportunity space which 
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is cognitively distant from the mainstream business. Hence, even in companies with a 
strict IP policy, OSS can be an important instrument to move in a distant opportunity 
space. 
2.5.2 Conclusions 
In summary, in answering the question how OSS acts as a bricolage mechanism for 
technological innovation in firms, our study makes several contributions. We have 
shown that OSS creates an opportunity space. However, that opportunity space is 
contingent upon the level of resource scarcity within the firms. Our case studies show 
that for start-up, firms with high resource constraints OSS provides an opportunity to 
exploit, but does not easily translate in exploration. For firms with moderate resource 
constraints which have an initial customer base, a mix of exploration and exploitation is 
more likely and OSS becomes a space for open innovation. In less resource-constrained 
firms, exploration is the most likely objective of the use of OSS tools.  
The findings suggest that there is a link between the theories of bricolage and 
exploration-exploitation. Overall, these findings provide insights suggestive of how 
bricolage can be used to access and coordinate technological resources in rapidly 
changing resource-constrained environments. As such, our findings help extend 
understanding of how different contexts help shape innovative entrepreneurial activity 
(Zahra and Wright, 2011). We hope that our insights resulting from a focus on analysis 
of a small number of cases will provide the departure point for future larger studies that 
encompass further variety in the nature of entrepreneurial ventures adopting OSS.     
67 
 
2.6 References 
Ahuja, G., Lampert, C. 2001. Entrepreneurship in a large corporation: a longitudinal 
study of how established firms create breakthrough innovations. Strategic 
Management Journal 22, 521-543. 
Ajila, S.A., Wu, D. 2007. Empirical study of effects of open source adoption on software 
development economics. Journal of Systems and Software 80 (9), 1517-1529. 
Anderson, O.J. 2008. A Bottom-up perspective on Innovations. Administration and 
Society 40(1), 54-78. 
Andriopoulos, C., Lewis, M.W. 2009. Exploitation-Exploration tensions and 
organizational ambidexterity: Managing paradoxes of innovation. Organization Science 
20(4), 696-717. 
Auh, S., Menguc, B. 2005. Balancing exploration and exploitation: the moderating role of 
competitive intensity. Journal of Business Research 58, 1652-1661. 
Autio, E., Yli-Renko, H., Salonen, A. 1997. International growth of young technology-
based Firms: A resource-based network model. Journal of Enterprising Culture 5(1), 
57-73. 
Baker, T., Miner, A.S., Eesley, D.T. 2003. Improvising firms: bricolage, account giving and 
improvisational competencies in the founding process. Research Policy 32, 255-276. 
Baker, T., Nelson, R.E. 2005. Creating something from nothing: Resource construction 
through entrepreneurial bricolage. Administrative Science Quarterly 50(3), 329-366. 
Bell, C., McNamara, J. 1991. High-tech ventures: The guide for entrepreneurial 
success. Massachusetts, US: Addison- Wesley Publishing Company, Inc. 
Benner, M.J., Tushman, M.L. 2003. Exploitation, exploration, and process management: 
the productivity dilemma revisited. Academy of Management Review 28, 238-256. 
Berchicci, L., Hulsink, W. 2006. Of bikes and men: Innovation patterns and strategic 
entrepreneurship in the human-powered vehicle sector. Strategic Entrepreneurship: 
the role of networking, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, July 3-4,2006. 
68 
 
Birkinshaw, J., Gibson, C. 2004. Building ambidexterity into an organization. MIT Sloan 
Management Review, 47-55. 
Bonaccorsi, A., Giannangeli, S., Rossi, C. 2006. Entry strategies under competing 
standards: Hybrid models in the open source software industry. Management Science 
52(7), 1085-1098. 
Bonaccorsi, A., Rossi, C. 2003. Why open source software can succeed. Research Policy 
32(7), 1243-1258. 
Bonaccorsi A., Rossi C. 2006. Comparing motivations of individual programmers and 
firms to take part in open Source movement: From community to business. Knowledge, 
Technology and Policy 18(4), 40-64. 
Bruderl, J., Preisendorfer, P., Ziegler, R. 1992. Survival chances of newly founded 
business organizations. American Sociological Review 57(2), 227-242.   
Bruneel, J., Clarysse, B., Wright, M. 2012. Entering the product or technology market: 
Strategic implications for entrepreneurial firms. Imperial College Business School 
Working Paper.  
Clarysse, B., Wright, M., Van de Velde, E. 2011. Entrepreneurial origin, technological 
knowledge, and the growth of spin-off companies. Journal of Management Studies 
48(6), 1419-1442. 
Ciborra, C. 2002. The labyrinths of information. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cohen, J. 1960. A coefficient of agreement for nominal scales. Educational and 
Psychological Measurement 20, 37-47. 
Cohen, W.M., Levinthal , D.A. 1990. Absorptive-capacity- A new perspective on learning 
and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly 35, 128-152. 
Colombo, M.G., Piva, E., Rossi-Lamastra, C. 2013. Authorizing employees to collaborate 
with communities during working hours: when is it valuable for firms?. Long Range 
Planning 46, 236-257. 
Dahlander, L. Magnusson, M. 2008. How do firms make use of open source communities? 
Long Range Planning 41(6), 629-649. 
69 
 
Damanpour, F. 1992. Organizational size and innovation. Organization Studies 13, 375-
402. 
Dougherty, D. 1992. Interpretive barriers to successful innovation in large firms. 
Organization Science 3(2), 179-202. 
Ebert, C. 2007. Open source drives innovation. IEEE Software 24(3), 105-109. 
Economides, N., Katsamakas, E. 2006. Two-sided competition of proprietary vs. open 
source technology platforms and the implications for the software industry. 
Management Science 52(7), 1057-1071. 
Eisenhardt, K.M., Schoonhoven, C.B. 1996.Resource-based view of strategic alliance 
formation: Strategic and social effects in entrepreneurial firms. Organization Science 
7(2), 136-150.  
Eisenhardt, K.M., Graebner, M.E. 2007. Theory building from cases: Opportunities and 
challenges. Academy of Management Journal 50(1), 25-32.  
Eisenhardt, K.M., Martin, J.A. 2000. Dynamic capabilities: What are they? Strategic 
Management Journal 21, 1105-1121. 
Elfring, T., Hulsink, W. 2003. Networks in entrepreneurship: The case of high- 
technology firms. Small Business Economics 21, 409-422. 
Feller, J., Fitzgerald, B. 2002. Understanding open source software development. 
Addison Wesley.  
Ferneley, E., and Bell, F. 2006. Using bricolage to integrate business and information 
technology innovation in SMEs. Technovation 26(2), 232-241. 
Fisher, G. 2012. Effectuation, causation, and bricolage: A behavioral comparison of 
emerging theories in entrepreneurship research. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice 36(5), 1019-1051. 
Fitzgerald B. 2006. The transformation of open source software. MIS Quarterly 30 (3), 
587–598. 
70 
 
Fitzgerald, B., Kenny. T. 2004. Developing an information systems infrastructure with 
open source software. IEEE software 21(1), 50-55. 
Foong, S. 1999. Effect of end user personnel and systems attributes on computer based 
information systems success in Malaysian SMEs. Journal of Small Business 
Management 37(3), 81-87.    
Gabbay, S.M., Leenders, R.T.A. 1999. The structure of advantage and disadvantage in 
Corporate Social Capital and Liability. In: Leenders, R.T.A., Gabbay, S.M., Kluwer, New 
York, 1-16.  
Garud, R., Karnoe, P. 2003. Bricolage versus breakthrough: distributed and embedded 
agency in technology entrepreneurship. Research Policy 32(2), 277-300. 
Garvin, D.A. 2004. What every CEO should know about creating new businesses. 
Harvard Business Creation 82(7/8), 18–21. 
Gibson, C.B., Birkinshaw, J. 2004. The antecedents, consequences and mediating role of 
organizational ambidexterity. Academy of Management Journal 47, 209-226.   
Gruber, M., Henkel, J. 2006. New ventures based on open innovation- an empirical 
analysis of start-up firms in embedded Linux. International Journal of Technology 
Management 33(4), 356-372. 
Halme, M., Linderman, S., Linna, P. 2012. Innovation for inclusive business: 
Intrapreneurial bricolage in multinational corporations. Journal of Management 
Studies 49(4), 743-784. 
Hargave, T.J., Van de Ven, A. 2006. A collective action model of institutional innovation. 
Academy of Management Review 31(4), 864-888. 
Haefliger, S., von Krogh, G., Spaeth, S. 2008. Code reuse in open source software. 
Management Science 54(1), 180-193. 
Hauge, O., Ayala, C., Conradi, R. 2010. Adoption of open source software in software-
intensive organizations- A systematic literature review. Information and Software 
Technology 52, 1133-1154. 
71 
 
He, Z., Wong, P. 2004. Exploration vs. exploitation: An empirical test of the ambidexterity 
hypothesis. Organization Science 15(4), 47-55. 
Henderson, R.M., Clark, K.B. 1990. Architectural innovation: the reconfiguration of 
existing product technologies and the failure of established firms. Administrative 
Science Quarterly 35, 9-31.  
Henkel, J. 2006. Selective revealing in open innovation processes: The case of embedded 
Linux. Research Policy 35(7), 965-969. 
Hertel, G., Neidner, S., Herrmann, S. 2003. Motivation of software developers in open 
source projects: an Internet-based survey of contributors to the Linux kernel. Research 
Policy 32, 1159-1177. 
Hitt, M.A., Ireland, R.D., Camp, S.M., Sexton, D.L. 2001. Strategic entrepreneurship: 
Entrepreneurial strategies for wealth creation. Strategic Management Journal 22(6-7), 
479-491. 
Hoegl, M., Gibbert, M., Mazursky, D. 2008. Financial constraints in innovation projects: 
When is less more? Research Policy 37(8), 1382-1391.  
Jansen, J.J.P., van den Bosch, F.A.J., Volberda, H.W. 2006. Exploratory innovation, 
exploitative innovation, and performance: Effects of organizational antecedents and 
environmental moderators. Management Science 52(11), 1661-1674. 
Katila, R., Ahuja, G. 2002. Something old, something new: a longitudinal study of search 
behavior and product introductions. Academy of Management Journal 45, 1183-1194. 
Lakhani, K.R., Von Hippel, E. 2003. How open source software works: “free” user-to-user 
assistance. Research Policy 32(6), 923-943. 
Lavie, D., Rosenkopf, L. 2006. Balancing exploration and exploitation in alliance 
formation. Academy of Management Journal 49, 797-818.  
Lee, C., Lee, K., Pennings, J.M. 2001. Internal capabilities, external networks, and 
performance: A study on technology-based ventures. Strategic Management Journal 
22(6-7), 615-640. 
72 
 
Leitch, C.M., Hill, F.M., Harrison, R.T. 2010. The philosophy and practice of interpretivist 
research in entrepreneurship: Quality, validation, and trust. Organizational Research 
Methods 13(1), 67-84. 
Lerner, J., Tirole, J. 2002. Some simple economics of open source. Journal of Industrial 
Economics 50(2), 197-234. 
Levi-Strauss, C. 1966. The savage mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Levinthal, D.A., March, J.G. 1993. The myopia of learning. Strategic Management 
Journal 14, 95-112. 
Levy, M., Powell, P., Yetton, P. 2001. SEMs: Aligning IS and the strategic context. Journal 
of Information Technology 16, 133-144. 
Lubatkin, M.H., Simsek, Z., Ling, Y., Veiga J.F. 2006. Ambidexterity and performance in 
small- to medium-sized firms: the pivotal role of top management behavioral 
integration. Journal of Management 32(5), 646-672. 
Mahoney, J.T., Michael, S. C. 2005. A subjectivist theory of entrepreneurship. In Alvarez, 
S. A., Agarwal, R., Sorenson, O. (Eds), Handbook of Entrepreneurship. Boston, MA: 
Kluwer, 33–53. 
March, J. 1991. Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization 
Science 2(1), 71-87. 
Melville, N., Kraemer, K., Gurbaxani, V. 2004. Review: Information technology and 
organizational performance: an integrative model of IT business value. MIS Quarterly 
28(2), 283-322. 
Nerkar, A. 2003. Old is gold? The value of temporal exploration in the creation of new 
knowledge. Management Science 49, 211-229.  
O’Reilly, C.A., Tushman, M.L. 2008. Ambidexterity as a dynamic capability: resolving the 
innovator’s dilemma. Research in Organizational Behavior 28, 185-206.  
Osterloh, M., Rota, S. 2007. Open source software development- Just another case of 
collective invention? Research Policy 36(2), 157-171. 
73 
 
Piva, E., Rentocchini, F., Rossi-Lamastra, C. 2012. Is open source software about 
innovation? Collaborations with the open source community and innovation 
performance of software entrepreneurial ventures. Journal of Small Business 
Management 50(2), 340-364. 
Raisch, S., Birkinshaw, J. 2008. Organizational ambidexterity: Antecedents, outcomes and 
moderators. Journal of Management 3(34), 375-409. 
Raisch, S., Birkinshaw, J., Probst, G., Tushman, M.L. 2009. Organizational ambidexterity: 
Balancing exploitation and exploration for sustained performance. Organization 
Science 20(4), 685-695. 
Reis, E. 2011. The Lean Startup: How today’s entrepreneurs use continuous 
innovations to create radically successful businesses. The Crown Publishing Group, 
New York. 
Riehle, D. 2009. The commercial open source business model. Proceedings of Americas 
Conference on Information Systems 2009. 
Rothaermel, F.T., Alexandre, M.T. 2009. Ambidexterity in technology sourcing: The 
moderating role of absorptive capacity. Organizational Science 20(4), 759-780. 
Rothaermel, F.T., Deeds, D.L. 2004. Exploration and exploitation alliances in 
biotechnology: a system of new product development. Strategic Management Journal 
25(3), 201-221. 
Rothaermel, F.T., Deeds, D.L. 2006. Alliance type, alliance experience, and alliance 
management capability in high-technology ventures. Journal of Business Venturing 
21(4), 429-460. 
Sarasvathy, S.D. 2001. Causation and effectuation: Towards a theoretical shift from 
economic inevitability to entrepreneurial contingency. Academy of Management Review 
26(2), 243–288. 
Senyard, J.M., Davidsson, P., Baker, T. 2011. Resource constraints in innovation: The role 
of bricolage in new venture creation and firm development. In Maritz, A. (Ed.) 
Proceedings of the 8th AGSE International Entrepreneurship Research Exchange, 
Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, 609-622. 
74 
 
Shah, S.K. 2006. Motivation, governance, and the viability of hybrid forms in open source 
software development. Management Science 52(7), 1000-1014.  
Shepherd, D.A., Douglas, E.J. ,Shanley, M. 2000. New venture survival: Ignorance, external 
shocks, and risk deduction strategies. Journal of Business Venturing 15 (5-6), 393-410. 
Sidhu, J., Commandeur, H.R., Volberda, H.W. 2007. The multifaceted nature of 
exploration and exploitation: Value of supply, demand, and spatial search for innovation. 
Organization Science 18, 20-38. 
Sirmon D.G., Hitt, M.A. 2003. Managing resources: Linking unique resources, 
management and wealth creation in family firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice 27(4), 339-358. 
Srivastava, M.K., Gnyawali, D.R. 2011. When do relational resources matter? Leveraging 
portfolio technological resources for breakthrough innovation. Academy of 
Management Journal 54(4), 797-810. 
Stigliani, I., Ravasi, D. 2012. Organizing thoughts and connecting brains: Material 
practices and the transition from individual to group-level prospective sensemaking. 
Academy of Management Journal, July 2012. 
Stuart, T.E., Hoang, H., Hybels, R.C. 1999. Interorganizational endorsements and the 
performance of entrepreneurial ventures. Administrative Science Quarterly 44(2), 
315-349. 
Stuart, T.E., Sorenson, O. 2007. Strategic networks and entrepreneurial ventures. 
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 1, 211-227.  
Thakur, S.P. 1999. Size of investment, opportunity choice, and human resources in new 
venture growth: Some typologies. Journal of Business Venturing 14(3), 283-309. 
Tushman, M.L., O’Reilly, C.A. 1996. Ambidextrous organizations: Managing evolutionary 
and revolutionary change. California Management Review 38(4), 8-30. 
von Hippel, E., von Krogh, G. 2003. Open source software and the "private-collective" 
innovation model: Issues for organization science. Organization Science 14, 209-225.  
75 
 
von Krogh, G., Spaeth, S., Lakhani, K. 2003. Community, joining, and specialization in 
open source software innovation: A case study. Research Policy 32, 1217-1241. 
von Krogh, G., von Hippel, E. 2006. The promise of research on open source software. 
Management Science 52(7), 975-983. 
Ven, K., Mannaert, H. 2008. Challenges and strategies in the use of open source software 
by independent software vendors. Information and Software Technology 50 (9-10), 
991-1002. 
Volberda, H., Lewin, A. 2003. Co-evolutionary dynamics within and between firms: from 
evolution to coevolution. Journal of Management Studies 40, 2111-2136. 
Ven, K., Verhelst, J., Mannaert, H. 2008. Should you adopt open source software? IEEE 
Software 25(3), 54-59. 
Yin, R.K. 1984. Case study research: Design and methods. Sage, London. 
Zahra, S. 1996. Technology strategy and performance. A study of corporate-sponsored 
and independent biotechnology ventures. Journal of Business Venturing 11(4), 298-
321. 
Zahra, S., Wright, M. 2011. Entrepreneurship’s next act. Academy of Management 
Perspectives 25(4), 67-83. 
  
76 
 
  
77 
 
3 Creating Value in Ecosystems: Crossing the Chasm between 
Knowledge and Business Ecosystems 
 
ABSTRACT 
Policy makers take initiatives to stimulate knowledge ecosystems in technology 
hotspots. It is implicitly assumed that these ecosystems will lead to value networks 
through which the participating companies can realize a competitive advantage. Value 
networks refer to business ecosystems where the value proposition is offered by a group 
of companies which are mutually complementary. The strategy literature suggests that 
business ecosystems lead to competitive advantages for each of the partners in the 
ecosystem. Based on a unique hand-collected database of 138 innovative start-ups in the 
region of Flanders, we analyze the knowledge and business ecosystems and the financial 
support network. We find that the knowledge ecosystem is well structured and 
concentrated around a number of central actors while the business ecosystem is almost 
non-existent at the local level. Further, we find that the financial support network is 
almost 100% publicly backed and fails to bridge the knowledge and business ecosystem. 
The implications for policy makers who tend to focus on the development of local 
ecosystems are discussed. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The literature has long recognized the advantages for innovative start-ups to be 
localized in geographical hotspots, usually centered on leading universities and public 
research organizations (Link and Scott, 2003; Van Looy et al., 2003; Löfsten and 
Lindelöf, 2001; Pouder and St John, 1996; Saxenian, 1996, 2006; Zucker and Darby, 
2001). The flow of tacit knowledge between companies and the mobility of personnel 
(Saxenian, 1996, 2006) have been advanced as the main advantages of geographic 
colocation which characterize these hotspots. Such hotspots have been characterized as 
knowledge ecosystems where local universities and public research organizations play a 
central role in advancing technological innovation within the system.  
In contrast, the strategic management literature focuses on business ecosystems as 
sources of competitive advantage for individual companies (Iansiti and Levien, 2004). A 
business ecosystem finds its roots in the idea of value networks (Normann and Ramirez, 
1993) and can be seen as a group of companies, which simultaneously create value by 
combining their skills and assets (Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000). Business ecosystems 
create value for an individual participant only when the participant is not capable of 
commercializing a product or service relying on its own competences (Lin et al., 2010). 
Such ecosystems are organized as complex networks of firms whose integrated efforts 
are focused on addressing the needs of the end customer. There is a growing consensus 
that business ecosystems provide entrepreneurial firms with resources and information 
to navigate in a constantly changing competitive environment (Zahra and Nambisan, 
2012). Quite often, it is implicitly assumed that business ecosystems are the automatic 
consequence of setting up a knowledge ecosystem. However, to date, it is not clear 
whether the success factors that lead to knowledge ecosystems are similar to those for 
business ecosystems. Companies participating in a knowledge ecosystem which can 
make use of knowledge available in the region may not necessarily mean that these 
companies will also participate in the same business ecosystem. Hence, in this study we 
explore the question of existence of a relation between knowledge and business 
ecosystems.   
This question is of particular interest from a policy perspective as policy makers 
increasingly invest in regional innovation systems, which foster the creation of 
innovative start-ups around so-called knowledge hubs, using successful examples such 
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as Silicon Valley as a benchmark (Engel and del-Palacio, 2011). We focus on whether 
such a knowledge ecosystem translates into a business ecosystem and draw conclusions 
for innovation policies aimed at fostering business ecosystems. 
We make use of a unique hand collected database of 138 innovative start-ups in the 
region of Flanders, founded between 2006 and 2010. These companies are those which 
agreed to collaborate from a total database of 178 companies identified through public 
innovation advisors as start-ups in this region which could apply for a business plan 
development grant because they were developing a product or service based on or 
contingent on novel technologies that did not exist yet in Flanders. Since these 
innovation advisors receive incentives to identify innovative start-ups and guide them 
toward channels of public support, we are confident that these companies approximate 
the total population of innovative start-ups in that period. For each company we 
constructed the knowledge ecosystem they were embedded in, the business network 
they participated in, and the financial support network they made use of.  
We find that the density of the knowledge ecosystem was much higher than that of the 
business ecosystem and was dominated by those knowledge institutes which had 
developed incubator/accelerator facilities and formal tech transfer offices. The business 
ecosystem’s density was extremely sparse with only dyadic relations and a high amount 
of international partners, indicating that there is no overlap. Also the density of the 
financial support network was rather sparse, with only 40% of the start-ups 
participating in that network. It was dominated by public funds which took a central role 
while the private sector was almost completely absent. We found that working together 
with the top central actors in the knowledge network has a positive impact on the 
innovation output of innovative start-ups, but collaborations with average technology 
partners typically has a negative impact. Further, our findings show that receiving 
financial support from public funds, typically associated with these knowledge actors, 
does not help the knowledge production function of these companies at all. Since neither 
the knowledge ecosystem nor the financial support network directly contributes to 
short-term survival of innovative start-ups, the lack of a business ecosystem has severe 
policy implications. 
The chapter unfolds as follows. First, we review the literature on knowledge and 
business ecosystems. We subsequently describe the method we used to collect and 
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analyze the data. Finally, we discuss the results and their implications for our 
understanding of knowledge and business ecosystems and the innovation policies 
developed to support them. 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Knowledge Ecosystems 
The knowledge ecosystems literature has explored the mechanisms by which 
geographically clustered organizations benefit from their locations (Jaffe, 1986; Almeida 
and Kogut, 1999). This research stream has identified the reduced costs of moving 
people and ideas as the primary sources of advantage from being located in 
technological clusters (Clark et al., 2000). In addition to external economies of scale 
which allow firms in these ecosystems to benefit from collective resources, local 
spillovers make their technology development efforts more fertile than those of their 
isolated competitors (Agrawal and Cockburn, 2002). Both linkages among firms and 
with universities and public research organizations (PRO) as well as intense labor 
mobility across different players facilitate collective learning and increase the speed of 
innovation diffusion (Baptista, 1998). As a result, physical proximity to knowledge 
generators such as PROs, universities and large firms with established R&D departments 
typically have a positive influence on the focal firm’s innovation output (Phelps et al., 
2012).  
Contemporary literature on knowledge ecosystems has analyzed the extent to which a 
focal company’s centrality in a global research network can substitute for not being part 
of a local technology hotspot (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Whittington et al., 2009). 
The main findings show that in a biotech environment, participating in a global research 
network can partly substitute the lack of geographical proximity to a technology hub in 
terms of its impact on the innovation output of the focal firm. However, being part of a 
dense knowledge ecosystem such as the Boston, San Diego and San Francisco Bay areas 
remains the most important predictor of innovation output of a biotech company 
(Whittington et al., 2009). In other words, from a policy perspective, creating such a 
dense knowledge ecosystem remains the best guarantee to spur a high degree of 
innovation in the area. 
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Powell et al., (2010) analyzed the critical success factors in developing biotech 
knowledge ecosystems in the San Francisco Bay area, the Boston and Cambridge, MA 
area, and Northern San Diego County. They consider two features and one mechanism to 
be central to the development of knowledge ecosystems: (1) a diversity of 
organizational forms and (2) the presence of an anchor tenant, and (3) the mechanism of 
cross-realm transposition. First, a diversity of organizational forms generates divergent 
standards and multiple kinds of rules, resulting in competing criteria for gauging success 
(Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). Including groups of organizations in the different parts 
of the value chain increases the adaptive capacity of the ecosystems more than if the 
system is dominated in only one area (Baptista, 1998). The availability of different 
actors such as universities and PROs, entrepreneurial firms, established companies, and 
venture capital firms has also been described in contemporary works on regional 
clusters (Saxenian, 1996). A second crucial feature is the presence of an anchor tenant. 
Anchor tenants assist in providing access to subsequent connections and field formation 
and hence actively spur economic growth (Agrawal and Cockburn, 2003). The anchor 
tenant is not disinterested, in the sense of being neutral, but does not directly compete 
with the other types of organizations that inhabit the community. Local universities or 
PROs can fulfill the role of anchor organizations in the knowledge generation process 
(Agrawal and Cockburn, 2002). These institutions produce basic and applied research 
and act as catalysts of technological innovation by transferring this to local industry 
through R&D collaborations. In turn, firms utilize this knowledge for industrial and 
commercial purposes (Friedman and Silberman, 2003). Diversity and anchor tenants 
alone are usually not sufficient to spur the emergence of an ecosystem, however. Some 
form of cross-network alignment is needed in which ideas and models are transposed 
from one network of organizational forms to another, for instance when the venture 
capital logic spills-over into the academic community in the context of spin-off ventures 
(Wright et al., 2006). This mechanism is called cross-realm transposition. 
Powell et al.’s. (2010) analysis focuses on the development of knowledge ecosystems in 
the particular setting of biotechnology. In the biotech industry, the mere presence of 
innovation output creates immediate economic value. Organizational growth in this 
industry results mainly from building an IP portfolio which ultimately gets sold to an 
incumbent company on the market for technology (Clarysse et al., 2011). R&D alliances 
between biotech firms and other research active organizations dominate in this 
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environment and are good predictors of exploitative alliances which determine the 
commercial potential of the biotech company (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). As a result, 
biotech start-ups with a central position in the knowledge creation network of R&D 
alliances also tend to be successful in setting up exploitative alliances with large 
pharmaceutical companies to capture the value of their technology.  
The implicit assumption made by research in the area of knowledge ecosystems is that 
they quasi-automatically evolve into business ecosystems. This means that creating a 
successful knowledge ecosystem is considered to be sufficient to create areas of true 
economic growth. We focus on (a) whether knowledge ecosystems are developed and 
(b) whether they lead to business ecosystems. 
3.2.2  Business Ecosystems 
Industries such as biotech are organized as value chains characterized by a linear 
knowledge creation – knowledge commercialization process (Gans and Stern, 2003). 
There is a clear division of innovative labor where entrepreneurial firms are specialized 
in knowledge creation and large, established firms are specialized in knowledge 
commercialization.  However, business ecosystems do not follow a linear value creation 
process and many of the players in such ecosystems fall outside the traditional value 
chain (Iansiti and Levien, 2004). Instead, different companies cooperate to jointly 
deliver a product or service to a customer. As a result, the value chain is not a linear 
process with upstream and downstream players, but is a network of companies with 
many horizontal relations (Moore, 1996). The members of such an ecosystem deliver 
value to end customers as an interrelated system of interdependent companies rather 
than as individual companies. Business ecosystems are nested commercial systems 
where each player contributes a specific component of an overarching solution 
(Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995). In a business ecosystem, inter-organizational 
networks consist of both collaborative and competitive relationships which results in a 
“coopetition” structure (Moore, 1993). As a result, it is the competition among 
ecosystems, not individual companies, that largely fuels the next round of innovations. 
Innovation in business ecosystems goes beyond the focus on technological activity alone 
which is characteristic of knowledge ecosystems. Business ecosystems introduce the 
customer (demand) side which is mainly absent in innovation ecosystems (Wright, 
2014). Companies collaborate to create and deliver solutions that meet the full package 
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of value to customers (Moore, 1993). In other words, business ecosystems allow firms to 
create value which no single firm could create by itself (Adner, 2006).  It also involves 
the creation of new markets and often entails the pursuit of relatively small and poorly 
defined commercial opportunities. For example, Kahney (2004) describes how Apple 
leveraged its business ecosystem to develop an easy-to-use MP3 player and music 
management and purchase software, which resulted in the iPod.  
Iansiti and Levien (2004) have described how companies such as Walmart and Microsoft 
developed competitive advantages by having a strategy to build a business ecosystem 
around their value proposition. Along the same lines, Gawer and Cusumano (2002) refer 
to multinationals in the digital economy which are able to manage innovation through 
their business ecosystem as ‘platform leaders’. Birkinshaw and Hill (2005) refer to 
ecosystem venturing as a strategy used by large companies to build a business 
ecosystem around the company by incubating and accelerating start-up activities related 
to the company’s innovation strategy. 
Through collaboration in a value network, firms exploit their interdependencies and 
have a competitive advantage over isolated companies which internalize all components 
of a value chain (Iansiti and Levien, 2004). For start-ups it is therefore important to 
participate in such a business ecosystem (Zahra and Nambisan, 2012). Companies in a 
business ecosystem co-evolve their capabilities and roles, and tend to align themselves 
with the directions set by one or more central companies. Hence, start-ups which can 
participate in such an ecosystem align their innovation function to the expectation of the 
leaders and move toward a shared vision (Moore, 1996). Numerous examples describe 
how start-ups in business ecosystems prosper from investments made by industry 
leaders to maintain the network (Birkinshaw and Hill, 2005; Kaminsky, 2000).  
Iansiti and Levien (2004) put forward two important ingredients that contribute to the 
success of business ecosystems. First, business ecosystems are characterized by a large 
number of loosely interconnected participants dependent on each other for their mutual 
performance. Each participant is specialized in a specific activity and it is the collective 
efforts of many participants that constitute value, while efforts individually have no 
value outside the collective effort. Rich networks sharing elements of both cooperation 
and competition emerge that link companies across products, services, and technologies. 
A second vital element is the need for a “keystone” company whose role is to ensure that 
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each member of the ecosystem remains in good health. They consistently invest in and 
integrate new technological innovations of other participants and encourage the 
creation of new markets by developing new fundamental infrastructures (Moore, 1993). 
Keystone companies also create “platforms” such as services, tools, or technologies, 
which are open for other players in the ecosystems to enhance their own performance 
(Iansiti and Levien, 2004). Consequently, keystone players are involved with the 
creation of value within the ecosystems as well as sharing the value with the other 
participants.    
Taken together, we observe three important factors in which knowledge and business 
ecosystems differ. First, the primary activity in knowledge ecosystems is the generation 
of new knowledge whereas the focus in business ecosystems is on value for customers. 
Second, players in a knowledge ecosystem are typically connected in a dense, 
geographically clustered network while business ecosystems are represented by value 
networks which can be globally dispersed. Third, knowledge ecosystems are centered 
on a university or PRO whereas large companies are the leaders of business ecosystems. 
Table 3 below provides an overview of these factors.  
Table 3: Overview of differences between knowledge and business ecosystems 
Factor Knowledge ecosystem Business ecosystem 
Focus of activity Knowledge generation Customer value 
Connectivity of players Geographically clustered Value network 
Key player University or PRO Large company 
 
Policy makers world-wide have sought out the most effective mechanisms to stimulate 
ecosystem development. Adopting a knowledge ecosystem philosophy, they have 
established policies giving a crucial role to universities and PROs as engines of regional 
economic development and drivers of technological innovation (Florida and Cohen, 
1999). Universities and PROs are catalysts of innovation, stimulating the production and 
diffusion of knowledge across regions (Finegold, 1999). Facilitating knowledge transfer 
via different mechanisms such as contract research and spin-offs became the third 
mission of these organizations after teaching and research, and they received structural 
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support from governments to fulfill this role (Debackere and Veugelers, 2005). In 
addition, governments have also implemented several initiatives specifically geared 
toward fostering innovative start-ups in the ecosystem, most notably stimulating access 
to external capital (Wright et al., 2006).  
Despite these policy initiatives, there is no guarantee that these knowledge ecosystems 
will evolve into business ecosystems as the dynamics in both are fundamentally 
different (Iansiti and Levien, 2004). Still, policy makers expect that the development of a 
knowledge ecosystem will facilitate the companies embedded in this ecosystem to 
become part of a larger business ecosystem. This is a strong hypothesis as both 
ecosystems are considerably different in terms of drivers and characteristics (see Table 
3). We will further investigate this hypothesis in the remainder of the chapter. 
3.3 Research Setting 
To address this issue, we focus on Flanders, a small region in northern Belgium, as an 
empirical context. Since the regionalization of science, technology and innovation policy 
in Belgium in 1991, the region autonomously decides on its innovation policy. The 
region is committed to invest 3% of its GDP (38 billion Euros) on R&D. A wide range of 
actors and stakeholders are involved in the Flemish Science and Technology Innovation 
system (Belgian Report on Science, Technology and Innovation, 2010): public 
administrations and agencies, knowledge institutes and centers, universities and 
university colleges, scientific institutes, PROs, university hospitals, various collective 
research centers, incubation centers, private companies, etc. Among these actors, the 
Flemish Agency of Innovation for Science and Technology (IWT)6 is the one-stop-shop 
financing industrial R&D and innovation in Flanders. They offer both direct funding for 
R&D and innovation and indirect funding through a network of innovation advisors 
(VIN). In total 1374 people in 220 intermediary organizations, such as knowledge 
centers, collective research centers and industry federations, provide advice to the local 
industrial community about new technologies in their sector, new innovative 
applications, how to finance innovation and how to get subsidies. 
Public sector financial support schemes are important for high-tech firms (Wright et al., 
2006). In addition to giving R&D grants, innovation support and indirect support 
                                                        
6
 Agentschap voor aanmoediging van Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technology 
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through the network of innovation advisors, the government manages through PMV7 a 
public risk capital fund (VINNOF), providing seed and early stage capital to innovative 
start-ups and is a shareholder in GIMV,8 which provides venture capital (early and later 
stage) to innovative start-ups. In addition, the government has invested €211mn since 
2005 in 12 funds through its ARKIMEDES program, a co-financing scheme for funds 
committed to invest in innovative start-ups.  
In addition to the private sector, universities and PROs play a key role in R&D in 
Flanders. Six major universities and four major PROs represent the majority of 
knowledge production (Wright et al., 2008). The universities represent 90% of all non-
private scientific output. In 2007, total expenditure in R&D in higher education was € 
739mn, of which 15.6% was privately and 84.4% was publicly funded. KULeuven, the 
largest university in Flanders spent €300mn in 2008 on R&D and has 85 active spin-offs 
today. Ghent University follows with €200mn R&D spending in 2008 and 60 active spin-
offs, while Brussels University (VUB) spent €70mn on R&D. In addition to the 
universities, there are six major PROs, four of which were founded before 2009 (and are 
relevant for our study). In 2009, these four centers collectively received an annual grant 
of €135mn in total. We refer to Table 4 for an overview of the PROs. 
  
                                                        
7
 Participatiemaatschappij Vlaanderen 
8
 Gewestelijke Investeringsmaatschappij Vlaanderen 
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Table 4: Overview of PROs 
 Research Expertise Founded 
in 
Operating 
budget 
2008 
#researchers #spin-offs 
IMEC Microelectronics (Research in 
nanotechnology) 
1984 €270mn 2000 26 
VIB Biotechnology 1995 €62.5mn 1200 12 
VITO Technological Research 
(Environment, Energy, materials 
and remote sensing) 
1991 €73.5mn 600  
IBBT 
(iMinds) 
Broadband Technology 2004 €26.4mn 1000 13 
Source: Belgian Report on Science, Technology and Innovation 2010 
To analyze the knowledge and business ecosystems, we gathered survey and secondary 
data to examine the R&D and commercial alliances of new technology-based firms 
founded in Flanders between 2006 and 2010. We started with a list of 211 new ventures 
provided by the innovation advisors of the IWT. After consulting the BELFIRST database 
for the founding year, companies older than 3 years at the time of initial data collection 
(2009) were eliminated. Of the remaining 185 companies that were contacted, 7 had 
been acquired or dissolved, leaving us with a sample of 178 companies. 138 of these 
firms agreed to participate in our study resulting in a response rate of 78%. Non-
response analysis did not reveal significant differences between the 40 which did not 
and those that did participate in terms of age, sector or revenues in 2012. The 
descriptive statistics of the participating companies are included in Table 5. This 
database is unique as it involves most of the new ventures created in the region with the 
specific objective to develop products or services new to the region and that are either 
based on novel technologies or involve the development of novel technologies.  
In the first interview round (118 companies interviewed in 2009 and 20 in 2010), 
general data about the company, team, founding conditions and activities was collected. 
This baseline information was collected by using a structured questionnaire during face-
to-face interviews which lasted between 30 minutes and 2 hours. These face-to-face 
interviews were extremely helpful to explain the upcoming longitudinal research design.  
Table 5: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Number of patents 
0.92 2.46 1.00 
   
  
   
  
 2. Top TP (dummy) 
0.39 0.49 0.226** 1.00 
        3. No TP (dummy) 
0.38 0.49 -0.10 -0.62*** 1.00 
       4. Top FP (dummy) 
0.19 0.39 -0.04 0.11 -0.11 1.00 
      5. No FP (dummy) 
0.70 0.46 -0.3*** -0.26** 0.18* -0.74*** 1.00 
     6. ICT (dummy) 
0.34 0.48 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.07 1.00 
    7. Manufacturing & Engineering (dummy) 
0.15 0.36 -0.03 0.07 -0.08 0.16 -0.08 -0.26** 1.00 
   8. Company age (in months) 
36.51 15.38 0.10 -0.12 -0.06 0.09 -0.13 -0.06 0.07 1.00 
  9. Number of employees 
5.67 7.14 0.25** 0.15 -0.11 0.03 -0.28*** 0.03 -0.06 0.24** 1.00 
 10. Failure (dummy) 
0.25 0.44 -0.1 -0.13 0.06 0.02 0.09 -0.07 0.26** 0.04 -0.15 1.00 
          
  
  TP: Technology Partner 
            FP: Financial Partner 
            n=138 
             * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
           
In the two follow-up rounds in 2010 and 2011, we collected data on investments and 
partnerships using a web-based survey supported by telephonic follow-up. The survey 
data was strengthened by supporting data collected from IWT, BELFIRST, GRAYDON, 
VENTUREEXPERT, EPO, Belgian Office Journal and the company websites. In sum, data 
on ecosystems was collected using several information sources. 
3.3.1 The Knowledge Ecosystem   
For each company studied, we calculated the alliances they have set up with the 
universities, PROs and R&D departments of established industrial firms based upon the 
projects they submitted to the IWT to get co-financing for these collaborations.9 We used 
the annual reports of the IWT from 2006 to 2011 to collect information about the 
requests for support for R&D. These reports contain an overview of the partners 
involved and the subject of the project. The pre-condition to submit a proposal is that 
the project should have a technological component and there should be technological 
uncertainty involved in progressing the project. In other words, the partnerships were 
mainly R&D focused. Using the IWT database, we identified 177 dyads between 86 
innovative start-ups on the one hand (out of 138) and 82 technology partners on the 
other hand, in the period 2006-2011. The information was used to calculate the 
symmetric dyad graphs included in Figure 1.  
3.3.2 The Business Ecosystem  
Further, we asked for information on the commercial co-operations established with 
other business partners. Commercial co-operations involve relationships with “key 
customers” with whom they had tested their prototype, further developed their 
prototype into a commercially viable product or leveraged their prototype into a 
scalable product and the key “business partners” with which they jointly had developed 
a business proposition for a common customer. In total, we identified 584 commercial 
alliances which represent dyads in our analysis between 80 innovative start-ups on the 
one hand and 547 industrial partners on the other. This information was used to 
calculate the business ecosystem in Figures 4-6.  
                                                        
9
 IWT co-finances between 15% and 50% of exploration alliances that are set up between companies or between 
companies and universities/PROs. Exploration means that the subject of the alliance should be the development 
of a new technology or a new product based upon a novel technology. New or novel means that it does not exist 
yet in Flanders 
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3.3.3 The Financial Support Network  
Finally, we also collected information about the financial support network of these 
innovative start-ups. Powell et al., (2010) argue that financial investors such as venture 
capitalists (VC) play a prominent role in bridging the gap between the production of new 
knowledge and the subsequent commercialization of that knowledge. To calculate the 
financial support network, we asked each start-up whether they had received financial 
support and from which investor. We cross-checked these answers relating to financial 
support with the websites of the investors which list the portfolio companies they invest 
in. Only for the business angels involved in the companies was no further information 
found. In total, we identified 102 dyads between 41 (out of 138) innovative start-ups 
receiving financial support on the one hand and 54 financial investors.  
3.4 Analysis of the Business and Knowledge Ecosystems and the 
Financial Support Network 
To analyze the knowledge and business ecosystems and the financial support network in 
the region, we used Ucinet 6.461 as a software program (Borgatti et al., 2002). We 
calculate Freeman’s (1979) degree and normalized degree as measures of centrality. 
Degree refers to the total number of direct ties the organization has, while normalized 
degree includes the number of direct ties divided by the total number of ties in the 
network. In addition we calculated the total network centralization as a measure of 
equality in the centralization of the total network and network density as an indicator of 
collaboration activity.  
3.4.1 The Knowledge Ecosystem 
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the knowledge ecosystem which has a 
network density of 0.007. This implies that a large number of dyads do not exist yet in 
the network. Two major universities in the region (KULeuven and UGent) and two of the 
four major PROs (IMEC and IBBT) play a leading role together with Sirris, which is the 
knowledge center of the major ICT industry federation (Agoria) (see Figure 2 and Figure 
3).10 The two universities, two PROs and the industry specific knowledge center seem to 
be Anchor-tenants as defined in the Powell et al., (2010) framework. These are the 
                                                        
10 Figure 2 and 3 present sub-networks of the complex knowledge ecosystem in Figure 1, and include only the 
academic partners and the PRO partners respectively.   
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central knowledge generators in the knowledge ecosystem with a normalized degree > 
4%, each. KULeuven has the highest share, which reflects its status as the largest 
research university in the region. We label these five central partners in the knowledge 
network as “top knowledge partners”. Since almost two out of three innovative start-ups 
in the ecosystem participate in the knowledge ecosystem, we can conclude that there is 
a high degree of cooperation among the actors and we can talk of a dense local network, 
which reflects a technology hotspot.  
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Figure 1: Knowledge ecosystem in Flanders 
 
 
 
Type 
Degree 
(centrality) 
Norm. 
Degree 
(centrality) 
Network  
Centralization 
Network 
Density 
Network    11.75% 0.007 
KULeuven University 27 16.265 
UGent University 20 12.048 
IBBT (iMinds) PRO 11 6.627 
SIRRIS PRO 8 4.819 
IMEC PRO 8 4.819 
UA University 5 3.012 
UHasselt University 5 3.012 
HOGent University 4 2.410 
KAHO Sint-
Lieven 
University 4 2.410 
 
Degree (centrality) = number of direct links 
Norm. Degree (centrality)= (number of direct links/total number of links)*100 
Network Centralization = Centralization= 100* Σ(C*-Ci) / Max Σ(C*-Ci) , where C* is the centrality of the 
most central actor and Ci, the centrality of all the other I actors 
Network Density= Sum of existing ties divided by the number of all possible ties 
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Figure 2: Knowledge ecosystem in Flanders including only academic partners 
(universities and university colleges)  
 
Figure 3: Knowledge ecosystem in Flanders including only PRO partners 
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3.4.2  The Business Ecosystem 
Figure 4 shows the results and network statistics of the business ecosystem where local 
and international business partners form a value network in which the innovative start-
ups participate.  
 
Figure 4: Business ecosystem in Flanders 
 
 
Degree 
(centrality) 
Norm. 
Degree 
(centrality) 
Network 
Centralization 
Network 
Density 
Total Network   8.88% 0.002 
Microsoft 3 0.482 
Nieuwsblad 3 0.482 
Deloitte 3 0.482 
VRT 3 0.482 
NMBS 3 0.482 
 
Degree (centrality) = number of direct links 
Norm. Degree (centrality)= (number of direct links/total number of links)*100 
Network Centralization = Centralization= 100* Σ(C*-Ci) / Max Σ(C*-Ci) , where C* is the centrality of the 
most central actor and Ci, the centrality of all the other I actors 
Network Density= Sum of existing ties divided by the number of all possible ties 
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It is clear that there are very few overlaps and that no organization takes the lead in the 
business ecosystem and hence fulfills the role of keystone player. The density of the 
network drops to 0.002 and the most central organizations only have a degree of 3, 
which means that they only collaborate with three innovative start-ups in total. Because 
the innovative start-ups included in Figure 4 are spread over different technological 
domains and are collaborating with a variety of research organization we took a 
subsample of the knowledge ecosystem, namely those innovative start-ups that only 
collaborate with the top-5 central organizations in the knowledge ecosystem 
(KULeuven, UGent, IBBT, Sirris and IMEC). Among these organizations, we only selected 
the innovative start-ups in ICT of which we can reasonably expect that there would be 
similar industrial companies with which these organizations can form partnerships.  
Figure 5: Business ecosystem in ICT with IBBT, UGent, KULeuven, Sirris and IMEC 
as central knowledge hubs 
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Figure 6: Business ecosystem in ICT with IBBT, iMinds,  as central knowledge hub 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the network of all the business partners around the top-5 central 
organizations. In Figure 6, we show the specific business partnerships of one business 
network, namely the one around IBBT (iMinds). The results are surprising. We would 
expect that a number of central “industrial leaders” would take the role of keystone 
players like the PROs in the knowledge ecosystem. As described in the business 
ecosystem literature (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Iansiti and Levien, 2004), these 
industrial leaders are companies like Microsoft and Cisco that create ecosystems around 
their businesses by supporting innovative start-ups. These industry leaders act as lead 
users (Von Hippel, 1986) which facilitate innovative start-ups to upgrade their 
prototypes and make them compatible with the expectations of other companies. It is 
clear that no business ecosystem has developed in the region although a few innovative 
start-ups that take part in the knowledge ecosystem succeed in integrating into 
Microsoft’s business ecosystem. However, overall, the innovative start-ups collaborate 
with different partners separately and try to develop an independent network but no 
industrial organization takes a central role. It is even surprising how scarce the relations 
are among the different independent start-ups themselves. In sum, our findings indicate 
that a business ecosystem is non-existent. This finding leads to hypothesize that, in 
contrast to policy maker expectations set out in Section 3.2, a tight knowledge 
ecosystem does not automatically lead to the emergence of a business ecosystem.  
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3.4.3  The Financial Support Network 
Following the same logic as above, we map the financial network that supports these 
innovative start-ups (see Figure 7). The overall network density is about the same as in 
the knowledge ecosystem. However, only 40% of the innovative start-ups received some 
form of investment.  
Figure 7: Financial support network in Flanders 
 
 
Type 
Degree 
(centrality) 
Norm. 
Degree 
(centrality) 
Network 
Centralization 
Network 
Density 
Total Network    8.72% 0.006 
VINNOF Public  13 13.83 
IBBT Incubator 7 7.447 
LRM Public  6 6.383 
Allegro Investment 
Fund 
Private 5 
5.319 
KULeuven/Gemma 
Frisius Fund 
University 4 
4.255 
UGent/Baekelandt 
Fund 
University 4 
4.255 
 
Degree (centrality) = number of direct links 
Norm. Degree (centrality)= (number of direct links/total number of links)*100 
Network Centralization = Centralization= 100* Σ(C*-Ci) / Max Σ(C*-Ci) , where C* is the centrality of the 
most central actor and Ci, the centrality of all the other I actors 
Network Density= Sum of existing ties divided by the number of all possible ties 
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The network centralization index is higher, which means that centrality is less spread 
over a number of key actors. In fact, VINNOF (Flemish Innovation Fund) plays the most 
prominent role. This is the main public fund which targets seed and early stage 
financing. Also, the other actors in the financial support network are mainly public. LRM 
is a regional fund in the north of Flanders, which is 100% publicly financed and IBBT 
(iMinds), KULeuven and UGent are a PRO and two universities, which have their own 
incubation/university funds that are involved in their spin-offs. The only notable 
exception is the Allegro Investment Fund, a 100% private fund set up by a few serial 
entrepreneurs in the region. Similar to the top knowledge partners, we label the top five 
financial partners in the support network “top financial partners”.  The lack of private 
initiatives in the financial support network is remarkable. 
Based on the network indices, we conclude that the private sector is only marginally 
involved in investing in innovative start-ups in Flanders since mostly public financiers 
play a role in supporting innovative start-ups. Moreover, the majority of the public 
investors are closely linked to the leading PROs and/or the university. This means that 
the financial agents in the ecosystem do not form a mechanism of cross realm 
transposition. This leads us to propose the hypothesis that for a knowledge network to 
evolve into a business ecosystem, private financial agents should take over the lead of 
public sector organizations and be the first mechanism of cross realm transposition. 
3.5 The Influence of the Knowledge Ecosystem and Financial Support 
Network on the Performance of Innovative Start-ups 
3.5.1 Innovation Output of Innovative Start-ups 
The performance indicator in the knowledge ecosystem is the firm’s level of innovation 
output (Powell et al., 2010), measured by the count of patents with the EPO.11 We 
analyze whether collaboration with more central research partners had a positive 
impact on the innovation output, measured by the number of patents, of the focal firm. 
The mean number of patents was 0.9, while the standard deviation was 2.46, which 
indicates that over-dispersion might distort the interpretation of other count models 
such as a Poisson regression (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986). A negative binomial 
                                                        
11
 As a sensitivity check, we also used more fine-grained measures of innovation output such as the citation 
weighted EPOs, but this had no impact on our results. We therefore chose to use the simplest measure in the 
further analysis. 
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estimation was therefore necessary. Table 6 shows the results of this analysis. In the 
first stage, we enter only the control variables (age, size, and sector). Firm size is 
positively associated with the number of patents.   
Table 6: Innovation output (Negative binomial regression) 
     
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Controls      
ICT (dummy) -0.014 -0.003 0,07 0,046 0,152 
       0.35) (0.336) (0.32) (0.315) (0.318) 
Manufacturing & engineering (dummy) -0.1 -0.031 0.347 0,301 0,415 
  (0.466) (0.46) (0.428) (0.423) (0.422) 
Number of employees (log) 0.835*** 0.695*** 0.439* 0.398* 0.421* 
 (0.249) (0.241) (0.233) (0.229) (0.233) 
Company age -0.005 -0.000 -0.005 -0.000 -0.003 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Predictors      
Top technology partners  1.657***  1.052** 1.065** 
  (0.494)  (0.479) (0.474) 
No technology partners  0.884*  0.805* 0.848* 
  (0.524)  (0.485) (0.479) 
Top financial partners   -1.696*** -1.482*** -0.893 
   (0.494) (0.491) (0.584) 
No financial partners   -1.999$ -1.717$ -1.193** 
   (0.403) (0.42) (0.509) 
Top technology partners * Top financial partners     -1.747* 
     (1.058) 
Top technology partners * No financial partners     -1.293 
     (0.893) 
R² 0.04 0.078 0.11 0.125 0.133 
Chi² 14.04** 27.04$ 38.12$ 43.21$ 45.97$ 
N 138 138 138 138 138 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, $ p<0.001     
 
In model 2, consistent with the extant literature on knowledge ecosystems  (Tallman et 
al., 2004; Boschma, 2005; Whittington et al., 2009), we find that being close to the most 
central organizations in the knowledge ecosystem has a positive impact on the 
innovation output of the focal firm. Having no technology partners at all, on the other 
hand, is better than working with non-central technology partners in the knowledge 
ecosystem. Hence, collaborating with local strong knowledge providers such as PROs or 
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universities accelerates the innovation output of the start-ups, but collaborating with 
technology institutes which have no central role in the knowledge ecosystem has a 
negative impact. The top institutes in Flanders play their role as anchor organizations in 
the knowledge ecosystem and have a positive impact on the innovative performance of 
the start-ups which collaborate with them. 
Table 6 also shows the impact of working together with a central financial partner on 
the innovation output of the innovative start-ups. Surprisingly, we find that receiving 
finance from the more central financial players in the Flemish network (VINNOF, LRM, 
Allegro, UGent, and Baekelandt) has a negative impact on the venture’s innovation 
output. This indicates that these investors mainly want to exploit technology rather than 
further developing technology portfolios to target the market for products or the market 
for technology (Clarysse et al., 2011). Those innovative ventures which do not attract 
financial investors have even lower levels of innovation output. However, working 
together with less embedded financial investors such as GIMV does have a positive 
impact on the level of innovation output. This suggests that start-ups with the most 
promising technology opportunities tend to look for investors that are not necessarily 
very well embedded or that do not necessarily target the local industrial community but 
are able to attract investors that only play a minor role in the local community. The 
result, however, is that the most embedded local investors play only a marginal role in 
helping to sustain the Flemish knowledge ecosystem.  
This finding extends Powell et al.’s (2010) view on how clusters develop as they do not 
distinguish between exogenous entry of agents such as investors into a network versus 
endogenous initiatives taken by local entrepreneurs or policy makers. In other words, to 
make a knowledge ecosystem sustainable in itself, a realm transposition needs to take 
place between the new network (e.g., the financial investors) and the old one (e.g., the 
knowledge network). The realm assumes that the new network introduces a new modus 
operandi which is then adopted by the actors in the old network. However, if the public 
funds are extensions of the knowledge actors in the old network, they do not bring new 
practices into the ecosystem, but extend the logic of the knowledge actors. This is exactly 
what we observe here. Most financial investors do not contribute to the start-ups’ 
innovation output. This finding lends further support to the hypothesis proposed in 
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Section 3.3.3 that private financial agents play a central role in facilitating the transition 
from knowledge to business ecosystems. 
3.5.2 Survival of Innovative Start-ups 
The business ecosystem literature proposes firm survival as the main performance 
indicator (Iansiti and Levien, 2004), especially for innovative start-ups as they operate 
in markets not yet clearly developed (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). Survival is less 
industry sensitive than other measures such as revenues.12 We operationalize firm 
survival as a dummy variable equaling 1 if the innovative start-up failed during the 
period under study and 0 otherwise. Failures included completed bankruptcies, 
completed liquidations, closures based on company request, and merger or acquisition 
of organizations at risk of bankruptcy (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). We first identified 
whether a start-up had failed using the Belgian Official Journal. Secondly, we used 
financial reports from GRAYDON to identify companies experiencing difficulties in 
fulfilling their financial obligations. The founders of these firms were contacted and 
coded “1” if the founder confirmed that the company was bankrupt, liquidated or closed. 
We use survival analysis to examine firm survival (e.g., Dencker et al., 2009; Geroski et 
al., 2010) and employ a Cox proportional hazard model. The results are presented in 
Table 7. 
  
                                                        
12
 In further sensitivity analysis, we checked with other performance measures we had at hand such as the degree 
to which the founders of these innovative start-ups perceived themselves to being ahead of or falling behind their 
initial plans in terms of performance. The use of this performance indicator did not impact our results. Hence, we 
chose to elaborate our analysis using survival.  
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Table 7: Cox proportional hazard model 
   
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Predictors     
Top technology partners  1,042  0,982 
  (0.491)  (0.460) 
No technology partners  1,257  1,093 
  (0.521)  (0.462) 
Top financial partners   2,313 2,293 
   (2.526) (2.512) 
No financial partners   3,653 3,541 
   (3.919) (3.831) 
     
Controls     
Number of patents 0,894 0,898 0,974 0,974 
 (0.141) (0.144) (0.153) (0.155) 
ICT (dummy) 1,421 1,451 1,478 1,488 
 (0.597) (0.613) (0.629) (0.635) 
Manufacturing & engineering (dummy) 2.956*** 3.059*** 3.427*** 3.446*** 
 (1.218) (1.282) (1.496) (1.511) 
Number of employees (log) 0.566*** 0.572*** 0.571** 0.576** 
 (0.119) (0.123) (0.124) (0.127) 
     
Chi² 14.61*** 14.96** 17.23*** 17.31** 
N 138 138 138 138 
          
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, $ p<0.001     
 
Interestingly, working together with central partners in the knowledge ecosystem does 
not impact the survival rate of the innovative start-ups. Even worse, working with 
centrally embedded financial investors does not improve survival rates. This is 
surprising as one would expect that if they do not add to the innovation output in the 
knowledge ecosystem (see Table 6), they would at least add to the economic viability of 
the start-ups. But this is not the case. This result suggests that the financial investors 
locally embedded in the ecosystem do not improve the economic viability of that system. 
This finding lends further supports to the hypothesis proposed in Section 3.4.2 which 
states that a knowledge ecosystem does not automatically lead to a business ecosystem. 
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3.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
We have analyzed the tension between knowledge and business ecosystems. On the 
surface, the success factors for the two types of ecosystems look similar: diversity of 
organizations and anchor/keystone player. However, there are significant differences 
between the organization and dynamics in knowledge ecosystems versus those in 
business ecosystems. First, the anchor organizations in the former type of ecosystems 
are not directly competing within the ecosystem and are typically players such as 
universities and PROs. In contrast, keystone players in business ecosystems are large, 
established companies that provide key resources and commercial infrastructures to the 
different ecosystem niches. Second, knowledge ecosystems are based on value chains 
where value creation flows from upstream to downstream players. Business ecosystems, 
on the other hand, are characterized by a non-linear value creation process as groups of 
firms deliver integrated solutions to end users. Our findings have notable implications 
for policy which we elaborate below.  
3.6.1 Policy Implications 
Our analysis suggests that policy has focused too much on bilateral links rather than on 
an ecosystem approach. Much policy emphasis has been on the commercialization of 
research on one hand and innovation support to SMEs on the other. We discuss the 
implications of our research on both of these policy foci. 
First, to facilitate commercialization of research, universities have received funding to 
set up technology transfer offices (TTOs) and seed funds which support spin-offs. The 
literature on knowledge ecosystems (Powell et al., 2010; Whittington et al., 2009) has 
already shown that for such an ecosystem to evolve into a viable cluster of organizations 
there must be anchor organizations facilitating connections between different types of 
players. We observe in this study that the leading TTOs and PROs play these roles as 
anchor organizations. However, Powell and colleagues (2010) argue that there needs to 
be a transfer of logic between the different players in the ecosystem. They label this 
process of logic shift as cross-realm transposition.  It is questionable whether these 
funds bring a new logic into the ecosystem or whether they are just used to finance 
companies which follow an academic rather than a commercial logic. If cross-realm 
transposition takes place in the ecosystem, private VCs should play a much more 
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prominent role than is the case. This lack of cross-realm transposition is reflected in 
their negative impact on the level of innovation output of these start-ups and the 
absence of the impact of financial investors on their survival. Our results suggest that 
public funds, which tend to be very focused on the regional dimension, can add little 
value in building a complex network of relationships across different industrial players.  
Second, innovation policy typically has focused on creating a network of technology 
intermediaries to support SMEs and innovative ventures which are not spun off from the 
large research institutes. We observe that these less central technology institutes do not 
cooperate with companies with a positive innovation output, nor do they contribute to 
the survival of these companies. Iansiti and Levien (2004) have shown that leading 
industrial incumbents play a major role in stimulating these companies thereby creating 
a business ecosystem which develops a joint value proposition to a common customer. 
We observe that the business ecosystem in Flanders is completely absent. This means 
that none of the leading companies in the region plays the role of keystone or anchor 
company. This is remarkable as it is these large companies which play a major role in the 
development of US business ecosystems. One could question why even large public 
companies such as the national (regional) television station and the telecom operator 
are not encouraged to play more of a leading role in nurturing innovative start-ups in 
the region. Public procurement policies, such as the SBIR13 programme in the US, may 
provide an important stimulus to the creation of a business ecosystem. SBIR programme 
incentivizes large, established companies to invest part of their budgets in projects with 
local, innovative start-ups.  In Europe, EU policy does not allow such programmes and 
there is little support, even informally, to work with innovative start-ups at regional 
level. In contrast, subsidies are given to technology push intermediaries or sector 
federations, which typically support large, established players in the ecosystem. 
Alternatively, the question arises as to whether a region might benefit from a university-
centered knowledge ecosystem without having a well-defined related business 
ecosystem or a keystone player. However, the challenges in linking universities and 
industries are well-known. 
It is likely that if the innovation output of the knowledge ecosystem is commercializable 
through a more global business ecosystem, a business ecosystem in that same region is 
                                                        
13
 Small Business Innovation Research Programme (SBIR) 
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not required. If the knowledge is globally commercializable then in the absence of a local 
business ecosystem, the region needs to develop links to global business players. 
However, if policymakers see development of a knowledge ecosystem as a mechanism to 
create local employment, they may need to adopt policies to attract global firms. Overall, 
this raises questions about the extent to which an innovation policy toward the 
development of knowledge ecosystems in the absence of a business ecosystem makes 
sense. One could argue that value is created in the knowledge ecosystem but is captured 
by a few central players in the business ecosystem (Thomas, 2013). If a region wants to 
benefit from the value creation which happens within its knowledge ecosystem, it will 
have to find a way to attract the companies which also capture the value. This can be 
done either by providing an interesting environment to attract them or, more 
realistically, by making sure that the innovative start-ups in the knowledge ecosystem 
also co-capture that value in the business ecosystem. Co-creation does not automatically 
lead to co-capturing (Thomas, 2013) so facilitation is needed.  
In light of these observations, policy may therefore need to develop incentives and 
mechanisms to enable ecosystem links to develop. There is a need for reconfiguration 
and reorientation of policy to link knowledge and business ecosystem elements. One key 
policy challenge is how to bring larger corporations into the ecosystem. Perhaps there is 
a need to develop boundary spanners who can make the bridge – and develop training 
mechanisms to enable this. The extant literature on tech hubs and knowledge 
ecosystems has shown that TTOs at universities and PROs are successful in developing 
local knowledge networks (Whittington et al., 2009). Policy makers should consider 
structurally supporting similar functions at large, established companies. Dedicated 
innovation managers in firms that are critical industry hubs should pay specific 
attention to their role in the business ecosystems and develop initiatives that promote 
collaborations with local, innovative start-ups. They should monitor the health of the 
network of innovative start-ups and stimulate large firms and incumbents to continue 
investments in technologies and commercial infrastructures which these start-ups can 
leverage. These managers have to guarantee that the terms of collaboration for 
innovative start-ups promote sustainable growth, avoiding that large, established 
players develop into dominators. As put forward by Iansiti and Levien (2004), a healthy 
business ecosystem requires a healthy keystone as well as healthy innovative start-ups.    
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The weakness of the financial support network in bridging the knowledge and business 
ecosystems suggests a need for policy to develop a financial network beyond public 
sector provision, which is lacking in both the amounts of finance and the specialized 
strategy support that can be provided. There may be a need for a more differentiated 
approach to developing financial support networks. Stimulation of business angel and 
accelerator activity may warrant attention. There may also be a need to stimulate cross-
border venture capital provision, which may involve both cross-national and cross-
regional borders. For example, a potentially fruitful avenue to address spatial 
mismatches in equity funding is to consider how to stimulate cross-regional mobility in 
such funding provision where angel financiers may find it difficult to identify enough 
sufficiently attractive targets in the regions where they are located (Harrison et al., 
2010). Entrepreneurs in investment finance-deficient regions with ventures that may be 
potentially attractive to venture capital firms and business angels may therefore need to 
find ways to signal their quality to these financiers located outside their region (Mueller 
et al., 2012). Policy may therefore need to consider developing incentives and 
mechanisms to facilitate cross-regional access to angels.  
A further option may be to try to attract interest of new financial entrants. For example, 
a growing trend in the provision of entrepreneurial finance is the development of ‘family 
office’ funds, where family firms with surplus cash balances are establishing funds to 
invest in private equity and venture capital. Perhaps more could be done to incentivize 
these operations to integrate more with the ecosystems. There may also be a need to 
explore whether the absence of a financial support network that bridges the gap 
between knowledge and business is related to demand side or supply side factors 
(Fraser et al., 2013). To the extent that some entrepreneurs are not interested in 
growing their firms, and/or maintaining control, they may be reduced demand for 
external finance. Other sources of finance may need to be stimulated, such as supply 
chain finance and crowdfunding, but may require policy initiatives to raise awareness, 
introduce appropriate regulation, etc. 
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3.6.2 Conclusions 
We show that there seems to be a disconnect between the development of knowledge 
and business ecosystems. Policy makers have primarily supported the creation of 
knowledge ecosystems assuming that these ecosystems will automatically trigger the 
development of business ecosystems. However, the value creation processes in 
knowledge and business ecosystems are fundamentally different, which implies that 
policies to support each type of ecosystem must be specifically tailored. Supporting 
large, established companies to fulfill their role as keystone players may be an important 
way forward. We hope that this study will inspire further research and policy to develop 
our understanding of different types of ecosystems.  
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4 How do Business Models of Closed Source and Open 
Source companies differ? An Analysis of Content 
Management Systems 
ABSTRACT 
While open source (OS) has been widely accepted as a successful development process 
in the software industry, the business models of open source software (OSS) companies 
still remain unclear. Questions on how companies adopt OSS remain unanswered. 
Similarly, how value is created and captured by OSS companies stays understudied. This 
article uses the context of content management systems (CMS) to analyze the business 
models of closed source (CS) software and OSS companies with respect to three 
dimensions: value creation, value delivery and value capture. 
The results show that for value creation, CS CMS outperform OS CMS in terms of 
intrinsic technology value, while in terms of extrinsic network value OS CMS are much 
more popular as shown by their complementary products and services and the size of 
their installed base. For CS CMS vendors, value capture is associated with new 
mechanisms of value delivery. OSS companies do not have sufficient degrees of freedom 
to adopt innovative value delivery models and hence try to capture value through after-
sales services, sometimes accompanied by dual-license fees on proprietary extensions of 
the OSS. 
In contrast to community-backed OS CMS, company-backed OS CMS have been relatively 
successful in terms of revenues, albeit much less than CS ones. Opening up the code to 
make it available to the public and building a community around the software are 
observed to be sources of value creation. The increasing investments in company 
backed-OS and OS-affiliated businesses, in contrast to the relatively low economic 
success of OSS, can be explained by the potential investors see in exploiting the 
relatively large user community.   
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4.1 Introduction 
Over the past decade, open source (OS) has emerged as a mainstream development 
method in the IT industry. In 1998, Eric Raymond coined the term “open source” 
referring to distributed, peer-reviewed and transparent software development 
processes, distinct from “free software”. The term “free software” had become 
associated with a number of negative connotations: vendors presumed this to mean ‘no 
revenue’ and customers assumed ‘no support’ (Hecker, 1999). By contrast, OS refers to 
making source code freely available. OS software14 (OSS) is free in the sense that no 
license fees are charged for use or redistribution of binaries of source code. In addition 
users have the freedom to modify the source code, create derivative works, and 
redistribute these works (Hecker, 1999) contingent upon the license under which the 
software is released.  
Questions remain as to how companies profit from providing OSS at no cost. Is OS an 
ideology or can it be a lucrative business? We contend that OS business models are 
under researched, resulting in difficulties in explaining the strategy and actions of key 
players in the sector. For example, why did Red Hat, the distributor of Linux, acquire 
JBoss’ application server for a reputed $350mn in 1996 and release it as open source? 
What revenue strategy does Oracle follow for their OS database MySQL, acquired in 
2009? These companies have been successful not only in terms of revenues, but also in 
attracting venture capital investment. Since 1997, OSS vendors have successfully 
attracted investments worth of $4.6bn (Aslett, 2011). What makes OSS an interesting 
investment for venture capitalists? Why invest in a company that has no intellectual 
property and gives away free products? Is OSS becoming more attractive than 
proprietary/closed source software (CSS)?  
Recent studies on OSS have discussed the working of OSS communities and specific OSS 
success stories (Hauge et al., 2010). Researchers have studied the evolution of OS 
operating systems like Linux, OS database management systems like MySQL, and OS 
programming languages like PERL. However, the existence of different business models 
in OSS companies and their limitations have received less attention in management 
literature. Questions remain unanswered as to how OSS carves a place for itself and 
                                                        
14 Ibid. 1 
115 
 
competes strongly in a market predominated by CSS. Although OSS has gained immense 
popularity as a (product) development process in the past decade, focused research on 
strategies of OSS in comparison to CSS is lacking. Studies comparing proprietary/closed 
source (CS) and OS software have studied differences at product level and used the 
design structure (MacCormak et al., 2006), pricing strategy (Economides and 
Katsamakas, 2006) and innovativeness (Lamastra, 2009; Boudreau, 2010) as a unit of 
comparison.  
Recent studies on value creation in firms have identified the business model as a source 
of competitive advantage for the firm, which contributes to the firm’s survival and 
performance (Teece, 2010; George and Bock, 2011). In this study, we aim to shed light 
on strategies of OSS companies by deeply exploring their business models. Further, we 
compare this business model with those of CSS companies to understand how they react 
to competition from OSS.  We use the business model approach to analyze how OSS 
companies differ from CSS companies within the context of a very specific industry, 
namely the Content Management Systems (CMS). The CMS industry provides examples 
of successful OSS as well as CSS projects. We chose to elaborate one specific industry 
case in order to draw conclusions from detailed insights rather than general findings. 
Our analysis of the CMS industry shows the different ways in which CMS companies 
work and how they achieve success in expanding their user base and revenues.  
The article is structured as follows. In the following section, we outline the conceptual 
background to the article in terms of OSS and business models. We then discuss the 
methodology- research setting and data collection- that we employed in our study. Next, 
we present our findings by comparing the business models of CSS and OSS companies 
with respect to value creation, value delivery and value capture. We proceed to discuss 
the convergence of business models of OSS and CSS firms by presenting how OSS 
communities influence the industry. Finally, we reflect on the findings and discuss the 
implications and conclusions. 
4.2 Conceptual Background 
4.2.1 Defining Open Source 
The history of OS dates back to the early 1960s when operating systems were developed 
in academic settings like Berkeley and MIT and code was shared freely (Lerner and 
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Tirole, 2002). The essence of OSS development is the rapid creation of solutions within a 
collaborative environment (Fitzgerald, 2006). From the beginning of the 2000s, wider 
interest and participation in OSS development has resulted in availability of more OSS 
solutions than their CSS counterparts. The repository Sourceforge.net lists 430,000 OS 
projects, several of which have been downloaded millions of times. The increasing 
popularity of OS is partly due to the high quality and reliability of the software, and also 
due to free availability of complimentary products. Despite this popularity, confusion 
remains in defining OSS and related approaches such as free software, freemium, 
freeware, shareware, web 2.0 etc. 
LinkedIn, Facebook and Skype are acknowledged success stories in IT. Founded in 2003, 
LinkedIn, the largest social networking site for professionals, had an IPO valued at 
$4.3bn in 2011. More than 250 million members have joined LinkedIn in the last ten 
years. Microsoft acquired Skype in May 2011 for $8.5bn, one of its largest acquisitions 
till date. Skype was launched in 2003 to facilitate voice over internet communication. By 
2011 it had 663 million registered users. With more than 1.3 billion active users since 
2004, Facebook has become the most popular social networking site and was valued at 
$104bn at IPO in 2012. These companies have one distinctive characteristic in common: 
a huge installed user base. They were set up in the early 2000s in a period when 
popularity of OSS was at its peak. They are often confused with OSS businesses because 
they offer users varying degrees of free access.  
Open source software (OSS) is defined as a software whose ‘source code is made freely 
available’. The official definition provided by Open Source Initiative goes beyond just the 
source code access to include detailed conditions of redistribution, modification, derived 
works and license. It is distinctive from CSS where the software code is developed and 
protected within the company. Open source stands for the ideology of making the source 
code available to everyone, thus encouraging collaborative development. Fitzgerald 
(2006) observes an evolution of OS from its free software origins to a more 
commercially viable form- referred to as professional OS or commercial OS. The shift 
sets a basic distinction between community OS and corporate/commercial/professional 
OS (Riehle, 2009). The key difference in these two lies primarily in the number of 
stakeholders. Community OSS is software owned by a community of stakeholders, 
commercial OSS is owned by a single stakeholder, namely the company behind the OSS. 
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This stakeholder has the full ownership rights to the code and related intellectual 
property. Casadesus-Masanell and Llanes (2011) further identify mixed source software 
as a mix of CSS and OSS, where the owner company makes a choice of releasing the code 
partly OS and partly CS.  
Following Riehle (2009), we provide an overview of different types of software in Figure 
8. Based on the development method, software is broadly classified as OSS or CSS. 
Moreover, within OSS, the ownership and management further classify the OSS in two 
types. We refer to the company managed software as “commercial OS” software and 
community managed software as “community OS” software.  
Figure 8: Software Typology 
 
In absence of formal entities behind the community, we consider only commercial OS 
when comparing business models. We refer to the owner of CSS as “CSS company” and 
that of commercial OS as “OSS company” when comparing their business models. 
Further, we use the term “OSS community” as owner of community OS.  
In order to study the business model in OSS, we need to clarify the basic classification of 
OS licenses. In what follows, we will discuss a range of Free and OS (FOSS) licenses and 
the permissions they allow the users of OSS.  
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4.2.2 Business Model 
In the past few years, the term business model has gained much interest in management 
research. Nevertheless, scholars have observed a disconnection between management 
practice and research on business models (Valtakoski and Ronkko, 2010). A few years 
ago, a good strategy would guarantee success. Things have changed, and now, along with 
a good strategy, a good business model is essential to every successful organization; be it 
a new venture or an established player (Magretta, 2002). With the rise in the number of 
internet users, most of the companies started using a business model as a managerial 
tool to set up e-businesses (Osterwalder et al., 2005; Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010). 
These e-businesses have led to the development of various new ways of making money 
over the internet which gave rise to e-business models (Afuah and Tucci, 2001). Further, 
the outsourcing and offshoring of business activities, the emerging knowledge economy 
and the restructuring of financial services were driving factors in the emergence of the 
business model concept. While the notion of business models has received significant 
attention from a lot of researchers, most of the research focuses on the definitions, 
components and taxonomies of business models or study a specific business model 
(Hedman and Kalling, 2003). Most of these business model studies have emphasized on 
value capture (Zott et al., 2011). 
The availability of several definitions of a business model in the literature has led to 
frequent interchangeable use of the terms business model, revenue model and strategy 
(Morris et al., 2005). The literature refers to business models as explanations of how 
revenues are generated, for example, Stewart and Zhao (2000) … “a statement of how a 
firm will make money and sustain its profit stream over time”. Rappa (2002) defines a 
business model as “the method of doing business by which a company can sustain itself”. 
Kim and Mauborgne (2000) also look at the economic view and define business model as 
an objective of arriving at a pricing structure of a product. According to Chesbrough 
(2003), the business model serves as an intermediate construct that links the physical 
domain of technical inputs with the economic domain of outputs. The business model 
does not only focus on for how much you sell, but also incorporates what you sell and how 
you sell. Markides (2008) focuses on the strategic view by defining the business model as 
the positioning of company in a three-dimensional strategic map comprising of who - the 
target group, what - the value proposition and how - the value delivery system. While the 
119 
 
ultimate goal of a business model is to make money, the revenue model is simply an 
element of the business model. Amit and Zott (2001) present a very novel perspective 
by viewing the business model as a source of value creation. Teece (2010) defines the 
business model as a conceptual model defining the logic of how a business can create 
and deliver value to its customer, while considering the associated revenues, costs and 
profits. Teece (2010) distinguishes three value constructs that are important 
dimensions of a business model: the ways in which a company (a) creates value for its 
customers; (b) delivers value to its customers, and; (c) captures value from its 
customers. 
Previous studies on business models in OS have considered open source itself as a 
business model. These business models were associated with the different license 
policies adopted by the firm. With popularity of General Public License (GPL), some 
researchers differentiated between GPL and non-GPL models (Krishnamurthy, 2003), 
others followed in a similar stream by splitting them in GPL, BSD and dual-license 
models (Onetti and Capobianco, 2005). The licensing policy also gives rise to the 
traditional models outlined by Hecker, namely the support sellers, loss leader, 
accessorizing and dual licensing (Hecker, 1999). We argue that OS is not a business 
model, but a development process and that a business model is not synonymous to a 
revenue generating mechanism. We adopt one of the four emerging themes outlined by 
Zott and colleagues (Zott et al., 2011) which suggests focusing on value for studying 
business models. We follow the definition of Teece (2010) and align it with the 
definition of Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010), to define a business model as a 
combination of three dimensions: 
 Value Creation: How does a company entice customers to pay for value? 
Value creation includes the value proposition that a company offers on the market. In 
addition to the product or service, availability of complimentary products and installed 
base contribute to value creation.  
 Value Delivery: How does the company deliver value to the customer? 
Value delivery depicts not only how the product or service is delivered, but also how the 
company builds and maintains strong customer relationships, and equally so with the 
partners it works with in the process of reaching the customer. 
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 Value Capture: How does a company convert payments to profits? 
Value capture deals with the financial aspects of the company, in particular, the revenue 
model and the cost model. 
Questions remain as to how companies profit from providing OSS at no cost. Therefore, 
in this study, we explore the business models of OSS and CSS companies using value 
creation, value delivery and value capture as three components of their business model. 
The study addresses the following research question: How do business models of OSS 
and CSS companies differ? How do these companies adapt their business models in 
response to industry trends?  
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Research Setting 
OSS is used as background software in all kinds of applications within the ICT industry; 
it would therefore be difficult to study business models in such a diverse context. 
Following Zott and colleagues (Zott et al., 2011), we considered one specific context, 
namely the content management systems (CMS) software to study the business models of 
OSS. A CMS facilitates the creation and deployment of dynamic websites for a variety of 
users via extranet, internet or intranet (McKeever, 2003).  
“Linguistically, it means any system that helps you manage content – creating, 
storing, indexing, archiving, publishing, and distributing content.” (K)15 
Behind every structured website today lies a CMS, providing easy development and 
administration without expert technical knowledge. This system helps businesses to 
design, set up and manage the content of a website and rapidly adapt this in a 
collaborative environment while maintaining quality (Boiko, 2001). It serves as a 
template for users to upload content without programming knowledge of scripting 
languages like PERL, HTML, Java, etc. CMS are used in commercial websites and by 
individuals for designing personal websites and blogs. Its structure varies according to 
user and functional requirements. To cope with this varied demand, more and more 
companies provide CMS in either a closed- or open- source application.   
                                                        
15 Letters in ( ) at the end of the quotes refer to interviewees. See Appendix A for an overview. 
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“A CMS is no longer about just managing a piece of content on your Web site. A CMS 
should be able to allow a non-technical user to manage any asset on a Web site that 
they wish to interact with, whether that is a piece of content, a picture, a video or 
information that is pulled from other sources.” (Y)  
 
The decision to study the CMS industry was influenced by several factors. Firstly, high 
variability is observed within the CMS industry (Vitari et al., 2006). The CMS industry is 
comprised of several types of software, namely web content management, enterprise 
content management, document management etc. Secondly, the CMS market is 
developing rapidly.16 Wintergreen’s research report (2009) valued the entire CMS 
market at $3.5bn in 2009, and anticipated it to reach $10.3bn by 2015.  Web CMS, which 
is an integral part of most enterprises today, generated $890mn in revenues in 
recession-hit 2009, and projects $1.4bn for its vendors by 2015. Thirdly, the fraction of 
websites which use CMS has increased from 16% in 2010 to 30% in 2012 showing a 
large potential market.17 With the rise in digital content, companies are finding it 
necessary to have some form of management process or system in order to structure 
content (McKeever, 2003). Lastly, OS has been predominant in the CMS industry. The 
number of OS CMS has been rapidly increasing; 120 OS CMS applications share the CMS 
market with 72 CS CMS.  
Figure 9 provides our analysis of development of the CMS industry. While websites have 
been around since the early 1990s, structured websites only appeared in the late 1990s. 
These dynamic websites were characterized by rich content, high interactivity and 
better structure. Software companies with prior web development knowledge were the 
first ones to develop CMS, and offered it as an additional service via proprietary license.  
                                                        
16 The statistics are presented by Wintergreen Research Inc. in a 2009 report titled “Web Content 
Management Market Shares Strategies, and Forecasts, Worldwide, 2009-2015”. Joab Jackson of IDG News 
Service shares his views on the growing business of web content management in August 2011 in an article 
in IT-World titled “Gartner: Web Content Management a billion-dollar business” 
17 W3 Techs Web Technology Surveys provide usage trends of content management system for websites. 
According to their survey data available for April 2012, 70% of the websites did not use any content 
management system for their website. The historical usage trends of CMS for websites are available at 
http://w3techs.com/technologies/history_overview/content_management/all 
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Figure 9: Development of the CMS industry  
 
Within a few years several community OS CMS as well as commercial OS CMS were 
introduced to the market (see Figure 8). In the recent past, independent software 
vendors have started offering services built over active community OSS, leading to an 
emerging market of third-party developers of OSS (Dahlander and Magnusson, 2008). 
The CMS market thus comprises of CS CMS, commercial OS CMS, community OS CMS and 
several third-party businesses of extension developers and service providers for 
community OS CMS systems. 
4.3.2 Data Collection 
As we are interested in explaining how business models of OSS companies and CSS 
companies differ, a qualitative approach seems most appropriate. The research started 
by building a comprehensive list of existing CMS, using data from CMS research reports 
by Water & Stone (2008; 2009; 2010; 2011)18, Wintergreen Research (2009)19 and 
Gartner (2013)20 complimented by data from CMS-related websites CMSWire, CMSCritic, 
CMSReview etc. The database consisted of 192 CMS, out of which 60 are commercial OS 
CMS, 60 are community OS CMS and the remaining 72 are CS CMS.  Additional secondary 
                                                        
18 http://waterandstone.com/ 
19 http://wintergreenresearch.com/reports/Web%20Content%20Management.htm 
20 https://www.gartner.com/doc/2565615/magic-quadrant-web-content-management 
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data on the founding year, platform, number of releases, downloads, licenses, owner 
company details, product offerings and pricing model was collected through web search. 
The data from Sourceforge.net was incorporated in the database to study the success of 
OS CMS based on the ranking and number of downloads. As an indicator of success for 
CS CMS, financial data was added after consulting Amadeus and Global Reference 
Solution databases.  
In order to study the business models, primary qualitative data was collected using 
interviews. Based on their popularity and success, the top 15 CMS of each type- 
community OS, commercial OS and CS CMS were contacted to request an interview. 
Seven community OS CMS and ten commercial OS CMS companies responded positively. 
Since a low response was observed from the top 15 CS CMS, additional 15 CS CMS 
companies were contacted, ultimately resulting in a response from ten CS CMS 
companies. 30 qualitative interviews with founders and top managers (see Appendix A) 
of 27 popular CMS (companies) were conducted between January 2009 and June 2012.21 
Due to geographical limitations, most interviews were conducted through Skype and 
lasted between 30m and 1h45m. Interviews were semi structured with open-ended 
questions on the CMS industry, the trends in the industry and activities and operations 
of the companies. One author conducted the interviews, while other authors were not a 
part of the interviews in order to avoid any confirmatory biases. The interviews were 
audiotaped and transcribed verbatim and the text was read and re-read several times to 
identify the themes and sub-themes.  
Interview data from OS CMS and CS CMS companies was used to analyze and compare 
their business models. Interviews with founders of OSS communities were further 
incorporated in analyzing the competitiveness in the CMS industry. To complement the 
interview data, secondary data was collected using several sources: (a) extensive 
archives, including corporate websites, blog articles, financial databases, corporate 
materials, business publications and press releases; (b) a survey among third-party 
providers of OS CMS Joomla!, and; (c) information collected through attendance at 
several international CMS conferences (see Appendix B).  
                                                        
21 Mike Johnston, owner of website CMSCritic, has kindly permitted the authors to use his dataset for 
research purposes. 
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4.4 Comparing Business Models 
As discussed in section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, every company has a business model which 
reflects a design of their business operations. To understand how CMS providers make 
money, we explore the business models of OSS and CSS companies based on the three 
dimensions outlined by Teece (2010): value creation, value delivery and value capture. 
Where relevant, our analysis will be complimented with quotes from the interviews in 
order to deepen our insights. Data on the respondents mentioned at the end of the 
quotes in ( ) is available in Appendix A.  
4.4.1 Value Creation 
In technological markets characterized by several players, firms need to continuously 
improve in order to gain market dominance. In absence of a dominant design, firms 
strive to create value for their customers in order to create technological lock-in and 
increase their market share. Value for the customer can be provided in the form of goods 
and services, knowledge or intangible benefits (Allee, 2000). While acceleration of 
technological change, the key medium representing value creation is the technology that 
the firm offers its customers in the form of knowledge embedded in their products and 
services (Schilling, 2003). Technological superiority or a better technological 
performance in comparison to competitors can provide a leading edge to firms 
operating in competitive markets (Suarez, 2004). Thus, the technology or the technology 
standalone value is an important dimension of value. However, technologically superior 
products can offer less value in absence of network externality effects (Schilling, 1998; 
Schilling, 2003). Scholars claim that the extent of availability of complementary goods 
has a significant effect on the consumers’ technology adoption (Thum, 1994; Katz and 
Shapiro, 1986). The adoption of technology is further influenced by the market 
perception and its popularity which is determined by its installed base, in other words, 
the number of people who adopt and use the technology (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). 
Schilling (1998) proposes that the size of installed base and availability of complementary 
goods are highly correlated. The value of the technology is thus enhanced by these 
external factors- availability of complementary goods and installed base- that result in a 
network of technology users, of which the effects are visible over time.  
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In order to study the element of value creation in CMS companies, we follow Schilling 
(2003) and focus on these two dimensions of value: intrinsic value (technology 
standalone value) and extrinsic value (network externality value)  
Intrinsic value 
The technology standalone value or technical superiority is controlled by the pure effect 
of the technology and its performance in comparison with the competition (Suarez, 
2004). A radical technology with significant improvement in functionality may surpass 
the advantages provided by other existing technologies with high external value 
(Schilling, 2003). The value that a new technology offers can be determined by several 
drivers, such as the functions it enables the customer to perform, its qualities, features 
and usability.  
The technology of CS CMS, like any other proprietary software, is developed for business 
purposes and protected through a copyright of the software code and secrecy. 
Protection from competition allows a clear advantage to CSS firms (Suarez, 2004). 
Technology development is carried out onsite by a team of managers, developers, 
designers and testers. The technology tends to provide superior results because 
structured and centralized approaches are deployed by a dedicated workforce. The 
structured and centralized approach leads to a clear roadmap and architecture to the 
development process (Karels, 2003). Moreover, unlike in OSS, CS CMS developers aspire 
to include all possible functionalities while taking into consideration different customer 
requirements. The customers are thus presented with a huge list of features which they 
can choose to use or ignore. Not only is the ultimate software presented to the market 
secure and thoroughly tested, it also offers stability with development over time.  
“CMS21 is put in place as an investment. As your site grows over the years, you will 
have a solid product that will only get better over time. Since we are customer 
driven and focused, our clients feel secure that CMS21 will be their long term needs. 
This is why we have such a high client retention rate.” (W) 
CS CMS are mostly active in B2B markets; their customers are business organizations 
that are highly dependent on IT. These customers prefer to focus on their core activities 
while outsourcing their IT activities, and hence need a reliable partner for their IT needs. 
As VP of CMS18 narrated their customers’ concern over the use of OSS:  
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“Our customers have tried to build a business with open source and bumped into 
various problems, especially when the business was growing to a large size.” (T)  
In contrast, commercial OS CMS is developed either by the OSS company or by a 
community of people working voluntarily on the software. In contrast to CSS firms, the 
development in OS CMS firms is a continuous cycle based on the functionality requested 
and required by users and developers. The development approach is less centralized 
and the addition of features is driven by the interests of contributors, rather than end 
users (Karels, 2003). The development in OSS companies is occasionally steered by a 
development team, which comprises of developers from within the company or from the 
community. Since the source code is freely available, bugs are easily identified, reported 
and fixed swiftly. Research shows that OSS has proven track record of reliability and 
security (Bonaccorsi et al., 2006). Scholars argue that hiding the source code does not 
provide higher security. In contrast, opening up the source code enables quickly 
identification and response to security threats (Boulanger, 2005). In the opinion of 
CMS13 founder,   
 “Just as importantly, we feel strongly that open source development leads to faster 
development, higher quality code, and closer attachment to market needs.” (O) 
OSS companies that hold the majority of the development in-house are not in a position 
to benefit from the knowledge inputs of community. An active community of developers 
is eager to contribute to the development of OSS in an environment where they feel a 
sense of freedom, ownership, achievement and authority. Moreover, governance in OSS 
companies, where only the OSS company commits code changes, prevents 
knowledgeable developers from investing time in commercial OSS development (Shah, 
2006). Value creation in OSS companies thus largely depends on the degree of credibility 
offered to external developers. Empirical evidence on innovativeness of OSS is 
inadequate (Lamastra, 2009). Tuomi (2005) argues that OSS is not innovative, and tends 
to re-implement the functionalities of CSS. Unlike in CSS, where a market or customer 
requirement survey drives the software development, development in OSS is handled by 
the active contributors who often decide on functionalities that need to be added 
(Karels, 2003). However, another stream of research claims that OSS solutions are more 
innovative than CSS solutions (Lamastra, 2009). Studies show that both CSS and OSS are 
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equally secure and reliable, and OSS projects are capable of meeting or even exceeding 
the quality of their CSS equivalents (Boulanger, 2005). 
In sum, although OS CMS try to mimic their CS counterparts in features and 
functionality, CS CMS are usually a step ahead with high-end functionality. Frequent 
releases of OS CMS often account for more bug fixes rather than more functionality with 
each new release. Although it is difficult to compare the two with respect to 
innovativeness, we observe that intrinsic value creation in CS CMS companies tends to 
be higher than that in OS CMS companies.  
Extrinsic value 
Network externality or extrinsic value is the value arising from the positive benefits 
accrued from all adopters of the same product or technology (Thum, 1994). This value is 
generated by the size of its installed base and the availability of complementary products 
(Allee, 2000) which enable or enhance the value of the technology (Teece, 2010).  
Many customers select a technology based on the availability of compatible 
complementary goods. Depending on the capabilities of the firms, firms choose to either 
provide complementary goods themselves, or depend on other firms for the production 
of complementary products (Schilling, 1998). Scholars claim that the availability of 
complementary goods positively influences the consumers’ choice of technology (Choi, 
1994; Katz and Shapiro, 1986). 
Complementary products may provide additional features and functionality to CMS, but 
are dispensable for the operation of CMS. Examples include add-ons, plug-ins or 
extensions which constitute supplementary features. The development of 
complementary products requires knowledge of CMS source code, or at least the 
structure of the source code. Complementary services include web design services, 
installation and support services, hosting services, etc., which require little or no 
knowledge of the source code.    
Due to source code protection, there is little possibility for other companies to offer 
complementary products or services for CS CMS. Only the vendor company usually has 
the authority to manage the development of complementary products or services, or 
they adopt complementary products developed by preferred (CS) partners. Proprietary 
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ownership generally restricts the opportunity of providing third-party services for CS 
CMS. A remarkable exception in proprietary companies is Apple. Despite being a closed 
source company, Apple has been successful in creating a large community of application 
developers. Apple has achieved this by providing a software development kit (SDK) and 
integrated development environments (IDE), guiding the development of applications, 
without disclosing the source code. CS CMS generally do not supply such platforms and 
tools for others to build upon their product. However, CS companies do not seem to 
assign importance to the availability of complementary goods. As CEO of CMS25 
mentions:  
“We believe that a Web Content Management System should provide marketers and 
developers with everything they need to achieve their goals on-line. They shouldn’t 
be forced to buy numerous add-on modules, requiring complex or even impossible 
upgrade paths from multiple vendors, which is quite often the case with open-
source CMS systems.” (AA)   
OSS companies, on the other hand, try to leverage their lower intrinsic value through a 
range of complementary products and services. The availability of source code enables 
external developers, who are often members of the community, to work on extensions 
and provide services. Since OS licenses are often permissive to the development of 
complementary products and services, the more popular commercial OS CMS have a 
large number of extensions available, which are offered at affordable prices, or 
sometimes at no cost by third-party developers. CMS9, one of the most popular 
commercial OS CMS hosts nearly 8000 add-ons in the form of apps, modules, skins etc. 
developed by the community members and offered at low costs. End users of 
commercial OS CMS are not obliged to use these complementary products since they are 
supplementary to the working of the CMS. The founder of CMS16 and the CEO of CMS9 
openly acknowledge the power of their community members who increase the value of 
their CMS by developing complementary products- extensions, add-ons, plugins and 
themes.    
“I don’t think it’s any one feature or thing that makes CMS16 different from others, 
it’s the thousands of plugins and themes available for the platform. That community 
is impossible to duplicate.” (R)  
129 
 
 “The big reason for our success is we are an extensible platform with more than 
8,000 commercially supported add-ons that plug into our platform. What makes us 
different and better is our vibrant ecosystem – A vibrant and rich ecosystem of 800 
ISVs who provide thousands of commercially supported add-ons at a low cost, 
hundreds of System Integrators who can help you custom build your web site 
whether your requirements are simple or complex, and numerous hosting providers 
who specialize in hosting CMS9.” (K) 
Although many complementary products and services are available for popular OS CMS, 
some providing the same functionality, the complementary products need to sell 
themselves by answering the relevant demands of functionality and robustness. The 
high technology value of CS CMS might demonstrate that potential complementary 
products (extensions) are already incorporated in the product itself. On the contrary, 
value-added complementary services are seen as extrinsic value enhancing options for 
OS CMS companies.  
In addition to the number of complementary products, applications and services, the 
network externality value of a product is represented by its installed base. This is the 
number of users of a particular product or service. A larger installed base is associated 
with increased demand and higher rates of adoption for a specific technology (Katz and 
Shapiro, 1985; Schilling, 1998). The installed base further helps to design future 
compatible products (Suarez, 2004).  
The most vital aspect that a user looks for in a CMS is its functionality - the ability of the 
CMS to meet user requirements. Besides the technological benefits, a potential user may 
choose to use a particular CMS based on the number of existing users and their reviews. 
The choice of CMS depends on the desired complexity of a website. The installed base 
has a very low influence on the potential customers for CS CMS. Firstly, the customer 
portfolio of CS CMS companies is rather limited to business customers, hence an 
installed base does not have much influence on customer decision making. Secondly, 
these business customers typically outsource all the activities of content management to 
the vendor company, in turn worrying less about the availability of specific features, and 
more about satisfying their requirement specifications.    
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In stark contrast, the installed base plays a major role in the further adoption of OSS 
(Ajila and Wu, 2007), not only by individuals, but also by developers of commercial 
applications (Stone, 2002). A majority of commercial OS CMS have been downloaded 
thousands of times, while five of them have more than a million downloads, showing 
that the popular commercial OS CMS have a large installed base.22 The installed base is 
also referred to as the community in the OS context, and includes the end users, 
developers and testers. The community is valuable for the OS CMS companies since it 
keeps the project active by solving issues and answering questions. Amongst others, 
CMS10 founder defends the unprecedented contribution of the community to the CMS 
development.  
 “It’s that kind of two-way interaction with the community that makes open source 
work.” (L) 
While the intrinsic value of OS CMS companies might be lower, their overall value is 
leveraged by the network externality, in other words, by the ecosystem that is created 
around it. However, contribution or participation in CMS development seems to follow 
the 1% rule observed in the Internet culture (Arthur, 2006). The rule suggests that: 
“If you get a group of 100 people online then one will create content, 10 will 
‘interact’ with it (commenting or offering improvements) and the other 89 will just 
view it.”      
Within the OS CMS world, very few developers actually help in developing the CMS code. 
Users download and use CMS in abundance. They return to the forums to ask for 
support, but there is no evidence of these users actively answering questions or 
participating in CMS development. Thus, while OSS attracts a lot of users and 
developers, the best applications are developed only by the active contributors. The 
number of active contributors in the community, and not the size of the ecosystem, 
represents the success of OS CMS.  
We can conclude that with a dedicated team of full-time developers, CS CMS companies 
have higher intrinsic value, while the intrinsic value of the OS CMS companies is not as 
                                                        
22 The number of downloads were retrieved in October 2010 from open source project repository, 
Sourceforge.net.  The number of downloads or installations is not available for CS CMS. The number of 
customers listed on the websites of CS CMS is used as a measure for the installed base. Of the popular CS 
CMS, EpiServer CMS lists the maximum number of customers- 967.   
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high as one would expect, mainly due to a relatively small number of developers who 
actively contribute to the development. OS CMS companies excel in extrinsic value, but 
the value needs to be leveraged by committed developers and contributors, superior 
quality extensions and higher numbers of users who provide valuable inputs rather than 
being mere spectators in the CMS development process (Lee et al., 2009). One can 
conclude that a large user base and an active team of committed developers are the main 
strengths of OS CMS companies, and they need to leverage this in order to overcome the 
weaker technological solution they tend to offer.  
4.4.2 Value Delivery  
The value delivery aspect deals with the ways in which the product or service reaches 
the end user. In adopting innovative transaction methods, companies need to decide on 
the parties involved in the transaction process. There are three basic value delivery 
models in the context of CMS. The first is traditional on-premise software, where CMS is 
installed onsite at the user’s facility.  On the one hand, users can install the CMS using a 
license provided by the vendor. This is mostly the case with CS CMS companies and with 
OS CMS companies providing a professional version of their CMS. Alternatively, users 
can download OS directly from the Internet. The terms of OS license enable CMS users to 
freely download, install, use and customize OS CMS according to their requirements. As 
quoted by several respondents: 
“Value lies in ease of use-making the software simple- install in one click, and you 
are all set to go!” (G) 
“If CMS15 was exceptionally hard to install and use we wouldn't have the download 
numbers and the installed user base.” (Q) 
“We choose the MIT license because it lets you do ANYTHING you want short of 
suing us. If you’re building a start-up, and you want to get a jump on the 
competition but truly own all the code you write – our MIT license makes that very 
easy. As a developer you don’t have to submit your code back to the project. For all I 
care you can package CMS8 up exactly as it is today, call it ‘cement6’ and go sell it 
on CDs in Walmart.” (J) 
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The second delivery mechanism is hosted software, where the software is hosted by the 
vendor or a third party as opposed to being installed onsite. This saves end users the 
high upfront investments of renting the hardware on a subscription basis. The 
application is accessible over the Internet or private network. The hosted application is 
usually customized to meet specific user needs. Hosted may imply that the vendor 
provides technical support, installation, upgrades and support for the CMS. The 
providers of hosted software have the choice of doing it themselves by being the only 
vendor of the CMS, or by using their partner network to manage some or all the services 
as third parties and only restricting their value proposition to the CMS application. This 
delivery mechanism is used by CS CMS companies as well as OS CMS companies. The 
third delivery method is Software as a Service (SaaS). SaaS allows the users to access the 
CMS over the Internet under subscription plans. SaaS is similar to hosted software with 
regard to saving upfront investment costs. The only difference is that the application 
delivered via the SaaS model is the same for all users. Hence CMS functionality is limited 
with respect to customization. The SaaS model is primarily used by CS CMS companies.       
Within the last two decades there has been a gradual transition in the way value is 
delivered. The transition has been from traditional ways of on-premise software and 
licenses to the more common SaaS and hosted software models. This change can be 
ascribed to the change in user behavior and requirements. Companies which require a 
CMS to manage their content are willing to pay an external supplier, rather than 
reinventing the wheel and developing the CMS in-house. This results in cost savings on 
hardware and ICT personnel, facilitating companies to work on their core business while 
outsourcing the complex task of ICT management.  Having said that, founders of CMS8 
and CMS22 have mixed opinions on the SaaS delivery model:  
“The traditional model where you charge a big license fee up front and then an 
ongoing maintenance fee, while not being able to look what is under the hood, that 
will become hard, because that is going to be replaced with SaaS.” (J) 
“What I am claiming is that SaaS is only a temporary measure to fill a market need. 
Eventually organizations need housing at their own facility; eventually all 
information needs to interrelate. SaaS acts like a band aid to fix a wound rather 
than cure the disease. Yes there is money to be made, but the longevity of these 
models is questionable.” (X) 
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We conclude from the above that the more control a company has over its software, the 
more novel its value delivery model becomes in order to differentiate itself from its 
competitors. CS CMS companies appear to be more innovative with their hosting and 
SaaS delivery model. Adopting a SaaS model may also result in customer lock-in and 
promises recurring revenues for CS companies. Due to the open nature of its source 
code, OS CMS companies have limited choice of value delivery mechanisms, and mostly 
follow the traditional on-premise installation method. A few OSS companies have taken 
over the hosting approach, and are likely to embrace SaaS in future.     
4.4.3 Value Capture  
Value capture is determined by the effectiveness of the revenue model. In order to be 
successful, companies aim to have a continuous stream of royalties from licenses, sell 
customized services on top of these royalties and have some peripheral revenue streams 
through advertising, sponsorship or donations. The most common revenue stream for 
CS CMS companies is through sale of licenses. Licenses can be purchased and owned with 
a one-time payment or can be rented on a monthly/ quarterly/ semi-annually or yearly 
basis. While the one-time license fee entitles the company to a large amount at one time, 
the rental method promises a continuous revenue stream. The value delivery mechanism 
(Traditional vs. SaaS) determines the proportion of a one-time license fee against 
recurring license fees.  
A second revenue stream for CS CMS companies is providing services. Different payment 
options are associated with different types of services. Installation services are usually 
for one-time payments. Support services are typically charged per hour or by 
subscription. Short-term and long-term subscription plans are available for hosting 
services. Customization and development services are charged for based on the size of the 
project or the development man-hours or man-months required. Upgrade services are 
charged at a fixed price. The respondent of CMS18 talks about their business activities 
with the services revenue model: 
“People are realizing they need more training, support, hosting and somebody to 
help them. A company that offers hosting and other services for an open source 
CMS; that is closer to what we do.” (T) 
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Within OSS, the distinction in management of the software application is facilitated by a 
licensing strategy under which the developers make the source code available. A license 
symbolizes the transfer of rights from the owner to the end user. Software licenses are 
classified as proprietary licenses and FOSS licenses. Proprietary licenses are available at 
a cost predetermined by the CMS owner. On the contrary, FOSS licenses are available at 
no cost, but have a few conditions that need to be taken into account while using the 
software. In the beginning, FOSS licenses were implemented with the aim to facilitate 
collaboration and free sharing. Few people started downloading OSS and customizing 
and using it for professional purposes, without sharing their changes back to the 
community. It became difficult for the OSS providers to monitor the use of OSS for 
commercial purposes. Hence, companies formulated the dual-licensing strategy 
(Välimäki, 2003; Gomulkiewicz, 2004). With the dual-licensing strategy, the software 
could be accessed under two licenses- a FOSS license and a paid commercial license. The 
free license allows users to download the software for free provided they share the 
modifications back to the community, while the commercial license permits the buyer to 
legally customize and use the software according to their own requirements without 
sharing the modifications with the community. This strategy made it easier to monitor 
the source code and also to generate revenues from users who wished to use the 
software for commercial purposes (Watson et al., 2005).    
“The base product is open-source, distributed as ‘CMS17 Community Project’ in its 
bleeding-edge version. The full Experience Management platform is distributed as 
part of a subscription, packaging all experience management features and services 
around the powerful content management engine.” (S) 
The revenue streams for OS CMS companies are similar to those of CS ones. Within our 
sample of OS CMS companies, one of the common revenue streams is dual licensing. A 
commercial license allows the customers to access and modify the CMS source code for 
their own use and further preserves secrecy of the software. As many as 38% of the 60 
OS CMS companies release their CMS under a commercial license together with a FOSS 
license. Other companies prefer to make the CMS purely open source and sell 
extensions, premium features and templates for a fee.  
Services are another popular revenue stream for commercial OS CMS developers. These 
include customized development and design services, support services, hosting services 
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and installation services. Next to these services, which are also offered by CS CMS 
companies, commercial OS CMS companies provide training and consultancy services 
for their OS CMS. About 75% of OS CMS companies offer at least one of the above 
mentioned professional services to their customers.  According to practitioners, selling 
services seems to be a successful business model in the OS world. As the co-founder of 
CMS10 states: 
“We’re following the tried and tested open source business model. Although anyone can 
download the core and use it for free, we provide a complete set of commercial services and 
training surrounding it.” (L) 
Besides revenue generation, OSS companies achieve profits by reducing costs. CS firms 
find it difficult to reduce costs, but OS firms explore cost reducing opportunities 
provided by their community. By virtue of its nature, OSS enjoys minimal personnel and 
marketing costs. The founders of CMS8 and CMS13 confirm this: 
“Honestly, we do not spend a tremendous amount of money on marketing. An 
enormous advantage of being open source is that you have that huge group of 
advocates that want to go out and sell for you.” (J) 
“We also wanted to grow our customer base and knew popularity and proliferation 
of our software would lead to credibility and drive commercial customers our way.” 
(O) 
The intrinsic value is of higher importance in the initial R&D and technical feasibility 
phase, while the extrinsic value plays an important role in the post-market launch 
(Suarez, 2004). The main insights of our analysis on the value creation, the value 
delivery and the value capture of OS and CS CMS companies is assimilated in Table 8. 
The table stresses the differences in business models of CS and OS CMS companies along 
their three underlying dimensions. CS CMS companies excel in intrinsic value and are 
much more diverse in their options to deliver value to their customers. As a result, they 
have looked into various ways to capture value and generate revenues from their CMS.  
Most value is captured through license fees which are either paid upfront or on a 
transaction basis. As a result, the turnover these companies typically generate is much 
higher than that of OS CMS companies. 
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Table 8:  Business model of OSS vs. CSS companies 
  CSS Companies  OSS Companies 
Value Creation 
- Intrinsic value 
- Extrinsic value 
  
High 
Low 
(Absence of installed base) 
  
Medium 
Extremely High 
(Availability of  
complementary goods and 
installed base) 
 
Value Delivery  High 
(MSP/Hosting and SaaS 
delivery models in addition to 
traditional) 
 
 Medium 
(Traditional and hosting) 
Value Capture  High 
(Licenses, Services) 
 Medium 
(Dual Licenses, Services, 
Extension development, Low 
development, personnel and 
marketing costs) 
 
OS CMS companies are more community-driven and aim to create value with the help of 
network externalities. These CMS have created most value through the community base 
in which they are installed. Innovative value delivery or value capture mechanisms are 
less important to them. OS CMS companies deliver value through the classic mechanism 
of downloading software and capture value mostly by providing dual licenses and 
support services. OS CMS companies are looking to experiment with new value delivery 
mechanisms, while pursuing new revenue channels.  
4.5 The Role of OSS Communities 
Alongside OSS companies that manage commercial OSS, there exist OSS communities 
that manage community OSS. Besides commercial OS CMS, community OS CMS also hold 
a significant market share in the CMS market. OS CMS communities are perceived as a 
severe threat to profitability and revenues streams of OS CMS vendors, and to a minor 
extent to OS CMS companies. Although questions are raised on security of OSS 
(Boulanger, 2005), OS CMS communities are confident about the security and 
robustness of their offering. As the developer of CMS7 suggests: 
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“Being closed-source doesn’t mean that the software is more secure. On the 
contrary, having more people looking at the source code (in open source) is just that 
extra benefit.” (H) 
OSS communities thus take pride in the intrinsic value of their CMS. In addition, OSS 
communities largely benefit from network externalities. In absence of a company behind 
the software who steers the development, OSS communities attract more knowledgeable 
developers than OSS companies (Shah, 2006). The CMS7 developer proudly presents the 
strong community of developers working on their CMS: 
“You’ve got to be quite a large proprietary company to compensate all the 
developing hours being done by the developers of a community like ours.” (I) 
However in practice, the size of the community does not reflect the active development 
in the two most popular community OS CMS Joomla! and Drupal. Our survey with 
community members of Joomla! OS CMS shows that 50% of service providers and 35% 
of extension developers do not contribute back to Joomla! development. Of the ones that 
contribute, only 12% spend more than 10 hours per week on Joomla! development. In 
another example, Drupal has nearly 1.1 billion registered users, but only 17,000 
registered developers.23 Consequently, Drupal developers represent merely 1.5% of the 
community. Undoubtedly, OSS communities tend to overemphasize the strengths of 
having a community of developers rather than a dedicated internal team of developers.  
However, the openness of OS CMS communities indeed attracts a significantly larger 
installed base. As a result, many of the community members who have been working on 
CMS development, set up OSS community affiliated firms developing complementary 
goods for a large installed base. The number of complementary goods, extensions and 
services provided by these OSS community affiliated firms further increases the intrinsic 
value of OSS communities. Joomla! lists 9300 extensions, while Drupal lists 15700 
modules and 1400 themes.24 These extensions and services add to the moderate 
intrinsic technological value of the OS CMS communities. 
“A huge community has grown up around CMS1, with thousands of active 
contributors to the open source project, including nearly 2,000 community-
                                                        
23 Data collected from Drupal website in April 2012.  
24 Statistics available on Joomla! and Drupal websites, accessed in April 2012. 
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developed modules for extending CMS1 functionality. [.…] CMS1’s thriving, vibrant 
ecosystem is the very reason that CMS1 is so successful – it is its greatest strength.  
The core strength of CMS1 is definitely the open source community that is behind 
the project. I am constantly amazed by the innovation that comes out of the 
thousands of dedicated CMS1 contributors.” (A) 
 While providing a free, high-value CMS to the world, OSS communities do not need to 
worry about value capture. Since they do not have any personnel, marketing or sales 
costs, they need meager revenues to cover the server costs for hosting their CMS. CMS 
capture value in terms of the time which developers dedicate to development. Quoting 
the development coordinator of CMS3 and the co-founder of CMS5:  
“We have Google AdSense on our sites, some of them. We get some donations from 
individuals and we have a great hosting partner that donates so much time and 
infrastructure. Well the most important donation we can ask for is time” (C) 
“The most basic thing people can do to contribute to CMS5 is let us know when 
something needs to be fixed or improved upon, or by requesting new features in our 
project tracker.” (F)  
Thus, while OSS communities do not capture value for themselves, they conquer a huge 
market share due to the high value they create with their CMS. As a result, they are 
undoubtedly the first choice for B2C customers, while they also capture some market of 
B2B customers owing to their stability, security and availability of complementary 
products and services. The value capture in OSS communities happens with the third 
party OSS community affiliated businesses that provide complementary products and 
services for popular OSS communities. Although it is difficult to estimate the amounts, 
the accumulated revenues generated from these OSS community affiliated businesses 
are significantly large enough to pose a threat to the revenues of CS CMS and OS CMS 
companies.    
4.6 Converging Business Models 
Both OS and CS CMS companies feel the competition from each other as well as from the 
OS CMS communities. They appear to have adopted the strengths of each other’s 
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business models in order to be competitive and capture a greater market share. We 
shortly discuss the changes that they foresee in their business models.  
4.6.1 Why and how do OS CMS adjust their Business Models? 
The real value of OS CMS lies in the installed base and complementary services, while 
the value of CS CMS lies in the intrinsic technology value and a wide range of delivery 
systems. The customer can either choose an expensive CS CMS, where the vendor takes 
care of the website, or a cheaper OS CMS, where the basic structure is for free, and the 
services or customized development can be outsourced to developers at a comparatively 
lower price. But what does the customer really value? 
The major hurdle to the widespread adoption of OSS in the B2B market is the assurance 
of continuous development. Since business customers completely rely on external IT 
support, adoption of OSS asks for the entire IT responsibility to be outsourced. OSS 
companies can guarantee continuous development when they either have a dedicated 
development team internally or a strong, active and dependable development team 
externally as a part of their community. The issue OSS companies face is the dilemma of 
degree of ownership. While assigning development and ownership of the software to the 
community can attract a larger installed base, it can limit revenue generation. On the 
other hand, preserving the ownership can prevent external contribution, signaling the 
OSS company to be an opportunistic company trying to profit from the efforts of the 
community. This makes it difficult for OSS companies to move to the CSS way. 
OSS communities pose a threat to OSS companies. OSS communities enable the creation 
of start-ups and provide individuals with opportunities to benefit from OSS (Piva and 
Rossi-Lamastra, 2012).  A number of third-party OSS community affiliated businesses 
have been created by active OSS community contributors who act as partners for the 
OSS communities. As the CEO of CMS2 mentions: 
“Our success lies in the number of websites running on CMS2. Without our service 
vendors who successfully adopted CMS2 as their core platform for creating 
websites, this was not possible.” (B) 
These OSS community affiliated businesses operate in a similar way as OSS companies, 
by providing products and services for community OSS. They sell CMS extensions which 
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are debugged and customized for company needs and guarantee service level 
agreements (SLAs) which are common in the CS CMS environment. They try to achieve 
the best of both worlds by positioning themselves in the market of OSS companies. They 
are evolving to innovative value delivery and revenue generating techniques, which 
seem to have helped them thrive in the CMS world. But they aim to have high extrinsic 
value aided by the scale of the community’s installed base. The success of OSS 
community affiliated businesses depends on the complexity of the websites and the 
technical know-how of the community. For the more complex CMS like Joomla! and 
Drupal, the community is mostly comprised of techies. WordPress on the other hand is 
easy to download, install and use, and hence is a favorite among non-techies. As a result, 
OSS community affiliated businesses of Joomla! and Drupal are primarily set up by 
business-minded techies who aim to serve the B2B market.   
OSS companies are trying to find the right balance between the degree of ownership and 
fostering an active community. Most of the OSS companies act as third parties for the 
OSS and provide support services for their commercial OS CMS. The services provided 
by OSS companies promise support for business customers and ensure continuous 
development by attracting developers. The larger installed base also ensures availability 
of complimentary goods. OSS companies are trying to provide a platform to promote 
these extensions. This is an added advantage for external developers to participate 
actively in the community. The CEO of CMS9 says about their efforts on promoting the 
external development of their software: 
“There are many ways to contribute to the CMS9 project, depending on an 
individual’s skill set and interests. [....] For more technical individuals, they can 
submit an open source extension to our Forge, they can become a team member on 
an existing Forge project where they can contribute source code and development 
assistance, or they can develop and sell their own CMS9 add-ons on 
Sxxxxxxxxxxd.com (CMS9 store).” (K)  
OS CMS companies also take advantage of the contributions they receive from the 
community together with feedback from commercial users. CMS13 has repeatedly used 
customer feedback to improve their CMS. 
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“In the same way a car has a driver and mechanic as distinct roles, we’ve ensured 
our product worked for our clients and us, and we’ve continuously used feedback to 
ensure both get improvements.” (O) 
To conclude, the success of OSS is more likely to be determined by the number of active 
contributors rather than by the number of users, and as such by the size of the 
ecosystem. OS CMS companies compete with CS CMS companies by excelling in extrinsic 
value. Since contributors and third-party developers are more likely to be attracted by 
the ease of use of CMS, a well-structured and well-documented source code can benefit 
OS CMS companies. Giving higher control to the community for attracting developers, 
while simultaneously deploying an internal development team to keep the development 
on track will be a key for OS CMS companies to foster an active community and attract 
investments to improve value capture mechanisms.   
4.6.2 Why and how do CS CMS adjust their Business Models? 
CS and OS CMS both face significant challenges. Firstly, with respect to value delivery, CS 
CMS create the perception among customers that there are high switching costs, 
creating lock-in. In the case of the hosted value delivery model, the initial license fee is 
quite high and is a sunk cost, but even if customers opt for the SaaS value delivery 
model, they lose their content if they wish to switch to another CMS. Secondly, with 
respect to value capture, CS CMS are confronted with high cost of sales as there is no 
community available to enable swift adoption. 
To address these challenges we observe that CS CMS use freeware, shareware or even 
hybrid models. Since CMS is the core product for most CS companies, they cannot afford 
to release it in the form of freeware or shareware unless they adopt a hybrid OS model 
like CMS8 and CMS13. Both these CMS moved from being a CSS product companies to 
OSS companies with similar intentions, and have become well-known commercial OS 
CMS providers. In 2006, CMS13 released their CMS as free under the BSD license, and 
became successful with their consulting and web development services.  
“We wanted to make a bigger difference in the world. We were unexcited by the free 
and open source offerings and knew if we made our system available to the public 
we could improve how developers build websites, and how most people manage and 
update their websites. [….] We’ve had nothing but positive outcomes that surprised 
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or exceeded our expectations. Migrating our product to an open source model has 
worked very well and I’m delighted when I see other companies doing the same 
thing [….] Its an awful lot of fun and satisfaction knowing a new feature or bug fix 
shall be enjoyed by tens of thousands of people, rather than a few dozen clients.” (O) 
“We strongly believe in the power of free information, so after years of pretending 
we didn’t, this complete openness makes us feel great.” (J) 
Although transitioning to OSS is difficult for CS CMS, these companies are constantly in 
search of strategies to adapt their business models with a view of increasing their 
extrinsic value. Other CS CMS companies choose freeware or shareware business 
models. However, as they do not want to give away their core CMS for free, they release 
other products as freeware and shareware and use them as branding mechanisms to 
attract users to their core CMS product. While freeware and shareware seem to be 
straightforward solutions to increase the installed base, CMS companies find it difficult 
to modularize their CMS to have basic software released as freeware or shareware. CS 
CMS could also build extrinsic value by following Apple’s strategy - providing users with 
toolkits and frameworks to develop complementary products. This can be challenging, 
but offers a viable alternative for CS CMS.   
To sum up, there is a need for vendors to boost the extrinsic value of their CS CMS. A few 
CS CMS companies are taking steps to build closed communities for their products. For 
instance, Amaxus CMS is making efforts in establishing user groups and communities for 
their customers. The community allows their customers to communicate and share 
knowledge, although in a closed environment. Another example is OpenText which also 
aims to utilize the power of customers by creating discussion groups. The senior 
management of CMS24 is also trying to build a community with a view of reducing costs: 
“By creating a community around your products or services, businesses can 
empower users to help each other to resolve issues, thus dramatically reducing the 
support costs.” (Z) 
Although the success of closed communities is not yet apparent, it is a potential path for 
CS CMS to increase their extrinsic value by harnessing the power of the crowds. 
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4.7 Discussion and Conclusions 
Despite the clear value of OSS companies in the size of the installed base, OSS companies 
has not shown convincing results in terms of revenues. Where 10 VC-backed CS CMS 
companies have been acquired between 2004 and 2010 for prices ranging from $3mn to 
$1.7bn, only one OS CMS company exited in this period. The biggest acquisition in CMS’s 
history is that of Documentum by ECM which was completed in 2003 for $1.7bn. Three 
major acquisitions were completed in 2010-2011, which include Open Text-Vignette, 
Autonomy-Interwoven and Adobe-Day Software. The only acquisition in OSS happened 
in 2010 when VideoEgg acquired SixApart, the owner of commercial OS CMS 
MovableType. 
Regardless of these successes in the CS CMS world, an increasing number of private 
organizations are embracing OSS (Stone, 2002). The widespread diffusion of OSS in a 
market dominated by CSS is evident (Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003). California-based 
Yodlee Inc., provider of online banking solutions, adopted OSS in 2006. Tim O’Brien, 
senior VP operations, defended their choice of OSS:  
 “It wasn't just the savings that prompted us to go with an open source solution. We 
also believed we could get an open source solution up and running faster than the 
proprietary alternatives. We are sure we’re missing out on some high-end features 
by not going with the big guys, but it doesn't really matter. It's like not having a 
Ferrari; you don't know what it feels like to drive one.”25 
The popularity is not only limited to the private sector, public organizations seem to 
follow in the same direction. For instance, the White House uses Drupal CMS and UK 
government uses Joomla! CMS for their websites. One reason for this is that government 
and not-for-profit organizations seek social attractiveness and acceptability. While it is 
difficult for OS communities to make a transition to OS CMS companies, individual 
developers can set up third-party businesses to increase the intrinsic technology value 
through screening the extensions and debugging them as well as offering professional 
SLAs to their customers. OS CMS communities thus open up several opportunities for 
developers who capture value from the OSS communities. In addition, the perceived 
                                                        
25 Tim O’Brien, Senior VP Operations, Yoodle Inc, as quoted in “Open Source lures cost-conscious CIOs” by 
Shamus McGillicuddy, SearchCIO.com, August 2006. 
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social value gives OS CMS a competitive edge vis-à-vis the CS CMS vendors. This social 
recognition drives investors towards OS where they may realize benefits from investing 
in the community, more than in the product.  
Figure 10: Comparison of value in OS and CS CMS 
 
 
Figure 10 shows the value26 of CS CMS and community OS CMS are orthogonal. The 
former lies at one extreme with the intent of gaining higher economic value, the later 
carries an entirely social mission due to its OSS ideology.   
The revenues per customer realized by commercial OS are much less than in the CS 
environment. However, the number of users is much higher so that the total revenues 
                                                        
26 Economic value is measured as the average of revenues in $mn per customer. Revenues are consulted 
from financial databases Amadeus and Global Reference Solution, while the number of customers are 
consulted from the interview data as well as the company website. The data was collected in Jan 2011. 
Since data is available in Euro, the average value is multiplied by 1.4 to convert the unit of economic value 
to $mn. The economic value of community OS CMS lies in the revenues that third parties make by 
providing products and services for community OS CMS, which is difficult to gauge. As a result, this value 
has not been considered in the graph above.  
Social value is measured as the number of downloads of the OS CMS from Sourceforge.net. Unit of social 
value is the amount in million downloads. Since the number of downloads is not available for CS CMS, the 
social value is considered as the average number of customers. As almost all of these CS CMS companies 
provide a B2B solution, the average number of customers is multiplied by 1000- an assumption of the size 
of their customer base. 
The graph consists of average values of the economic value and social value of all CMS of which data are 
available. Economic value of CS CMS is even higher, considering the fact that only those CS companies that 
have a flagship CMS product have been considered in the graph 
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converge with those of CS CMS vendors. In contrast, community OS CMS fail to generate 
revenues themselves. However community OS affiliated businesses capture a significant 
share of economic value. In other words, ‘going hybrid’ by combining OS and CS aspects 
seems to be the key to success. Individual customers turn to community OSS for their 
free product. Business organizations have started adopting commercial OSS which show 
continuous activity and promise support services. OS community affiliated business 
work in close coordination with OSS communities and act as OSS companies for their 
community OS CMS, thus increasing the value capture for these CMS. 
Nevertheless, increasing interest from VC has been observed in the OS CMS industry. 
Ten CS CMS received an average VC funding of $20mn. The higher investment in CS CMS 
can be accounted to the fact that CS CMS companies have a broader portfolio and not all 
have CMS as their flagship product. On the contrary, four OS CMS companies were 
successful in seizing VC investments averaging $10mn. Alfresco is one example of a 
successful OS CMS company. Established in 2005 in London, it started with a hybrid 
model using a dual-licensing strategy and providing support services. Accel Partners 
provided Alfresco with a seed investment of $2.2mn in 2005. By 2011, Alfresco seized 
VC investment of $20mn and had grown to become a much larger player in the CMS 
industry with revenues of $22mn.   
“Alfresco continues to demonstrate a bit more edge thinking in the world of ECM 
than their commercial counterparts IBM, EMC, Oracle, and Open Text.”27 (Kyle 
McNabb, Principal Analyst, Forrester)  
 While no OS CMS communities were able to attract VC funding, OS community affiliated 
businesses have performed better than CS CMS. An example is Drupal-based Acquia 
which started in 2007 with a seed capital of $7mn and was successful in acquiring 
venture capital funding of $67mn by 2012.  
This illustrates that VCs are interested in robust good-quality software with low 
development costs. They consider OSS as a risky investment due to low revenue 
generating prospects and lack of IP (Aslett, 2009). Investors seem to be interested in OS 
CMS that show promising revenue generating opportunities, i.e. OS community affiliated 
                                                        
27 Kyle McNabb, Principal Analyst, Forrester as quoted on website of Alfresco Software. Online: 
http://www.alfresco.com/about 
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businesses and OSS companies. With no prior studies on VC investment is OSS in the 
management literature, the promising CMS industry opens avenues for further research. 
4.7.1 Managerial Implications 
OSS is usually developed by students and young graduate engineers. Because of their 
familiarity with OSS during their education, an increasing number of engineering 
graduates are acquainted with OSS and stimulate its adoption. However, from a 
company point of view, one should be clear of the purpose and functionality of the OSS if 
an OS strategy is chosen. OSS is likely to have more value in a research environment, 
where people use, reuse and share knowledge and information. The use of OSS and 
contributions to OSS can flourish in such an environment. Students and researchers 
have the freedom to build OSS using existing OSS products. This is a preferred manner 
since they do not need to pay for the software, and they can also improve their 
knowledge by working on the OSS. Along with self-development, peer recognition 
motivates individuals in such a research environment. Such a choice of OSS might not be 
prevalent in the industry context. Many of the OS CMS companies are started by fresh 
graduates from universities, so their choice for OS CMS can be explained by their 
familiarity with OSS rather than by a genuine analysis of market opportunities.  
However, most of these start-ups quickly find it difficult to generate revenues from a 
community-driven and community-owned OSS. One of the necessary conditions to adopt 
a commercial OSS model seems to be that not the community but the newly founded 
company owns a significant part of the OS CMS. Although converting to a commercial OS 
CMS significantly decreases the number of users, there are still a significant number of 
‘users’, which can be converted to ‘customers’ in the commercial OS context. Alfesco, eZ 
Systems, DotNetNuke have been successful in creating loyal customers for their CMS. OS 
CMS communities such as Joomla! generated $0.29mn in 2010 on advertisements, 
merchandising and donations, while Drupal earned $0.8mn in 2010 from conference 
tickets, advertising, sponsorships, memberships and donations. These revenues are 
extremely small in contrast to the OS CMS companies which generated on average 
revenues of $20mn in 2009, mainly through professional services, royalties from dual-
license agreements and royalties from proprietary extensions.        
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Despite the relative success of OS CMS companies, their average revenues of $20mn are 
significantly below the CS CMS ones of $1.4bn. As discussed above, this might be due to 
the fact that the perceived intrinsic value of OS CMS is still lower than that of CS CMS. 
However, it might also indicate that the large ecosystems of users are not fully exploited 
yet and might still offer a significant amount of expectations to investors. Quoting John 
Buswell (2009): 
“Investing in open source is about investing in People instead of investing in a 
Vendor.”  
Among the OS community affiliated businesses, both Acquia (third party behind Drupal) 
and Automattic (third party behind WordPress), were able to secure investments of 
more than $30mn each in the last six years, which illustrates the high expectations VCs 
have from OS community affiliated businesses. This boost in investments can only be 
explained by the high potential that VCs might see in the large user base of a typical OS 
CMS. 
4.7.2 Conclusions 
In this study, we clarify the unclear world of OSS companies and analyze their main 
business models. The business models are being studied in detail in the specific context 
in which OSS has been particularly successful: CMS. We explored the business models in 
the value creation, value delivery and value capture phases, and also studied how both 
OS and CS CMS companies are trying to come closer by adopting hybrid strategies in 
their business models. The results show that in terms of value creation, CS CMS 
companies outperform OS CMS companies in terms of intrinsic value, which 
immediately explains their popularity in the market. In terms of extrinsic value, OS CMS 
companies are much more popular as shown by the number of users. We questioned 
whether OS CMS companies are able to ‘capture’ network externality value. For CS CMS 
vendors, value capture is associated with new mechanisms of value delivery. The 
emergence of cloud computing made it possible to adopt relatively new software models 
such as SaaS where customers are charged by transaction and thus avoid immediate 
investments in licenses which are a sunk cost and only pay back if the CMS is used. OS 
CMS companies do not have sufficient degrees of freedom to adopt innovative value 
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delivery models and thus try to capture value through after-sales services, sometimes 
accompanied by dual-license fees on proprietary extensions of the CMS. 
We concluded that, third-party or OS community affiliated businesses could secure a 
part of the intrinsic value. However in those cases, such as Joomla!, where the 
community rather than a third party orchestrates the developments, this strategy is 
much more difficult. For example, Joomla! could focus on the quality of the community, 
rather than on the quantity, to guarantee robust and working software. These OS 
community affiliated businesses as well as OSS companies have been relatively 
successful in terms of revenues, albeit much less than CS ones. Despite this relatively low 
success, the number of investments in these commercial OS CMS companies and OS 
community affiliated businesses has exponentially increased the last few years. This can 
partly be explained by the typical option taking behavior of VCs which tend to follow 
each other and often confuse OSS with successful trade sales of freemium companies, 
such as Skype or advertising-based companies such as Facebook. However, part of this 
might also be explained by the potential which VCs see in exploiting the relatively large 
user communities which OS CMS companies have in comparison to CS CMS companies. 
These communities might be turned into customers, but the value delivery and value 
capture models remain unclear and provide new avenues for further research. 
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5 Conclusions 
This dissertation is a collection of three studies on value creation in technology-based 
firms (TBFs). The first study addresses the process by which firms use open source 
software (OSS) as a technological and social capital resource when faced with resource 
constraints. In this study, I draw on theories on bricolage and ambidexterity and 
combine them with the literature on OSS. The second study focusses on regional 
ecosystems for value creation. More specifically, I study the knowledge ecosystem, 
business ecosystem and financial support network and their impact on firm 
performance and firm survival. The third study examines how opening up the source 
code, or going ‘open source’, leads to value creation. In this study, I depart from the 
literature on business models and open source (OS) literature and compare business 
models of OSS and closed source software (CSS) companies.  
In this final chapter I summarize the main findings of these three studies. Next, I discuss 
the most important contributions to management science and provide an overview of 
implications in practice. Finally, I present an overview of the limitations of my Ph.D. 
which lead to potential avenues for further research.  
5.1 Main Findings 
In the first study, a qualitative case study research approach is taken on three firms with 
different degrees of resource scarcity to study the technological bricolage process in 
these firms. All these firms bricolage using OSS as a technological and social capital 
resource, but the dependence on OSS varies contingent on the level of resource scarcity. 
Highly resource-constrained firms largely depend on OSS, which are under 
development, and use OSS as a bricolage mechanism to build their value offering and 
exploit the OSS community as a marketing and networking channel. Moderately 
resource-constrained firms exhibit a lower degree of dependence on developed OSS and 
mostly bricolage in order to quickly satisfy unexpected customer demands. Firms with 
low resource constraints are least dependent on OSS but use mature OSS as a 
prototyping tool to gain credibility within the firm. Further, a link between bricolage and 
exploration-exploitation is observed. While bricolage in highly resource-constrained 
firms is an exploitative process by nature, moderately resource-constrained firms are 
able to exhibit ambidexterity in the bricolage process. Firms with low resource 
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constraints are more explorative by nature which confirms their risk taking behavior of 
using OSS in radical innovations. 
In the second study, I challenge the implicit assumption that a knowledge ecosystem 
leads to a business ecosystem which can empower participating companies with a 
competitive advantage. This empirical study of regional innovation systems in the region 
of Flanders in Belgium analyses the knowledge ecosystem, the business ecosystem and 
the financial support system of 138 innovative start-ups in Flanders. I find that the 
knowledge ecosystem is strongly developed in Flanders and is concentrated around a 
number of central actors. The density of the knowledge ecosystem is much higher than 
that of the business ecosystem and is dominated by knowledge institutes which have 
developed incubator facilities and formal technology transfer offices. On the contrary, a 
business ecosystem is non-existent and the financial support system is present but 
almost 100% publicly backed. Neither the knowledge ecosystem nor the financial 
support network translates into a business ecosystem at a regional level.  Further, it is 
found that working together with the top central actors in the knowledge ecosystem has 
a positive impact on the innovation output of innovative start-ups, while collaboration 
with average technology partners typically has a negative impact. Moreover, receiving 
financial support from public funds does not impact the innovation output in a positive 
way. Lastly, neither the knowledge ecosystem nor the financial support network directly 
contributes to the short-term survival of innovative start-ups. 
The third study is a qualitative study of business models in OSS and CSS companies. The 
business models are compared on three components: value creation, value delivery and 
value capture. This study extends the literature on business models and OSS by showing 
how value can be created from an installed base and complementary goods. Opening up 
the source code and making it (partially) available to the public enables companies to 
build up a network and to increase their installed base, thereby leading to value 
creation. It is found that OSS companies excel in value creation while CSS companies 
excel in value delivery and value capture. The business models of both these types of 
software companies are converging due to the threat posed by OSS communities which 
have led to the rise of several OSS community affiliated businesses. Albeit the low 
economic success, venture capitalists (VC) seem to have noticed the potential of OSS in 
the magnitude of its installed base. This is confirmed by the increasing VC investments 
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in OSS companies. Third-party businesses based on OSS, or OSS community affiliated 
ventures, are found to be benefiting from the existing OSS community and installed base, 
and seem to be flourishing by orchestrating the developments in OSS communities.  
5.2 Implications 
5.2.1 Implications for Management Science 
The findings in the first study have important implications for the bricolage literature. 
Many studies on bricolage have implicitly assumed that bricolage takes place only in the 
start-up phase where companies face severe resource constraints. My study implies that 
bricolage occurs irrespective of the level of resource scarcity or the development stage 
in the company life cycle, and that SMEs, VC-backed firms as well as departments in 
large firms engage in bricolage. The findings provide insights into how bricolage can be 
used to access technological resources in rapidly changing resource-constrained 
environments and into the heterogeneity of these environments with respect to 
different levels of resource scarcity within the firm. The findings further imply that 
bricolage occurs in a different stage of the company life cycle with the aim of serving a 
different purpose in each firms. Secondly, the study extends the emerging OSS literature 
by presenting OSS as an opportunity space and as a technological and social capital 
resource for bricolage in resource-constrained firms. The study also contributes to the 
OSS literature by highlighting the heterogeneity of the contexts in which it can be 
applied in technological firms. Lastly, the study builds upon the literature on 
organizational ambidexterity. The main contribution of the study is that it uncovers a 
link between bricolage and exploration-exploitation.  
The second study makes contributions to the literature on ecosystems. It is implicitly 
assumed that a well-developed knowledge ecosystem leads to a business ecosystem. My 
results show that this is not true in all cases; the regional innovation system in Flanders 
has an excellent knowledge ecosystem, while a business ecosystem is completely absent. 
The findings imply the importance of government policies and incentives to spur 
regional innovation. While several funds are available for innovative start-ups, 
government needs to promote participation of large firms in building a business 
ecosystem. The study further contributes to the knowledge ecosystems literature by 
confirming the importance of a dense knowledge ecosystem and the positive impact of 
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the presence of top technology partners on firm performance. Additionally, the study 
investigates the importance of private VCs as a potential link between the knowledge 
and business ecosystems. The study implies that cross-regional and cross-border VC 
investments can help the development of business ecosystem.  Finally, the study extends 
the importance of a value network or a business ecosystem, since neither a technology 
partner nor a financial partner is able to predict the short-term firm survival. 
The results of the third study contribute to the literature on OSS and business models. 
Business models in OSS have been popular in practice, but have received scant attention 
in management literature. The findings imply that OSS companies can compete with CSS 
companies based on the social value they create. The results suggest that the installed 
base and complementary goods add more value to OSS companies than the intrinsic 
technology value. The study contributes further to the business model literature by 
uncovering detailed business models of firms in a specific sector. The study also 
investigates the evolution of business models towards achieving a best of both worlds. 
Lastly, the findings contribute to the VC literature where research on potential in OSS 
has been sidelined. The study suggests VCs to refine their selection criteria and consider 
investments in OSS taking into account the prospects presented by its installed base.   
5.2.2 Implications for Practice 
Besides the contributions to management science, this doctoral dissertation also 
generated some interesting insights for practice. The findings and insights from this 
doctoral study are useful and relevant for entrepreneurs, managers and investors and 
reveal some interesting implications for policy makers. 
The first study mainly provides guidelines for entrepreneurs and managers. 
Entrepreneurs setting up start-ups based on OSS should carefully choose OSS, after 
studying the OSS license conditions. While some licenses allow entire freedom of use of 
software, other licenses can be quite restrictive in building a proprietary product from 
OSS. As a result, entrepreneurs are better off offering services, rather than products, for 
OSS. The installed base serves a potential customer base for these services. 
Entrepreneurs need to understand that the exploitation of OSS can limit technology 
exploration leading to short-term success. Responding to environmental changes can 
prevent them from getting trapped in the exploitation phase. Additionally, 
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entrepreneurs are more likely to profit from developing an active OSS for which 
development is less likely to cease abruptly. Managers in SMEs are presented with the 
most opportunities by OSS. The key to success for managers in SMEs is to balance 
exploration and exploitation by contributing back to the development of the OSS they 
embrace in order to gain long-term results from the OSS. Since large organizations 
cross-license their products and have strong secrecy and IP protection, while 
incorporating OSS in their products, managers should carefully study the OSS license 
conditions in order to avoid future lawsuits. They can use OSS as a prototyping tool or 
an artifact in communication within the organization, also referred to as sense making 
by Stigliani and Ravasi (2012). While exploring opportunities within OSS, managers 
should make quick decisions and prevent themselves from trapping in the endless loop 
of search and change.      
The second study, on the other hand, mainly has implications for policy makers. My 
study claims that anchor organizations which facilitate the connection between different 
players in the ecosystem (Powell et al., 2010) are absent in Flanders. Universities 
receive funding in order to set up technology transfer offices to support spin-offs and 
facilitate commercialization of research. These funds do not seem to transfer logic 
between the different players in the ecosystem. This is reflected by the absence of an 
impact by financial partners on innovation output and firm survival. Private VCs can 
play an important role in bridging this gap, since public funds add little value to building 
a complex network of relationships across different industry players. Secondly, a 
business ecosystem is clearly lacking in Flanders. None of the leading companies plays 
the role of an anchor organization as is the case in USA where anchor organizations help 
in building a strong business ecosystem. Government should encourage large 
companies, such as telecom operators and television stations, to play a role in nurturing 
innovative start-ups in the region. Public procurement policies, such as the SBIR28 
programme in USA which incentivizes large companies to invest part of their budget in 
regional innovative start-ups, can provide a stimulus to the creation of a business 
ecosystem. Global firms can also play a key role in business ecosystem creation. Policies 
to attract global firms will prove advantageous to the regional innovation system. 
Thirdly, as technology transfer offices and public research organizations are successful 
                                                        
28 Ibid. 13 
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in developing a local knowledge ecosystem (Whittington et al., 2009), policy makers 
should consider supporting similar functions at large established companies. Dedicated 
innovation managers in large firms can be assigned the task of developing initiatives to 
promote collaboration with local, innovative start-ups. Such collaboration can promote 
sustainable growth for start-ups and, as stated by Iansiti and Levien (2004), a healthy 
business ecosystem needs a healthy keystone and healthy innovative start-ups. Lastly, 
there is a need for a policy to develop a financial network beyond the public sector. 
Stimulation of business angels and incubator activity, and cross national or cross-
regional venture capital provisions might prove to be successful incentives.  
The third study has several implications for entrepreneurs developing OSS or starting-
up ventures based on OSS- OSS companies or OSS community affiliated businesses. From 
a business point of view, entrepreneurs should be clear of the purpose and functionality 
of OSS, if they choose to follow the OS way. OSS is likely to have more value and is more 
likely to flourish in research environments, where people use, reuse and share 
knowledge and information. Entrepreneurs can benefit from a thorough market analysis 
before starting-up OSS community affiliated businesses. The study also suggests 
developers of OSS software to be careful when choosing to set up OSS companies. 
Contributors are reluctant to contribute to the development of software which is owned 
by a company. Thus, in order to create an installed base, developers should clearly think 
of a better revenue model other than dual licensing where part of the code might be 
available only to paying customers. Lastly, the study also has implications for VCs and 
investors. While VCs invest in companies with promising cash flows, they need to look 
beyond economic value and focus on social value. Facebook, LinkedIn, Skype etc. have 
already accentuated the power of the installed base and networks. Similarly, the power 
of OSS lies in the community behind it. Therefore, VCs should not only look at the 
potential of the revenue model, but also at the breadth of the installed base.  
5.3 Limitations and Directions for Further Research 
As any doctoral dissertation, this study not only provided answers to the research 
questions posed but also led to additional research questions and avenues for further 
research. Our first study contains a number of limitations that open the door for future 
research. Firstly, although detailed, the number of case studies can limit the 
generalization of results across all firms. It would be valuable to explore the bricolage 
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process for a broader sample in a longitudinal study across the entire life cycle of the 
firm, as it can strengthen the research on exploration-exploitation during the bricolage 
process. The challenge here is to identify firms with lower resource constraints that 
bricolage using OSS and openly acknowledge their use of OSS. In a similar way, a 
detailed study of OSS adoption across all departments within large firms can shed light 
on the level of bricolage and exploration-exploitation across the firm, which can help us 
fine tune our results. We are also in deep need of an understanding of the factors that 
clearly differentiate exploration and exploitation in highly resource-constrained firms. 
The bricolage process is more prevalent in these firms since they face resource scarcity 
at start up. Resource constraints persuade these firms to use and leverage OSS to 
innovate and create value. Given that OSS is easily available in the market, to explain 
whether and how differences in usage of OSS can create differences in innovation and 
value proposition in highly resource-constrained firms can be a critical question for 
future research. Developing key constructs to measure how these firms capture value 
can also be an interesting research avenue.   
Limitations in our second study on value creation in ecosystems present several 
opportunities for further research. First, our context is related to a small region in one 
country, which may not be representative of all types of regions. As spatial context may 
have an important influence on entrepreneurial and innovative ecosystems (Zahra and 
Wright, 2011). Further research is needed both to compare similar regions in other 
countries and also to compare our findings with different contexts. For example, future 
studies might consider matched pairs of research intensive regions in Europe (Clarysse 
et al., 2005) to revisit the ecosystem questions addressed in this study. Further, from a 
national perspective, different geographical locations may involve different ecosystems 
some of which are local while some have cross-regional and cross-country elements. 
Second, social contexts for entrepreneurship and innovation are heterogeneous (Wright, 
2014). The structure and dynamics of knowledge and business ecosystems may differ 
both across sectors and the phases of the life-cycle of the development of innovation 
start-ups. Further, as these start-ups emerge, they may need to enter and disrupt pre-
existing ecosystems. As yet, little is known about how these processes work. Third, I use 
very simple measures of innovation output and economic performance.  Future research 
might explore these into more depth by looking at a mix of short-term and long-term 
measures. Innovation outputs can be further refined by adding a citation impact as a 
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long-term quality measure, while economic performance can be further developed into 
measures of long-term success such as IPO, profitability and sustainable growth (de 
Saint-Georges and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2013; van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie, 2011). However, survival is the short-term focus of most innovative start-ups 
and it is the most straightforward performance measure. By controlling for the industry 
and the availability of venture capital, I overcome the most important cross-sectorial 
differences in survival rates. Hence, our analysis of the determinants becomes stronger. 
Finally, I included universities as part of the knowledge ecosystem but further research 
might focus on examining the circumstances under which a university could be 
considered as an ecosystem and how this interacts with knowledge and business 
ecosystems. The literature on universities as research partners suggests an important 
role for universities in creating basic research awareness and its challenges in public-
private funded projects at the pre-commercial stage (Hall et al., 2003). The related 
academic engagement literature covers a wide-range of activities between academics 
and industry partners and tends to emphasize individual and department level 
engagement (Perkmann et al., 2013). The links between pre-commercialization 
engagement (knowledge) and subsequent commercialization (business) and the 
challenges in developing them to create an ecosystem have, however, been neglected. 
Studies could attempt to identify and analyze cases where universities operate as such 
ecosystems and, for example, develop a typology of the kind of knowledge and 
commercialization that lends itself to different types of ecosystems.  
The last study on business models is limited to a single domain of content management 
systems. Although the focus on a single domain helps in in-depth research, questions 
remain whether the results can be generalized for other domains and industries. While 
OSS has had more than its share of popularity in ICT sector, an interesting research 
avenue would be to study how OSS is embraced in other industries. Moreover, the most 
successful OSS cases with respect to VC investments have been Red Hat Linux, MySQL, 
SugarCRM, not to forget Acquia and Alfresco in the area of content management 
systems. With fragmented research on VC investment in OSS, additional research with 
VCs could help shed light on their search and selection strategy and their expectations 
from investments in OSS.   
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5.4 Discussion 
The resource-based view of a firm has been dominant in explaining the importance of 
resources for creating competitive advantage for a firm (Barney, 1991). While 
possession of rare and valuable resources can be advantageous, the resources are 
insignificant if not managed in an optimal way (Barney and Arikan, 2001). Firms need to 
acquire, develop, incorporate and leverage resources to create and maintain value. In 
absence of valuable resources at start-up or initial growth phase, value creation is 
crucial for the development of TBFs in order for them to innovate and survive (Ireland 
et al., 2003). The three studies of my doctoral dissertation depict diverse mechanisms 
using which TBFs acquire, use, develop and manage their resources in a fine way to 
create value for the firm.  
The first mechanism of bricolage discusses acquisition and use of freely-available 
resources for value creation. Ecosystems emphasize the strength of partner networks in 
developing resources in order to create value. Lastly, studying the business model 
allows for the development of technological and network value using the power of 
community. This triad comprising of bricolage, an ecosystem and a business model 
focusses attention on managing resources for value creation in TBFs. These three 
studies build up the understanding of processes that TBFs can implement to start with 
value creation for the organization, and then proceed further to create value for its 
employees, stakeholders, society and environment. 
Bricolage using OSS as a resource provides TBFs with the access to technology to 
develop their products or services or to enhance their existing product portfolio. This is 
crucial in uncertain environments where TBFs are constantly constrained with time and 
money. The OSS also acts as a social capital by connecting the TBFs to a pool of like-
minded knowledgeable people in the community which acts as an informal partner for 
supporting their technology. The use of OSS as technological and social capital resource 
functions as an importance source of value creation.  
Further, regional innovation systems benefit new and young TBFs more than 
established competitors. The presence of a strong knowledge ecosystem clearly signals 
the importance of research and development within the region. Knowledge ecosystems 
are breeding grounds for technology, and the presence of reputed universities and PROs 
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provides TBFs with multiple technological resources. The presence of a business 
ecosystem may pave the way for potential social capital resources that TBFs seek. The 
current alternative for a business ecosystem as a social capital resource is the 
university-industry collaboration which presents certain networking opportunities, 
although still in its infancy. 
Lastly, the business model is a tool that allows a firm to reflect on its existing capabilities 
and resources. For new and young TBFS, business models are unclear and are subject to 
constant change pertaining to the rapid changes in technology. My study shows that not 
only the standalone value of the technology but also the social network value enhances 
the value creation for TBFs. This underlines the importance of using and developing 
both technological and social capital resources for value creation.  
These three mechanisms allow the firm to seek and develop the resources that they 
might need to cope with the drastic changes in the industry. Not only does the triad of 
bricolage, the ecosystem and the business model help the TBFs in pursuing resources, it 
also facilitates easy adaption of their product development processes contingent on 
industry expectations in order to innovate and create value for the organization. Value 
can be created from both incremental and radical innovation, however TBFs need to 
efficiently manage and explore resources for innovation, taking into account the risks 
involved. As a general conclusion for this dissertation, we propose further research on 
this triad with respect to resource management and value creation for TBFs. 
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Appendix A: Characteristics of Interview Data 
Interviewee CMS 
 Name 
Founding  
year 
Type of 
 CMS 
Based in  Position 
A CMS1 2001 Community OS 
 
Founder 
B CMS2 2009 Community OS 
 
Founder 
C CMS3 2005 Community OS 
 
Development coordinator 
D  CMS3 2005 Community OS 
 
President 
E CMS4 2008 Community OS 
 
Co-founder 
F  CMS5 2004 Community OS 
 
Co-founder 
G  CMS6 2001 Community OS 
 
Founder 
H  CMS7 2001 Community OS 
 
Board of Director and 
Developer 
I CMS7 2001 Community OS 
 
Core Developer 
J  CMS8* 2003 Commercial OS USA Founder 
K  CMS9 2006 Commercial OS USA CEO 
L  CMS10 2005 Commercial OS UK Co-founder 
M  CMS11 2004 Commercial OS USA CEO 
N  CMS12 2006 Commercial OS France CMO 
O  CMS13* 2000 Commercial OS New Zealand Founder 
P  CMS14 2006 Commercial OS Germany CEO 
Q CMS15 2005 Commercial OS Denmark Lead Developer 
R CMS16 2003 Commercial OS USA Founder 
S CMS17 1999 Commercial OS Norway VP Community 
T CMS18 2001 CS USA VP Communications 
U CMS19** 2004 CS USA Director Product Management 
V CMS20 2006 CS USA Co-founder 
W CMS21 2001 CS USA Sales Manager 
X CMS22 2000 CS USA Founder 
Y CMS23 2001 CS USA Founder 
Z  CMS24 2005 CS Germany VP Global Marketing 
AA CMS25 2004 CS 
Czech 
Republic CEO 
AB CMS26 2000 CS USA President 
AC CMS27 2001 CS Denmark Regional Sales Director 
AD CMS27 2001 CS Denmark CEO 
      
 
*started as CS, moved to OS  
  
 
** acquired in 2010 
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Appendix B: List of Data Sources 
 
Extensive Archives 
Variable Source 
Acquisition data Factiva Database (Press releases), Corporates websites, Zephyr 
Database 
Capital Investment data Factiva Database (Press releases), Corporate Websites, VentureSource 
Database 
Data on OSS projects and 
Licenses 
Sourceforge.net 
Financial Data (Revenues, IPO) Amadeus Database, Global Reference Solution Database, Corporate 
Websites 
List of content management 
systems (CMS) 
Websites such as CMS Review, CMS wire, CMS Matrix, CMS Match  
Market Reports from Gartner, RealStory Group and Water & Stone 
CMS ownership Corporate websites, archives 
CMS downloads Sourceforge.net, Corporate websites 
CMS founding and activity Corporate websites 
CMS Licensing information  Corporate websites 
Product/Service portfolio Corporate websites 
Customer portfolio Corporate websites 
Value capture/ revenue 
generation mechanisms 
Corporate websites, Factiva Database (Press releases) 
 
Survey 
An online survey was distributed via Joomla! portal, blog posts, and Joomla! forums to address extension 
developers and service providers of Joomla! OS CMS. Amongst others, questions regarding the value 
proposition, contribution to Joomla! and/or other OSS, marketing channels, distribution methods and 
revenue models were addressed. The exact response rate is difficult to calculate for such a sample as it is 
difficult to know the precise population size. The survey yielded 171 valid responses, including 57 
responses from extension developers and 114 service providers. 
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Conferences 
 The Next Web Conference, Amsterdam, April 2009 
 DrupalCon, Paris, September 2009  
 Joomla!® Day, New York, October 2009 
 DrupalCon, San Francisco, April 2010 
 CMS Expo, Chicago, May 2010 
 J & Beyond, 1st International Joomla!® conference, Wiesbaden, Germany, June 2010. 
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“Arise! Awake! And stop not until the goal is reached.” 
                                                     ~ Swami Vivekananda 
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